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Security has been a growing concern for large organizations, especially financial and gov-
ernmental institutions, as security breaches in the systems they depend have repeatedly
resulted in losses of billions per year, and this cost is on the rise. A primary reason for
these breaches is the “socio-technical” nature of today’s systems that consist of an amal-
gam of social and human actors, processes, technology and infrastructure. We refer to
such systems as Socio-Technical Systems (STSs). Finding secure solutions for STSs is a
difficult and error-prone task because of their heterogeneity and complexity.
The thesis proposes a holistic security requirements analysis framework which catego-
rizes system security concerns into three layers, including a social layer (social actors and
business processes), a software layer (software applications that support the social layer)
and an infrastructure layer (physical infrastructure, hardware, and devices). Within each
layer, security requirements are elicited, and security mechanisms are designed to satisfy
the security requirements. In particular, a cross-layer support link is defined to capture
how security mechanisms deployed at one layer influence security requirements of the next
layer down, allowing us to systematically and iteratively analyze security for all three
layers and eventually produce holistic security solutions for the systems.
To ensure the quality of the analysis of our approach and to promote practical adop-
tion of the three-layer approach, the thesis includes two additional components. Firstly,
we propose a holistic attack analysis, which takes an attacker’s perspective to explore re-
alistic attacks that can happen to a system and thus contributes to the identification of
critical security requirements. This approach consists of an attack strategy identification
method which analyzes attacker’s alternative malicious intentions, and an attack strategy
operationalization method which analyzes realistic attack actions that can be performed by
attackers. Secondly, the thesis proposes a systematic approach for selecting and applying
security patterns, which describe proven security solutions to known security problems.
As such, analysts with little security knowledge can efficiently leverage reusable security
knowledge to operationalize security requirements in terms of security mechanisms. This
approach also allows us to systematically analyze and enforce the impact of deployed se-
curity mechanisms on system functional specifications.
We have developed a prototype tool, which implements the formalized analysis methods
of our three-layer framework and enables the semi-automatic application of our proposal.
With the help of the tool, we apply our framework to two large-scale case studies so as to
validate the efficacy of our approach.
Keywords[Security Requirements Engineering, Socio-Technical Systems, Goal Models,
Security Patterns, Security Attacks]
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Security is a chain; it’s only as secure as the weakest link.
Bruce Schneier
Security has been a growing concern for large organizations, especially financial and
governmental institutions, as security breaches in the systems they depend have repeat-
edly resulted in losses of billions per year, and this cost is on the rise. According to
Ponemon Institute, the average total cost of a data breach for the 350 companies partici-
pating in their study was 3.79 million dollars in 2015 [Ponemon, 2015]. The breaches are
caused by a broad scope of factors, including trusted insiders (inadvertent or malicious),
malware, SQL injections, and hijacked devices, etc. A primary reason for these breaches
is the “socio-technical” nature of today’s systems that consist of social and human actors,
processes, technology and infrastructure. We refer to such systems as Socio-Technical
Systems (STSs). In this chapter, we discuss the complexity of STSs, as well as the chal-
lenges which arise when designing secure STSs. Then, we present a three-layer security
requirements analysis framework, which addresses those challenges and eventually gener-
ates holistic security solutions that satisfy security requirements of STSs.
1.1 Complexity of Socio-Technical Systems
Socio-Technical Systems (STSs) are an amalgam of people and technology. In contrast to
vanilla software systems, STSs extend their system boundary to include additional com-
ponents, such as social and human actors, business processes and physical infrastructure,
to better support the achievement of strategic and tactical objectives.
Consider a smart grid advanced metering infrastructure as a typical STS. In order
to dynamically regulate the energy price according to the energy load, we need not only
an energy management application, but also an effective business process for generating
2 Introduction
and distributing energy prices, as well as a well-deployed physical infrastructure. Incorrect
design of any of these components will impair the satisfaction of stakeholder requirements.
In addition to a broader scope of concerns, the design of an STS must not ignore
interactions among different components, since the design of one system component can
influence another. In the smart grid example, the design of the price generation process
determines the features of the energy management application, and which physical devices
should be deployed according to the applications they host (e.g., if an application needs to
communicate with other applications, then the host device should be deployed to connect
to a network).
1.2 Challenges in Designing Secure STSs
Expanded system boundary. Thanks to an expanded system boundary, STSs are able
to provide advanced functionality catering to more challenging requirements. However,
on the security side, an expanded system boundary actually presents a larger attack
surface than before, and thus introduces more challenges to the protection of STSs. A
common cause for many breaches in STSs is that security solutions are not designed
in a holistic fashion. Rather, they are dealt with in a piecemeal fashion, by different
analysts, using different analysis techniques, and focusing on different components of STS
(e.g., processes, software, hardware). For example, Mitnick and Simon [2005, 2011] focus
on analyzing social attacks and corresponding countermeasures; Ju¨rjens [2002] proposes
UMLsec for designing secure software applications; Weingart [2000] surveys and discuss
known physical attacks and present corresponding security methods. Such approaches
cannot guarantee the overall security of an STS, and may lead to security gaps and
vulnerabilities for parts of the system. It is worth noting that providing holistic protection
for STSs does not imply putting all related security mechanisms into the system design,
although such design can probably satisfy the system security requirements. Security is
not free: the more security mechanisms a system applies, the more expensive the system
is, with system performance and usability likely suffering as well. Regarding information
security, good enough always beats perfect, and the big challenge is determining what is
good enough [Sandhu, 2003]. Consequently, the challenges are not only producing security
specifications for each component of STSs, but also orchestrating them in an appropriate
way in order to produce a cost-effective security solution.
Dealing with security issues during the requirements phase has been recognized as
an efficient way of reducing security cost, as the earlier security flaws are detected, the
less money is paid for security remedies. In particular, Hoo et al. [2001] have reported
that introducing security analysis in the early stage of the system development cycle
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can reduce costs related to software development and maintenance from 12-21%. Security
Requirements Engineering, as a research branch, has been founded on the need to analyze
security requirements early on, along with other requirements, instead of as an after-
thought. Over the last two decades, many approaches have been proposed to model,
elicit, and evaluate security requirements. Some of these approaches focus on the social
and organizational aspect of a system [Liu et al., 2003; Giorgini et al., 2005a; Mouratidis
and Giorgini, 2007a; Paja et al., 2013]; some others investigate security requirements
regarding the business processes of a system [Herrmann and Herrmann, 2006; Rodr´ıguez
et al., 2011; Salnitri et al., 2014a]; most of these approaches analyze software security
requirements [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005; Van Lamsweerde et al., 2007; Haley et al., 2008;
Hatebur et al., 2006] However, when designing secure STSs, we need a holistic approach
that spans all layers of an STS, rather than just one.
Multistage attacks. Multistage attacks have been recognized as a growing threat for
any complex systems, including STSs. Multistage attacks are comprised of less dangerous
attack actions (or even harmless ones) and are difficult to be detected, imposing their
challenges to system security [Ourston et al., 2003]. Due to their complex nature, STSs
have become the ideal target of multistage attacks. As a result, there has been a sub-
stantial increase of multistage attacks on STSs [Mitnick and Simon, 2011, Ch. 11]. For
example, to break into an intranet of a company, an attacker might first harvest employee
email addresses via social information gathering attacks (dumpster diving, pretexting,
etc.); then the attacker sends emails to employees to convince them to install malware in
their computers; with the malware, the attacker is able to penetrate into the intranet of
the company. To deal with such multistage attacks in STSs, we need to not only capture
all attack techniques to different components of STSs, but also analyze all potential attack
strategies that present specific ways of composing atomic attack actions.
Much work has been done to analyze multistage attacks for network security by using
attack graphs [Phillips and Swiler, 1998; Sheyner et al., 2002]. In particular, such ap-
proaches leverage model checking techniques to automatically examine all possible pene-
tration paths that attackers may have. A key factor to the success of these approaches is
that computers in the network have homogeneous settings. As such, the states of the com-
puters (nodes in the attack graph) and the atomic attacks on these computers (transitions
in the attack graph) can be enumerated. Similarly, a recent proposal applies the attack
graph approach to analyze multistage attacks of social engineering, where the states of
people are modeled as nodes and social engineering attacks are captured as transitions
between nodes [Beckers et al., 2015]. However, as the attack graph approach only applies
to systems that have simple and homogeneous components, it is inappropriate for security
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analysis of complex STSs that have heterogeneous components.
Availability of security knowledge. As the components of STSs are by their nature
heterogeneous, each one of them raises different security concerns. This implies that
designers need to have considerable security knowledge. For example, in order to design
a secure business process, analysts should ensure safe task assignment, no conflicts of
interest, etc.; while for a secure software application, analysts should consider software
technical phenomena, e.g., encryption, suitable access controls, regular software patches;
when designing secure infrastructure, analysts should take into account physical issues
(e.g, locks, uninterrupted energy suppliers) . Ensuring that such broad security knowledge
is available during the design process constitutes yet another challenge.
Failing to solve this challenge will render the holistic security analysis too time con-
suming and laborious, preventing the practical adoption of our framework. A recent study
acknowledges such a challenge, especially because security knowledge is hard to acquire
for software designers in reality [Souag et al., 2015]. As a result, the authors of the study
advocate for reuse of provable security knowledge, which can make security requirements
analysis much easier, more in-depth, and faster. In addition, the authors also emphasize
that the knowledge sources have to be of high quality and must be applied in a correct
and effective manner. Otherwise, the security analysis results may not be reliable, and
may even introduce new security problems.
1.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions
Based on the context and challenges we have discussed in the previous sections, we now
present the overall research objective of this thesis.
Research Objective : develop a comprehensive framework that assists security ana-
lysts in analyzing security requirements and generating security solutions for socio-technical
systems in a holistic manner.
We decompose this research objective into the following specific research questions, all
of which are addressed by this thesis.
RQ1: How can we holistically analyze the security requirements of STSs?
The holistic analysis needs to appropriately deal with the challenges concerning com-
plexity and heterogeneity. Due to the increased system boundary of STSs, analyzing
security requirements of STSs becomes much more complex. For one thing, analysts
have to take into account all components of STSs, and their heterogeneity, in order
to provide comprehensive protection. For another, analysts also need to appropri-
ately orchestrate security requirements of different components to obtain the most
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cost-effective solution. Moreover, the heterogeneity of STSs entails that different
system components involve different security concerns. Thus, a general conceptual
framework is required to unify security requirements analysis for all the components.
RQ2: How can we identify realistic threats to an STS?
Threat identification has been recognized as an important step for engineering se-
curity requirements by many researchers [Mead and Stehney, 2005; Mellado et al.,
2007], because it helps analysts to determine the criticality of security requirements,
so that they can design suitable security solutions.
As any single vulnerability or exposure of any component of an STS can lead to
serious security breaches, identifying all potential threats to an STS becomes more
important and at the same time challenging. This challenge is exacerbated by the in-
creasing prevalence of multistage attacks, which adopt more sophisticated strategies
and consist of multiple attack actions, exploiting vulnerabilities of different system
components. Moreover, a lack of knowledge about impending attacks introduces an-
other challenge to threat analysis, which can result in unrealistic threats and further
introduce false positives or false negatives into security analysis [Barnum and Sethi,
2007].
RQ3: How can we efficiently operationalize security requirements?
Once obtaining critical security requirements and corresponding threats, we further
investigate how to operationalize the security requirements in terms of security mech-
anisms which can tackle the threats. Since such analysis requires intensive security
knowledge, we base our analysis on security patterns, which document proven secu-
rity solutions to known security problems. Specifically, we leverage security patterns
from different repositories which contain more than 100 security patterns, accommo-
dating security analysis in different layers [Asnar et al., 2011a; Yskout et al., 2006;
Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]. However, such security patterns are normally specified
in text which can only be manually selected and applied by analysts. Given the large
number of patterns, a systematic methodology is required to efficiently leverage se-
curity patterns to operationalize security requirements. In addition, after a security
requirement has been operationalized by one or several security mechanisms, a subse-
quent challenge is to efficiently identify and enforce the impact of these mechanisms
imposed on system functional requirements, otherwise the resulting requirements
specification is incomplete.
RQ4: Can we apply the developed approach to effectively analyze security
requirements of STSs in realistic settings?
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As a design artifact, our proposal needs to be appropriately validated, which is
an imperative part of achieving methodological soundness [Wieringa and Heerkens,
2006]. As our framework is intended to provide automated reasoning support for
the holistic security requirements analysis, we need to first implement corresponding
analysis methods in a prototype tool. With the support of the tool, we need to collect
empirical evidence to validate the efficacy of our framework when it is applied to
realistic large-scale STSs. In particular, we focus on evaluating whether the entire
approach can effectively identify holistic security requirements of STSs and efficiently
deal with the complexity of large-scale STSs. Furthermore, we should also evaluate
the utility of the supporting tool.
1.4 Research Overview and Contribution
This thesis proposes a three-layer security requirements analysis framework, which can
holistically analyze security requirements of STSs and eventually generate holistic security
solutions that satisfy the security requirements. The contributions of the thesis consist of
four parts, shown schematically in Fig. 1.1. Specifically, we propose a three-layer security
requirements modeling framework to holistically capture phenomena of STSs and a com-
panion analysis framework which analyzes security requirements across all three layers.
We have developed a prototype tool to implement the proposed analysis methods so as
to semi-automate the overall analysis process. Finally, we perform two comprehensive
cases studies to validate our proposal. In the remaining part of this section, we describe
the above contributions in detail. For each contribution, we list relevant publications and
research questions addressed.
1.4.1 A Three-Layer Security Requirements Modeling Framework
In order to deal with the inherit complexity of STSs, we structure an STS into three con-
ceptual layers, each of which accounts for particular artifacts that need to be designed in
the STS. At the most abstract level, we consider a social layer that conceptualized in terms
of social actors, social dependencies, and business process activities. At the next layer,
we consider software applications that support the social layer, conceptualized in terms
of architectural components. Finally, we consider an infrastructure layer which focuses
on physical infrastructure that supports deployment of software applications and business
processes. We argue that each layer involves specific security solutions that deal with
particular security requirements of that layer. For example, separation of duty ensures
the service integrity in the social layer, while secure pipe is deployed to tackle confiden-
tiality issues in the application layer. Thus, a holistic security requirements analysis of
















































Figure 1.1: An overview of our holistic security requirements analysis framework
STSs requires us to identify security requirements and generate security solutions in all
the three layers.
To deal with the requirements of STSs, we base our framework on the requirements
problem defined by Zave and Jackson [1997], i.e., finding a collection of specifications,
which can satisfy all requirements under certain domain assumptions. In particular, we
extend the Zava and Jackson’s requirements ontology and re-formulate the requirements
problem to account for requirements of STSs based on the three-layer structure. Thus,
each layer has its own requirements, which are satisfied by layer-specific specifications un-
der corresponding domain assumptions. To model and analyze the extended requirements
problem of STSs, we propose a three-layer security requirements modeling language based
on existing goal modeling languages i* [Yu, 1997] and Techne [Jureta et al., 2008]. The
proposed language can model not only the layer-specific security requirements and secu-
rity solutions, but also the dependencies across layers. As such, it provides the foundation
for holistically analyzing security requirements throughout three layers.
Contributions to literature. Existing requirements modeling languages, such
as [Dardenne et al., 1993; Yu, 1997; Jureta et al., 2008], do not explicitly account for
8 Introduction
requirements of different artifacts of STSs (business processes, physical infrastructures,
etc.). We extend Zave and Jackson’s core RE ontology [Zave and Jackson, 1997] and
re-formulate the requirements problem, providing the theoretical foundation for dealing
with requirements of STSs. The proposed modeling language can be used to model secu-
rity requirements and security mechanisms for various artifacts involved in STSs, while
capturing the interrelationships among them. As such, the modeling language enables us
to deal with requirements of STSs using a divide and conquer approach [Knuth, 1998,
p.159], which can reduce the complexity of security requirements analysis of STSs.
Publications: Li and Horkoff [2014].
Addressed research questions: RQ1.
1.4.2 A Three-Layer Security Requirements Analysis Framework
Based on the three-layer requirements modeling framework, we propose a comprehensive
set of analysis methods to holistically analyze security requirements of STSs in three layers.
In the top-left part in Fig. 1.1, an overall process of the three-layer analysis framework is
presented, which iteratively refines, simplifies, operationalizes security goals in each layer,
and transfers security concerns from one layer to the next layer down. In subsequent
work, two analysis steps have been further elaborated to tackle particular challenges that
we encountered during the evaluation of the holistic analysis framework. Firstly, a holistic
attack analysis approach is proposed to holistically identify all potential attacks that are
related to security goals. Secondly, we propose a security pattern-based analysis approach
to support security goal operationalization. This framework takes security goals as input,
then effectively selects and applies appropriate security patterns to operationalize the
security goals. In the rest of this section, we introduce the overall analysis process and
the two supporting analysis approaches, respectively.
Holistic security requirements analysis process
Based on the three-layer structure, we propose a systematic process and a set of analysis
methods to guide security analysis both within one and across layers. Within each layer,
we first iteratively refine and concretize security goals so as to identify critical security
goals, which need to be satisfied. After that the identified critical security goals are
operationalized in terms of security mechanisms. After the operationalization analysis, we
propagate security concerns from one layer to the next layer down based on the connections
between layers. After iteratively performing such security analysis for all layers, finally,
we can generate a collection of alternative security solutions, which satisfy critical security
requirements across all the three layers. A set of formal predicates and inference rules
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have been defined to (semi-)automate the above analysis. We have implemented such
rules in Disjunctive Datalog [Eiter et al., 1997].
Contributions to literature. As different artifacts involve different security issues,
existing approaches focus on analyzing security requirements of specific artifacts, e.g.,
Lamsweerde [2004] analyzes software security requirements, while Rodr´ıguez et al. [2007b]
investigate security requirements for business processes. Our approach, built on top of the
three-layer structure, holistically analyzes the security requirements of various artifacts of
STSs in a divide-and-conquer manner. In this way, our approach is able to appropriately
deal with the inherent complexity of STSs.
Publications: Li and Horkoff [2014].
Addressed research questions: RQ1.
Holistic attack analysis
During the three-layer security requirements analysis, in order to identify critical security
goals, we need to know possible attacks on the target systems. However, compared to typ-
ical software systems, STSs suffer from a broader scope of attacks due to their complexity
and heterogeneity. Especially, the increasing types of attacks can lead to exponentially
more multistage attacks which compose atomic attack actions from different parts of
STSs. Precisely detecting all the possible attacks on an STS is essential for determining
the criticality of security goals during the holistic security requirements analysis.
We propose a holistic attack analysis approach to detect (multistage) attacks on STSs
from an attacker’s viewpoint. In particular, this approach takes the three-layer security
requirements goal model as input and holistically detect attacks related to the security
requirements. As indicated in the top-left corner in Fig. 1.1, the approach consists of
two parts: firstly, we identify an attacker’s strategies by systematically elaborating an
attacker’s malicious intentions. To this end, we systematically examine three real com-
prehensive attack scenarios, through which we investigate how attackers elaborate their
malicious intentions to produce attack strategies. Grounded in such real evidence, we pro-
pose an attacker strategy analysis framework which supports systematic exploration of
attack strategies. Secondly, we analyze how attackers implement identified attack strate-
gies in terms of realistic attack behaviors. For this purpose, we depend on the CAPEC
attack patterns [Barnum and Sethi, 2007] for realistic attack knowledge, which helps us
to operationalize attackers’ malicious intentions in terms of realistic attack behaviors.
Specifically, we propose to model attack patterns in terms of contextual goal models, al-
lowing us to semi-automatically identify applicable attack patterns with tool support. We
have pragmatically processed and modeled 102 attack patterns in the CAPEC repository,
and have seamlessly integrated such attack knowledge into our holistic attack analysis.
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Once we finish the attack operationalization analysis, the resulting identified attacks will
be used in the three-layer security requirements analysis for identifying critical security
goals.
Contributions to literature. Many approaches have advocated for analyzing se-
curity requirements from an attacker’s viewpoint [Elahi et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2003b].
However, due to the knowledge gap between attackers and defenders [Mansourov and
Campara, 2010], it is very difficult for analysts to realistically analyze attacker’s inten-
tions and behaviors. Our approach deals with this challenge by practically examining
realistic attack scenarios and leveraging reusable attack patterns. In the meantime, our
approach contributes to the detection of multistage attacks, as we are able to understand
how an attacker composes atomic attack behaviors based on the attacker’s intentional
model. Lastly, our proposal not only serves our attack analysis, but also contributes to
the practical adoption of attack patterns. We have pragmatically followed our method
to model 102 real attack patterns, which can thus be semi-automatically selected and
applied by analysts in our attack analysis.
Publications: Li et al. [2015a], Li et al. [2015d], [Li et al., 2015c], [Li et al., 2016]
(accepted).
Addressed research questions: RQ2.
Security pattern analysis
Operationalizing security requirements in terms of security mechanisms is a laborious and
knowledge-intensive process for large-scale systems, e.g., STSs. Such operationalization
analysis plays an imperative role in the holistic security requirements analysis, as the
results of this analysis (i.e., security mechanisms) at one layer can affect security require-
ments in the next layer down. Therefore, if the operationalization results are incomplete,
the subsequent security analysis in lower layers will be affected accordingly.
In order to enhance the efficacy of the operationalization analysis, we practically lever-
age reusable security patterns to bridges the knowledge gap between security requirements
(i.e., security problems) and security mechanisms (i.e., security solutions). In particular,
we model security patterns in terms of the contextual goal model [Ali et al., 2010] in order
to seamlessly integrate security patterns analysis with our goal-oriented security require-
ments analysis. To this end, we have first defined a conceptual mapping between the
primary concepts of security patterns and contextual goal models, as well as a process for
building contextual goal models from security patterns. Moreover, we propose a detailed
analysis process, which helps analysts to systematically and semi-automatically select and
apply security patterns to operationalize security requirements. To promote the practical
adoption of this approach, we have pragmatically modeled 20 security patterns in the
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repository [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013].
During the application of security patterns, i.e., operationalizing security goals into
security mechanisms, we noticed that the deployed security mechanisms can affect not only
security requirements in the next layer down, but also the system functional requirements.
Ignoring such impact will result in incomplete requirements specifications. As such, we
have proposed a systematic method to capture and enforce the impact of deployed security
mechanisms.
Contributions to literature. Compared to existing approaches [Araujo and Weiss,
2002; Mouratidis et al., 2006; Asnar et al., 2011a], our approach first contributes to the
practical integration of security patterns and goal-based security requirements analysis.
Specifically, we propose a systematic guideline for modeling security patterns in terms
of the contextual goal model, and have pragmatically modeled 20 security patterns from
existing pattern repository. with the tool support, our approach can be semi-automatically
applied to select and apply security patterns. Lastly, our approach can capture the impact
that security mechanisms imposed on functional requirements, and can semi-automatically
enforce such impact.
Publications: [Li and Mylopoulos, 2014], [Li et al., 2014a], [Li et al., 2015b].
Addressed research questions: RQ3.
1.4.3 Prototype Tool
We have developed a prototype tool MUSER in order to semi-automate our proposal in
this thesis, facilitating its practical adoption. The tool was initially designed to support
the three-layer security requirements modeling and analysis, and has been incrementally
enhanced to support the elaborated holistic attack analysis and security pattern analysis.
In particular, this tool consists of two modules, as indicated in Fig. 1.1. The modeling
module supports constructing different analysis models used by our framework, while the
reasoning module (semi-)automates analysis methods that are defined in the framework.
As the complexity of STSs imposes challenges on both the modeling module and the
reasoning module, we have purposely optimized the prototype to tackle such challenges. In
particular, we developed the prototype tool on top of a powerful diagramming application
OmniGraﬄe1, allowing us to easily build large-scale models and avoid pragmatic problems
of graphical modeling, such as mentioned in [Massacci and Paci, 2012]. Moreover, we
implemented the inference module of the prototype tool based on the DLV inference




Contributions to literature. The prototype tool plays an important role in dealing
with the complexity of security requirements analysis of STSs. On one hand, the tool
allows us to realistically apply our proposal to analyze security requirements of STSs,
serving as the precondition for conducting large-scale case studies. On the other hand,
the tool contributes to the practical adoption of our approach.
Publications: [Li et al., 2014b].
Addressed research questions: RQ4.
1.4.4 Case Studies
To validate our approach, we need to evaluate the efficacy of the approach when applying
it to realistic systems. As such, we need to first choose appropriate methods to collect
and analyze empirical data. Easterbrook et al. [2008] summarize five empirical methods
for software engineering research, including controlled experiments, case studies, survey
research, ethnographies, and action research. Due to the complexity of STSs, a full
application of our approach requires analysts to have comprehensive knowledge about
phenomena in all three layers of STSs and perform a series of analysis steps using such
knowledge (as indicated in Fig. 1.1), which can take several person-months. Considering
the amount of time required to apply our approach, we choose to use case studies to
validate our approach, as “case study research is most appropriate for cases where effects
are expected to be wide ranging, or take a long to appear” [Easterbrook et al., 2008].
When performing case studies, it is essential to select appropriate cases that are most
relevant to our research problem, because the properties of our approach that are validated
by such case studies are likely to hold for many other cases. We have purposely selected
two representative large-scale STSs to perform case studies, which intensively involve
phenomena across all the three layers of STSs and have high demand for security.
Firstly, I applied our approach (by myself) to smart grid advanced metering infrastruc-
ture based on realistic specifications [NIST, 2012; Cuellar and Suppan, 2013], and holis-
tically analyzed security requirements for protecting the metering data. In this study, we
focus on evaluating the efficiency and expressiveness of the proposed modeling language,
as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed analysis framework.
Secondly, we applied our approach to a large-scale medical emergency response system,
which is enriched from an European project case study [Serenity-Consortium, March
2007], and address the system’s holistic security concerns. This study is grounded on a
Master thesis [Robin, 2015]. The Master student was first taught the three-layer security
requirements modeling language, and then used the prototype to perform the holistic
security requirements analysis under the supervision of Prof. Mylopoulos and myself.
Different from the first case study which focuses on evaluating the efficacy of our approach,
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this study is intended to preliminarily assess whether our approach has the potential to be
adopted in reality by people who were not involved in the development of the approach.
Contributions to literature. The two case studies validate the efficacy of our
approach when applied to realistic large-scale systems. In addition, they help us to better
understand the advantages and limitations of our approach.
Addressed research questions: RQ4.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
• Chapter 2 presents the state of art of this thesis. We first review approaches for
engineering security requirements and designing holistic security. Then, we examine
research in the area of security attack analysis, which plays an important role in
identifying security requirements. Finally, we survey the subject of security patterns
which bridge the knowledge gap between security problems and security solutions.
• Chapter 3 describes baseline approaches, which have been used or extended in this
thesis, including the requirements problem, the goal modeling languages, security
patterns and attack patterns.
• Chapter 4 first introduces the three-layer security requirements modeling framework
which can model phenomena in different layers of STSs. Based on the three-layer
model, we then describe the overall analysis framework that is used to holistically
analyze security requirements of STSs. Finally, we compare the three-layer security
requirements modeling and analysis framework with the state of the art.
• Chapter 5 presents the holistic attack analysis approach, which supports the security
goal simplification analysis during the three-layer security requirements analysis. We
first introduce an attacker strategy analysis method which explores potential attack
strategies, and then describe an attack pattern-based approach that operationalizes
those attack strategies. Lastly, we discuss the related work of this attack analysis
approach.
• Chapter 6 presents the security pattern-based operationalization analysis, which
integrates security patterns into our three-layer framework and assists analysts with
little security knowledge in operationalizing security goals. We first present the
conceptual mapping between security patterns and contextual goal models. Then we
describe the systematic process for selecting and applying security patterns. Finally,
we discuss related security pattern analysis approaches.
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• Chapter 7 describes the analysis framework for analyzing and enforcing the impact
of security mechanisms. We first describe the proposed enriched requirements spec-
ification and security mechanism specification, respectively. Then, we introduce the
systematic analysis process for detecting and analyzing the impact. Finally, we
compare our proposal with approaches related to the security impact analysis.
• Chapter 8 describes the prototype tool MUSER we have developed to support mod-
eling and analyzing security requirements of STSs in three layers. In particular,
We not only present the architecture and features of the prototype tool, but also
describe detailed use case specifications for each feature in order to guide potential
users.
• Chapter 9 presents the two case studies we have performed for validation of our
approach. For each case study, we first introduce the scenario, and then describe
the three-layer model we have built based on the scenario, and finally present and
evaluate the analysis results.
• Chapter 10 concludes the thesis, discusses limitations of the holistic security require-
ments analysis framework, and clarifies subsequent work that needs to be done to
improve the approach. As inspired by the proposal in this thesis, we have identified
a number of future research directions, which are introduced at the end of this thesis.
1.6 Published Work
All the publications related to this thesis are listed here, which are divided into three
categories: journals, conferences, workshops and demos. All the publications are refereed.
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Published Work 15
• Li, Tong; Horkoff, Jennifer; Paja, Elda; Beckers, Kristian, and Mylopoulos, John.
Analyzing attack strategies through anti-goal refinement. In The Practice of Enter-
prise Modeling (PoEM 2015), pages 75–90. Springer International Publishing, 2015c
• Li, Tong; Horkoff, Jennifer, and Mylopoulos, John. Analyzing and enforcing security
mechanisms on requirements specification. In Requirements Engineering: Foundation
for Software Quality (REFSQ 2015). Springer International Publishing, 2015b
• Li, Tong and Horkoff, Jennifer. Dealing with security requirements for socio-technical
systems: A holistic approach. In Advanced Information Systems Engineering (CAiSE
2014), pages 185–200. Springer International Publishing, 2014
• Li, Tong; Horkoff, Jennifer, and Mylopoulos, John. Integrating security patterns
with security requirements analysis using contextual goal models. In The Practice
of Enterprise Modeling (PoEM 2014), pages 208–223. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2014a
• Horkoff, Jennifer; Li, Tong; Li, Feng-Lin; Salnitri, Mattia; Cardoso, Evellin; Giorgini,
Paolo; Mylopoulos, John, and Pimentel, Joa˜o. Taking goal models downstream: A
systematic roadmap. In Research Challenges in Information Science (RCIS), 2014
IEEE Eighth International Conference on, pages 1–12. IEEE, 2014b
• Horkoff, Jennifer; Aydemir, Fatma Bas¸ak; Li, Feng-Lin; Li, Tong, and Mylopoulos,
John. Evaluating modeling languages: An example from the requirements domain. In
Conceptual Modeling (ER 2014), pages 260–274. Springer International Publishing,
2014a
Workshops and Demos
• Li, Tong; Paja, Elda; Mylopoulos, John; Horkoff, Jennifer, and Beckers, Kristian.
Holistic security requirements analysis: An attacker’s perspective. In Requirements
Engineering Conference (RE), 2015 IEEE 23rd International, pages 282–283. IEEE,
2015d
• Li, Tong; Horkoff, Jennifer; Beckers, Kristian; Paja, Elda, and Mylopoulos, John.
A holistic approach to security attack modeling and analysis. In Proceedings of the
Eighth International i* Workshop, pages 49–54, 2015a
• Li, Tong and Mylopoulos, John. Modeling and applying security patterns using
contextual goal models. In The 7th International i* Workshop (iStar14), pages
208–223, 2014
16 Introduction
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Forum at the 26th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems En-
gineering, pages 185–192, 2014b
Chapter 2
State of the Art
If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.
Isaac Newton
In this chapter, we first review the state of the art in the area of security requirements
engineering which deals with security requirements elicitation and analysis in the early
phase of software development (Section 2.1). Moreover, we survey several related research
areas that contribute to the security requirements analysis of STSs, corresponding to the
research challenges we have introduced in Section 1.2. In particular, we review the ap-
proaches that deal with security beyond software systems and holistically analyze system
security (Section 2.2); the approaches that identify and analyze attacks (Section 2.3); and
the approaches that select and apply security patterns (Section 2.4). Note that in this
chapter we review and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of existing approaches
according to the research questions and challenges we have described in the last chapter.
Detailed comparison between our proposal and the existing approaches will be presented
in the following chapters after introducing our proposal.
2.1 Security Requirements Engineering
Security requirements engineering is motivated by the fact that analyzing security in the
early stage of the system development cycle can significantly save costs for later system
development and maintenance [Hoo et al., 2001], which has been investigated for more
than two decades. Many approaches have been proposed to produce high-quality security
requirements. In this section, we first review and compare approaches that define pro-
cesses for systematically engineering security requirements, based on which we summarize
a generic process of security requirements engineering that cover all important analysis
steps of security requirements engineering. After that we review existing typical security
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requirements engineering approaches on the basis of several detailed survey papers [Nhla-
batsi et al., 2010; Fabian et al., 2010; Elahi et al., 2011; Souag et al., 2015]. All the
reviewed approaches are then systematically compared based on the topics of this thesis
presented in Section 1.1, e.g., focused system layers.
2.1.1 Security Requirements Engineering Processes
Although analyzing security requirements upfront has been widely accepted, Mead and
Stehney [2005] have argued that without a systematic process of engineering security re-
quirements the obtained security requirements can be ambiguous and incomplete. Specif-
ically, the ad hoc way of analyzing security requirements is tended to simply describe
general security mechanisms instead of analyzing what stakeholders need for their sys-
tems’ security [Firesmith, 2003a; Mead, 2006b]. In order to help analysts to engineer
high quality security requirements, Mead [2006b] has developed the SQUARE (Security
QUAlity Requirements Engineering) methodology, which provides a nine-step security
requirements elicitation and analysis process (shown in Table 2.1). This process involves
stakeholders, requirements engineers, risk experts, and inspection teams, and eventually
delivers a collection of categorized and prioritized security requirements. Specifically, the
author has developed a prototype tool to support such analysis process. In subsequent
research, [Chen et al., 2004] iteratively evaluated and improved the SQUARE process
through several case studies, which involved real-world clients that were developing large-
scale IT projects. Moreover, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of SQUARE,
Mead et al. [2008] propose a method to fit the SQUARE methodology into the Ratio-
nal Unified Process (RUP) [Kruchten, 2004]. Note that the SQUARE process presents
general steps that need to be performed by security analysts, while does not limit itself
to specific techniques. Thus, analysts should select appropriate techniques to implement
each step of the process. In particular, Mead [2006a] compared difference security re-
quirements elicitation techniques, shedding light on how such techniques can be used in
the SQUARE process.
Mellado et al. [2007] propose a Common Criteria (CC) centered and reuse-based Se-
curity Requirements Engineering Process (SREP), which is partially based on SQUARE.
CC is an international security standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for evaluating the security
properties of information systems, and it has been incorporated in SREP to facilitate se-
curity requirements analysis in two ways: first, it contains a collection of well-documented
security functional requirements, assisting analysts in eliciting and specifying security re-
quirements. Secondly, CC includes assurance requirements which can be used to evaluate
the security of the system and thus help to inspect the elicited security requirements.
The reusability of SREP is derived from a Security Resources Repository (SRR). The
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repository stores reusable artifacts (e.g., threat specifications and security requirements
specifications) that are specified using different techniques, such as Misuse cases [Sindre
and Opdahl, 2005] and UMLsec [Ju¨rjens, 2002]. The entire analysis process of SREP
consists of nine steps (as shown in Table 2.1), which account for the two new features
of SREP as introduced above. Note that SREP is an iterative and incremental process,
which is built on top of the Unified Process (UP) [Jacobson et al., 1999]. Mellado et al.
[2006] have performed a case study to demonstrate how the security requirements for a
security critical system can be systematically obtained by applying SREP.
Another related piece of work is carried out by Wang et al. [2009], who propose a more
fine-grained process for dealing with security requirements in the early stage of system
development. The process consists of nine steps (Table 2.1), which has an emphasis on
the threat and risk analysis but does not consider the prioritization and inspection of
security requirements after they have been elicited.
A recent study proposes a dedicated security requirements engineering process for web
applications (MOSRE-WebApp) [Salini and Kanmani, 2012]. MOSRE-WebApp involves
16 specific analysis steps (Table 2.1), which are presented using a spiral process model in
order to cover all phases of RE. The authors have performed a comprehensive case study
for an e-voting system, and the evaluation results of this study shows that the effectiveness
and performance of this process are comparatively better than existing approaches [Salini
and Kanmani, 2015].
Comparison of processes
Given the four security requirements engineering processes we have reviewed above, we
summarize a generic process which sheds light on detailed and important analysis steps
that should be performed in order to systematically engineer security requirements. Based
on such insights, we further discuss similarities and differences among the four reviewed
processes. Note that this generic process we presented here serves as a theoretical foun-
dation for our holistic security requirements analysis framework.
Basically, we identify 11 generic steps of security requirement engineering, which are
derived from elaborating two steps of SQUARE. Firstly, we add a step “Identify assets”
before the second step of SQUARE “Identify security goals”. This new step is a non-trivial
step, which is an imperative precondition for identifying security goals and has been rec-
ognized by the other three proposals. Secondly, we elaborate the third steps of SQUARE
“Develop artifacts to support security requirements definition” into two sub-steps “Do-
main analysis” and “Identify threats/vulnerabilities”. The former sub-step focuses on
developing functional models that character the system, while the latter one identifies
threats and vulnerabilities in the system. Apart from these two modifications, the rest of
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Table 2.1: A comparison of security requirements engineering processes
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the generic analysis steps are the same with corresponding steps in SQUARE.
In Table 2.1, we presented the 11 generic steps of security requirement engineering in
the first column. From the second column to the fifth column, we list detailed analysis
steps of the four security requirements engineering processes, which have been categorized
into corresponding generic steps. As SREP is proposed partially based on SQUARE, there
are only a few differences between them. Specifically, SREP emphasizes the step of asset
identification, while omits the step of selecting elicitation techniques. Moreover, SREP
has a particular step “Repository improvement” as it proposes to reuse analytical artifacts.
As shown in Table 2.1, the process which is proposed by Wang et al. [2009] covers the first
8 generic analysis steps except for step 7. This process proposal has an emphasis on the
threat and vulnerability analysis, but does not further process security requirements after
they are elicited. For MOSRE-WebApp, it has a strong focus on both domain analysis
and risk analysis. However, similar to [Wang et al., 2009], MOSRE-WebApp does not
categorize nor prioritize elicited security requirements. To be noted that the last two
steps of MOSRE-WebApp have stepped into system security design and thus are beyond
our discussion.
2.1.2 Security Requirements Engineering Approaches
Goal-oriented approaches
Chung [1993] proposes to treat security requirements as a class of Non-Functional Require-
ments (NFRs), which are used for selecting among system design decisions and justifying
the overall design. The author also defines a process-oriented approach to analyze se-
curity requirements, which is adapted from the work done by Mylopoulos et al. [1992].
This approach emphasizes the importance of reusing security design knowledge. In par-
ticular, the approach incorporates reusable taxonomies of security properties and security
goal satisficing methods, so as to support security goal refinement and operationalization.
Oladimeji et al. [2006a] extend NFR framework with the notations of negative softgoals for
representing threats and inverse contributions in order to model and analyze threats. In
addition, another extension of NFR proposes to unify security goals and their associated
security policies with UML functional models [Oladimeji et al., 2006b], which can discover
conflicts and inconsistencies in security policies at the early stage of system development.
Lamsweerde extends KAOS by introducing the notions of obstacle [Van Lamsweerde
and Letier, 2000] and anti-goal [Lamsweerde, 2004] to analyze security requirements of
a system. KAOS obstacles capture undesired states of affairs that prevent stakeholder
goals from being satisfied, while anti-goals analyze obstacles that are intentionally im-
posed by attackers. KAOS leverages formal methods to systematically refine (security)
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goals that are specified in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), using a set of predefined refine-
ment patterns [Darimont and Van Lamsweerde, 1996]. After identifying specific threats
via the anti-goal refinement, security requirements (i.e., countermeasures to the threats)
are elicited accordingly. In addition, De Landtsheer and Van Lamsweerde [2005] have pro-
posed a collection of KAOS specification patterns that codify families of confidentiality
requirements, enabling automatic check of confidentiality violation.
Liu et al. [2003] propose a methodological framework for dealing with security and pri-
vacy requirements, which extends the i* framework [Yu, 1997]. This approach places an
emphasis on the security of organizational settings. In particular, their proposal can de-
tect vulnerabilities in organizational relationships, can identify potential system abusers,
and eventually can generate countermeasures so as to protect the system. Elahi et al.
[2009] also advocate for incorporating vulnerability into security requirements analysis.
They have proposed a vulnerability-centric security analysis approach [Elahi et al., 2010],
which is also built on the i* framework. This approach links empirical knowledge of vul-
nerability to system requirements models, and proposes a method to assess system risks.
Specifically, the authors propose to take advantage of available vulnerability knowledge,
such as CWE [MITRE-CWE] and CVE [MITRE-CVE]. In addition, Elahi and Yu [2007]
have also developed an approach for analyzing security trade-offs and selecting the best
design alternative once risk assessment results are available.
Mouratidis and Giorgini [2002] extend Tropos [Castro et al., 2001, 2002] with security
concepts in order to integrate security concerns into the entire life cycle of system devel-
opment, especially the early requirements stage. The resulting approach, Secure Tropos,
has been continuously elaborated and extended for more than ten years, such as reported
in [Mouratidis et al., 2004; Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007b; Matulevicˇius et al., 2008;
Mouratidis and Jurjens, 2010]. Recently, Mouratidis [2011] summarizes Security Tropos
as an approach, which can be used to identify security requirements, transform the se-
curity requirements to design, and validate the designed system. In particular, a series
of security concepts have been proposed and used to model security enhanced diagrams,
including security enhanced actor diagram, security enhanced goal diagram, architectural
style selection diagram, security attack scenarios diagram, and security reference diagram.
A computer-aided tool (SecTro) has been developed to support graphical modeling of the
above diagrams and to automatically generate some templates and diagrams that are re-
quired by the methodology [Pavlidis and Islam, 2011]. In addition, Mouratidis et al. [2006]
use the extended security concepts to model security patterns, encapsulating reusable se-
curity knowledge. In another recent work, Mouratidis et al. [2013] enrich Secure Tropos
with new concepts (e.g., cloud actor) to support the selection of cloud providers based on
security and privacy requirements.
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Giorgini et al. [2005b, 2006] emphasize the importance of analyzing organizational se-
curity requirements without getting into security protocols or security techniques. They
have proposed a formal modeling framework SI* to capture the such security concerns,
which extends Tropos [Bresciani et al., 2004] with notions of trust, permission, and owner-
ship. On the basis of this modeling framework, they define a collection of formal reasoning
rules for automatically checking security properties at the organizational level, e.g., need-
to-know policies and conflicts of trust. A CASE tool (ST-Tool) has been developed to
support modeling and verifying security requirements at the organizational level. This
approach has been revised according to experiences gained from several industry case
studies, the latest version of the SI* modeling framework and the Secure Tropos method-
ology1 are presented in [Massacci et al., 2010]. Based on the SI* framework, Dalpiaz
et al. [2011] propose SecCo, which explicitly models security needs via commitments and
relates them to security requirements. Such commitment specifications are then used for
designing secure business processes [Paja et al., 2012]. Paja et al. [2013] also propose
a formal framework to automatically detect conflicts among security requirements that
have been captured in SecCo. Another related work is performed by Asnar et al. [2011b],
which extends SI* with a reasoning technique that identifies potential security threats on
system assets.
UML-based approaches
Sindre and Opdahl [2005] extend traditional use cases to cover misuse cases, which de-
scribe behaviors that stakeholders do not want to occur. Based on the extended concept,
the authors propose a systematic process for eliciting security requirements. To facili-
tate the analysis process, the authors have also defined an approach that constructs and
reuses a repository of generic misuse cases [Sindre et al., 2003]. Similar to this approach,
McDermott and Fox [1999] use abuse cases to capture harmful interactions to a system.
As compared in [Wei, 2005], misuse cases can model a wider range of threats than abuse
cases. In addition, misuse cases are modeled together with use cases instead of modeling
separately like abuse cases. Lastly, misuse cases have been used by Firesmith [2003b] to
identify security use cases. Several approaches have extended or applied misuse cases, such
as executable misuse cases [Whittle et al., 2008], combining misuse cases with security
goals [Okubo et al., 2009], and combining misuse cases with the Common Criteria [Ware
et al., 2005].
UMLsec extends UML with security constructs (stereotypes, constraints, and tagged
values), allowing analysts to express security concerns within the UML diagrams (e.g.,
use case diagram and activity diagram) [Ju¨rjens, 2002, 2005]. As such, security can be
1This is different from the Secure Tropos approach proposed by Mouratidis et al.
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designed and evaluated throughout the entire software development process. In partic-
ular, the author has defined formal semantics for each security construct in order to
automatically verify security in a given specification. Although this approach mainly
focuses on engineering security design rather than security requirements, it has been in-
tegrated with Secure Tropos so as to support the entire secure software development
lifecycle [Mouratidis and Jurjens, 2010]. Similarly, another model-driven security design
approach, SecureUML, has defined a security modeling language to formally design and
verify role-based access control policies in UML diagrams [Lodderstedt et al., 2002].
Problem frame-based approaches
Crook et al. [2002] introduce the concept of anti-requirements, which are the requirements
of malicious users and subvert existing system requirements. The authors then incorporate
such anti-requirements into abuse frames [Lin et al., 2003b,a], which represent a set of
undesirable phenomena (i.e., security threats) in Problem Frames [Jackson, 2001]. As
such, analysts can elicit security requirements according to the threats captured in the
abuse frames.
Hatebur et al. [2006] specialize Problem Frames into two kinds: Security Problem
Frame (SPF) and Concertized Security Problem Frame (CSPF), in order to engineer sys-
tem security. In particular, SPFs document general security problems, which are selected
and instantiated to identify security requirements; CSPFs specify general security solu-
tions to the security problems, which are selected and instantiated to design appropriate
security mechanisms that satisfy the identified security requirements. In such a way,
this approach explicitly distinguishes security problems from their solutions and leverage
reusable security knowledge to facilitate analysis in both parts. On the basis of such
extended frames, Hatebur et al. [2007] propose a systematic process for analyzing secu-
rity requirements and solutions. Later on Schmidt [2010] further elaborates this analysis
process by incorporating threat and risk analysis.
Haley et al. [2008] present a Security Requirements Engineering Framework (SREF)
for security requirements elicitation and analysis. The authors use problem frames to
represent system functional requirements, and model security constraints on top of the
problem diagrams. The elicited security requirements are verified by using both outer
(formal) and inner (informal) satisfaction arguments. Note that this framework clearly
distinguishes security goals from security requirements, where the security goals are stake-
holder’s security concerns (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, etc.) and the security require-
ments are constraints on system functions. As the authors acknowledge the mutual impact
between requirements and architecture, they define their security requirements analysis
as an iterative process.
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Summary of techniques
Table 2.2 summarizes and compares the security requirements engineering techniques we
have reviewed. Although the approaches are designed for analyzing security requirements
of software applications, some of them have already pointed out the importance of design-
ing security at the organizational level. In particular, the approaches that are designed
based on i*/Tropos inherit the capability of modeling social interactions and thus are suit-
able for analyzing organizational security. Apart from organizational security, UMLsec
can analyze infrastructure security using the extended UML deployment diagram. To deal
with security of STSs, we need to take into account security concerns of all components
of STSs and to holistically select the best solution, which cannot be accommodated by
existing approaches.
Most of the existing approaches incorporate threat analysis, but none of them can
systematically analyze multistage attacks, which are an emerging challenge in designing
secure STSs. By further examining existing approaches, we find out that goal-oriented
approaches have inherent advantages in analyzing multistage attacks. In particular, their
hierarchical AND/OR refinement structure allows analysts to capture different steps of
multistage attacks. In other words, goal-oriented approaches are able to model multistage
attacks when corresponding knowledge is available. However, currently there is limited
knowledge about multistage attacks on STSs, especially since there are no approaches can
analyze multistage attacks in a socio-technical setting. Therefore we need an approach
that can not only import and represent multistage attacks in the threat analysis, but can
also systematically discover all possible multistage attacks on STSs. As indicated in
Table 2.2, the KAOS anti-goal approach can be used to identify multistage attacks via
anti-goal refinement using requirements refinement patterns. However, as those refinement
patterns are not initially designed for refining malicious intentions from an attacker’s
viewpoint, they cannot guarantee the completeness of the analysis results.
Reusing security knowledge has recently received a substantial increase of attention, as
it can significantly ease the knowledge-intensive security analysis, such as threat identifica-
tion and security requirement elicitation. As shown in Table 2.2, various ways for reusing
security knowledge have been proposed. For example, Mouratidis et al. [2006] propose to
reuse security requirements knowledge via security patterns; Sindre et al. [2003] propose
to construct and reuse a repository of generic misuse cases for security requirements anal-
ysis. Although these proposals contribute to the methods of reusing security knowledge,
less efforts have been made to promote the practical use of such methods. The Source col-
umn in Table 2.2 shows knowledge sources to be reused by each approach. In particular,
most reuse-based approaches rely on literature in general for security knowledge, but do
not investigate how to effectively use the knowledge. Instead, researchers normally make
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assumptions to simplify the problem, e.g., “the proposed framework assumes that analysts
have knowledge about vulnerabilities, potential attacks, and proper countermeasure or can
obtain such information”[Elahi et al., 2010]. However, comprehensive security knowledge
repositories normally have an impressive scale, e.g., CAPEC has 504 attack patterns [Bar-
num and Sethi, 2007] and CWE include 719 weaknesses [MITRE-CWE]. Given the large
body of security knowledge, analysts are reluctant to adopt them in practice without an
efficient method [Shostack, 2014, p.106]. Thus, we argue that a systematic method and
automated support are required in order to practically reuse security knowledge, which
has also been concluded from a mapping study [Souag et al., 2015].
Because of the complexity of STSs, a holistic security analysis can result in large-scale
models, consisting of hundreds of elements. As such, manual analysis is time-consuming
and error-prone, and there is a strong need for automated reasoning and analysis. Al-
though the surveyed existing approaches all have tool support for graphically modeling
analysis models, only half of them can automate the security analysis on top of the mod-
els. In addition, the usability of tools remains as a challenge to the practical adoption of
security analysis techniques [Massacci and Paci, 2012].
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2.2 Holistic Security
To holistically design secure STSs, security requirements of all components of STSs should
be elicited and analyzed. As we have reviewed in the last section, typical security require-
ments analysis techniques focus on analyzing security requirements of software, some of
which can also analyze security requirements of organizational settings. In this section, we
first review approaches that focus on designing secure business processes and secure phys-
ical infrastructure, which are beyond the software-oriented security requirements analysis
approaches. To be noted that some software-oriented approaches, e.g., Misuse cases, can
also be applied in general to analyze security for different artifacts. However, we here
focus on specialized approaches that can provide in-depth understanding about security
in business processes and physical infrastructure. After that we examine approaches that
holistically deal with system security.
2.2.1 Security Analysis beyond Software Systems
Business process security
Providing security in business process design has been recognized as important [Herrmann
and Pernul, 1998]. Different researchers have been investigating what kind of security
requirements need to be enforced during business management, what are the semantics of
those security requirements, and how to verify and enforce those requirements. However,
none of these approaches can capture alternative security requirements and perform trade-
off analysis.
Rodr´ıguez et al. [2007a] extend BPMN [Group, 2011] with security notations so as to
model security requirements within business processes. The authors define seven security
requirements, which can be annotated to specific BPMN constructs. In particular, they
use OCL (Object Constraint Language) to unambiguously specify restrictions imposed by
the security requirements. In subsequent research [Rodr´ıguez et al., 2011], the authors ex-
tends UML 2.0 activity diagrams with similar security requirements concepts. Moreover,
they propose a model-driven approach M-BPsec, which transforms the extended activity
diagrams (Computation Independent Model – CIM) into a set of UML artifacts used in
software development (Platform Independent Model – PIM).
Altuhhova et al. [2012] analyze BPMN with respect to Information System Security
Risk Management (ISSRM) model [Dubois et al., 2010], investigating how to express
security concepts (e.g., assets, threats) with original BPMN constructs. The authors
provide an alignment of the ISSRM concepts and the BPMN constructs, allowing them
to annotate security issues on top of BPMN models. As such, they are able to analyze
and design secure business processes by following the ISSRM process.
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Meland and Gjære [2012] emphasize the need of expressing threats and unwanted
incidents on BPMN 2.0 models. They propose a process-centric threat modeling approach
that can analyze which threat events trigger a deviation from the typical business process
flow. A triggered threat will provoke a re-composition and/or reduced functionality of
the composite services. To keep the number of BPMN constructs to a minimum, they use
existing constructs to define unwanted events in business processes instead of inventing
new constructs.
Salnitri et al. [2015] propose SecBPMN-ml as an extension of BPMN for modeling secu-
rity aspects in business processes. Several security annotations are included in SecBPMN-
ml, the semantics of which have been formally specified. In addition, the authors define
the SecBPMN-Q query language for representing security policies, which can be automat-
ically checked against SecBPMN-ml specifications.
Physical infrastructure security
Physical security protections highly depend on the specific physical devices. Different de-
vices involve different vulnerabilities and thus can be attacked in different ways, such as
attacks against smart meters [Flick and Morehouse, 2010, Chap.12] and advanced meter-
ing infrastructure [Carpenter et al., 2009]. As such, instead of modeling and abstracting
common features of different physical devices, most physical security analysis is performed
in an ad-hoc way that focuses on analyzing particular devices.
There are a few model-based approaches that model and analyze the infrastructure
security. Ju¨rjens [2002] considers physical layer in UMLsec, in which the author specifies
and verifies secure concerns in deployment diagrams. Specifically, this work focuses on
the dependencies between components deployed in different nodes, as well as the location
of the nodes.
Ustun et al. [2006] propose an agent-based conceptual design of a physical system se-
curity simulation, which allows analysts to identify potential threats to physical security
systems. According to the simulation results, a security configuration will be generated
to minimize risks, which includes the physical structure of the facility, the set of sen-
sors included in the facility, and the set of guards and their respective operating/patrol
strategies.
Fernandez et al. [2007b] examined existing systems, industry standards and govern-
ment regulations, based on which they have summarized a core set of features that a
physical access control system should have. Such knowledge is specified in terms of secu-
rity patterns, which can be reused to develop physical security. In particular, they have
created and illustrated three specific patterns: Alarm Monitoring, Relays, Access Control
to Physical Structures.
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2.2.2 Holistic Security Analysis Approaches
Mouratidis and Jurjens [2010] analyze security from both organizational and technical
perspectives by combining existing approaches Secure Tropos and UMLsec. The authors
provide a systematic process to transfer the elicited organizational security requirements
(i.e., Security Tropos models) to secure software design models (i.e., UMLsec class dia-
grams and deployment diagrams). Salnitri et al. [2014b] propose an incremental and iter-
ative process to align business process policies with organizational security requirements.
By automatically verifying such policies, this approach ensures the organizational security
requirements are preserved in the business layer. Other approaches [Menzel et al., 2009;
Rodr´ıguez et al., 2010] apply model-driven techniques to transform security requirements
captured in business processes into concrete security configurations in software design.
All the above approaches cover multiple aspects of system security and align security re-
quirements in a top-down manner. However, these approaches do not holistically analyze
alternative security requirements across different aspects. As such, the analysis result
may not be the optimal solution.
Apart from the alignment-based approach, several studies have been done to structure
information systems into multiple conceptual layers. May and Dhillon [2010] propose a
holistic conceptual framework to identify security issues from both social and technical
perspectives. The authors contend that information security is becoming a multidimen-
sional discipline, where particular models can only address part of the security issues and
a meta-theoretical basis is required to achieve a holistic understanding of information
security. As such, they base their framework on the theory of semiotics, which consists
of six layers of abstraction. By mapping information security issues into these six layers,
their framework can theoretically and intuitively guide holistic security analysis process.
Similarly, Wimmer and Von Bredow [2002] propose a holistic approach to generate secu-
rity solutions in e-government. This proposal consists of four levels, including community
level, process level, interaction level, and infrastructure level. The authors argue that
each of these four levels has different security requirements, and they exemplify security
solutions at each level. However, these approaches do not systematically analyze inter-
actions among different layers. In addition, the approaches do not have any automated
analysis support, and thus cannot be pragmatically used to analyze large-scale systems.
Zuccato [2004] introduces a holistic security requirements engineering approach for
electronic commerce. The approach synthesizes three paradigms that are commonly used
to elicit security requirements in order to have a complete set of requirements. In such
a way, the author claims this approach can analyze holistic security requirements. In
particular, the approach first collects security requirements from risk analysis, business
process analysis, and workshops with stakeholders, respectively; and then compiles such
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requirements by solving conflicts among them. The author provides detailed instructions
for performing this holistic security requirements analysis. Instead of analyzing differ-
ent components of a system, this approach implements holistic analysis from another
dimension, i.e., using multiple elicitation paradigms.
Spears [2005] describes a systematic process for holistically analyzing security risks.
This proposal starts from identifying business functions, and then consecutively identifies
corresponding critical business processes, information systems, and supporting infrastruc-
ture. After that the author proposes to analyze threats and vulnerabilities and to develop
risk scenarios for each of the critical assets, in order to perform a holistic analysis. Al-
though this approach can cover different security concerns pertain to the information
systems, it cannot holistically select the best security solution. In addition, this approach
does not have any automated analysis support.
2.3 Security Attack Analysis
In this section, we review approaches that analyze security attacks from three perspectives.
Firstly, we focus on approaches that are based on attacker analysis. Secondly, we review
papers that leverage reusable attack patterns. Thirdly, we survey approaches that are
designed to analyze multistage attacks.
2.3.1 Attacker-oriented Analysis
Steele and Jia [2008] leverage User-Centered Design techniques to develop personas, de-
scribing the archetypal behavior of possible attackers. Apart from this speculative pro-
posal, Atzeni et al. [2011] propose a grounded approach for developing attacker personas.
They collect realistic data from people who have been known to attack systems, based
on which they develop personas. In addition, their approach includes an argumentation
model, which associates grounded arguments to specific characteristics of attackers. As
such, the attacker personas can be better understood by analysts and can be revised in
light of different contexts. These personas-based approaches help to easily comprehend
attackers and identify attack scenarios, especially for non-security analysts.
Another branch of attacker analysis advocates analyzing attacks from an attacker’s
viewpoint. Several approaches have been proposed to analyze attacks at the operational
level, i.e., modeling behaviors of attackers. Such as the attack tree [Schneier, 1999],
misuse cases [Sindre and Opdahl, 2001, 2005], and abuse cases McDermott and Fox [1999].
Beyond the operational level, later studies capture intention of attackers in order to
understand why the malicious behaviors are performed by attackers. Crook et al. [2002]
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capture the requirements of a malicious user that subvert an existing requirement as anti-
requirements. Later on, Lin et al. [2003a,b] incorporate such anti-requirements into abuse
frames to represent threats and analyze security requirements.
Lamsweerde [2004] proposes to use anti-goals to model an attacker’s malicious in-
tention, by refining which alternative attacks can be identified. Specifically, the author
leverages formal goal refinement patterns [Darimont and Van Lamsweerde, 1996], which
were initially designed for refining requirements goals, to refine anti-goals. By opera-
tionalizing each leaf anti-goal in terms of specific attack actions, the approach eventually
can discover alternative attack scenarios. This approach is developed in the context of
the goal modeling approach KAOS, and it has been formalized with automated analysis
support. Similar approaches have also been proposed to model an attacker’s intention
using goal modeling languages [Liu et al., 2003; Mouratidis et al., 2004; Elahi et al.,
2010]. Instead of identifying attacks, these approaches focus on analyzing the influences
of modeled alternative attacks on a system using goal satisfaction analysis techniques.
However, all of these intention-oriented approaches are not grounded in realistic security
knowledge, which requires analysts to have in-depth understanding about attackers in
order to effectively apply these approaches.
2.3.2 Attack Pattern-based Analysis
Moore et al. [2001] emphasize the importance of reusing known attack knowledge, which
significantly affects the practicality of attack analysis methods (e.g., attack tree). As
such, they first define attack patterns to support the knowledge reuse. In particular, each
pattern consists of four sections: goal, precondition, attack steps, and post-condition. In
subsequent research, Bozic and Wotawa [2014] use this structure to define attack patterns
and formalize the malicious actions of the attack patterns. In this way, the approach
can automate the execution of attack patterns and test system security. Apart from
this attack pattern template, several researchers have defined attack patterns using their
own templates. Gegick and Williams [2005] define software attack patterns in term of a
sequence of events, using regular expressions. Specifically, each event is expressed by its
associated component, such as user, server, hard disk, etc. By automatically matching
such patterns with system design, the approach can assist analysts in identifying system
vulnerabilities. Fernandez et al. [2007a, 2009] specify attack patterns (i.e., misuse pattern)
based on POSA template [Buschmann et al., 1996]. The POSA template includes much
more sections than the initial one defined in [Moore et al., 2001], such as context, known
uses, countermeasures, etc., which contribute to the practicality of attack pattern-based
analysis. Although the above approaches contribute to the theoretical foundation of
attack patterns, they have not been pragmatically applied to develop attack patterns.
Security Attack Analysis 33
For example, Moore et al. [2001] illustrate their approach with four patterns and we are
unaware of subsequent work has been done for developing patterns; Fernandez-Buglioni
[2013] has only developed three misuse patterns, as reported in his recent book.
Compared to the above theoretical approaches, the Common Attack Pattern Enu-
meration and Classification (CAPEC) is initiated as a baseline catalog of attack patterns
along with a comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy [Barnum and Sethi, 2007].
CAPEC was launched in 2007 and has been consecutively developed, which currently in-
cludes 504 attack patterns2. Since CAPEC provides a significant amount of practical
security knowledge, it is receiving an increase of attention from both academia and in-
dustry. Especially, a main research question is how to effectively use CAPEC, given its
impressive size. Kaiya et al. [2014] define term-maps, which link terms in requirements
specifications to specific security terms used in CAPEC. As such, this approach can auto-
matically identify related attack patterns based on requirements specifications, and thus
further obtains corresponding security requirements. Engebretson and Pauli [2009] enrich
the CAPEC attack patterns with the concepts parent threat and parent mitigation in
order to facilitate the navigation among the large number of attack patterns. Yuan et al.
[2014] map CAPEC patterns to STRIDE [Shostack, 2014], based on which they develop
a tool to facilitate the retrieval of CAPEC patterns. However, all the above approaches
do not use context to check the applicability of attack patterns. In addition, the CAPEC
patterns focus on documenting operational attack knowledge, and currently there are
no approaches that associate such patterns with attacker intention analysis, limiting the
utility of CAPEC patterns.
2.3.3 Multistage Attack Analysis
An attack graph shows all paths through a system that end in a state where an attacker
achieves his malicious intention. Each attack path indicates a potential attack that con-
sists of one or several steps, allowing analysts to analyze multistage attacks. Different
techniques have been proposed to automatically generate such graphs. Phillips and Swiler
[1998] first use attack graphs to analyze network security. Because of the homogeneous
settings of machines in the network, the states of machines (i.e., nodes in the attack
graph) and the atomic attacks on machines (i.e., transitions in the attack graph) can be
enumerated. As such, it is possible to automatically generate all the attack paths by
following a comparatively simple attack strategy. Take the approach of [Sheyner et al.,
2002], for example: an attacker starts from a machine with the root permission, he then
iteratively detects the next vulnerable machine in the network, logs into that machine,
and gets the root permission of that machine until reaching his target machine. In a
2https://capec.mitre.org
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recent study, Beckers et al. [2015] apply the attack graph technique to analyze social en-
gineering attacks, where the states of people are modeled as nodes and social engineering
attacks are captured as transitions between nodes. However, the attack graph approach
only applies to systems that have simple and homogeneous components, where the states
of components and relevant actions can be enumerated, i.e., without combinatorial ex-
plosions. Thus, it is not suitable for security analysis of STSs which can involve a large
number of heterogeneous components, such as people, software, and hardware.
Attack trees are a typical way of representing alternative attacks, which can also
capture multistage attacks due to their hierarchical tree structure. Thus, the systematic
construction of such trees contributes to the identification of multistage attacks. Although
there is no unique way of creating attack trees, different researchers have proposed several
guidelines/methods. Morais et al. [2013] advocate a guideline for creating attack trees,
which starts from modeling the general attack description; and then identifies the violated
security properties and the security mechanisms to be exploited, respectively; and finally
models the concrete attack actions. Paul [2014] proposes a layer-per-layer approach to
automatically generate skeletons of attack trees using information derived from system
architecture, risk assessment study, and related security knowledge base. However, as the
attack tree approaches only focus on operational attack actions and do not capture an
attacker’s malicious intentions, they fail to identify the variety of attacks at the strategic
level.
Several studies have been proposed to capture attacker’s malicious intentions as (anti-
)goals using goal-oriented modeling language, e.g., [Lamsweerde, 2004; Liu et al., 2003;
Mouratidis et al., 2004]. As such, analysts can well understand both how and why attacks
are performed, and thus better explore the space of attack alternatives. In addition, the
tree structure of goal models allows analysts to capture multistage attacks. However,
these approaches are not grounded in realistic security knowledge, requiring analysts to
have a strong security background in order to effectively model and analyze attacks.
2.4 Security Patterns
Security patterns encapsulate reusable security knowledge which can assist analysts with
little security knowledge in identifying security solutions to satisfying security require-
ments. We here first review existing security pattern repositories with the aim of under-
standing the situation of security pattern development. In particular, we try to know the
total number of security patterns that have been developed. After that we survey ex-
isting techniques to investigate how to effectively select the best security pattern among
alternatives. Finally, we review approaches that analyze the impact of applied security
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mechanisms (i.e., solutions of security patterns).
2.4.1 Security Pattern Collections
Yoder and Barcalow [1997] wrote the first paper on security patterns, which includes
seven patterns. The authors specify these patterns in a structured manner using the GoF
template [Gamma et al., 1994] and describe interactions among patterns in order to fit
the seven patterns all together. After that different researchers have been working on
the discovery, documentation, and application of security patterns, resulting in several
security pattern collections that include a significant number of patterns.
Schumacher et al. [2006] published a book in 2006, which advocates using security pat-
terns to integrate security and software engineering. In particular, the authors introduce
44 security patterns in details, which are specified using the POSA template [Buschmann
et al., 2007], and illustrate the usage of security patterns via case studies. In a recent
textbook, Fernandez-Buglioni [2013] summarizes in total 68 security patterns that have
been written by himself, which are also specified with the POSA template. Some of these
patterns have appeared in [Schumacher et al., 2006], but have been revised by Fernandez
based on his experiences and security knowledge.
Yskout et al. [2006] gather a collection of security patterns based on an extensive
survey of security patterns in literature in order to form a system of security patterns. The
collected patterns are screened based on their complexity, quality, and abstraction level,
leading to 35 core security patterns that concentrate on software architecture and detailed
design. The authors document the patterns in a specific security pattern template, which
is extended from the GoF template.
Asnar et al. [2011a] present a process-oriented approach for capturing, validating, and
applying security and dependability organizational patterns. By applying this approach
within an industry lead EU project, an organizational pattern library has been established
based on a number of case studies of the project. The library covers a broad spectrum of
security management issues, e.g., legality, privacy, security, etc., totally including 49 orga-
nizational patterns. Each pattern is defined as a triple <Context; Requirement; Solution>,
the elements of which are specified by using the SI* framework [Massacci et al., 2010].
Given the different collections of security patterns, it is difficult to tell the exact number
of security patterns that have been developed. For one thing, the above reviewed security
pattern repositories cannot be exhaustive. For another thing, as existing security patterns
can cover different levels of abstraction, there is no consensus on the definition of security
pattern. For example, Heyman et al. [2007] argue that some existing security patterns
are too abstract to be considered as actual patterns (e.g., Asset Valuation), which are
closer to security guidelines or principles. They have performed an extensive survey over
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220 patterns, among which 55% are classified as core patterns, 35% are guidelines and
principles, and 10% are process activities. However, the definition of security patterns is
out of the scope of this thesis. Apart from this survey, in a recent mapping study, Ito
et al. [2015] acknowledge that currently there are more than 200 security patterns.
2.4.2 Security Pattern Selection
Scandariato et al. [2008] propose a methodology which can help analysts to systematically
select security patterns to develop secure systems. This methodology is built on 35 well-
documented security patterns [Yskout et al., 2006]. In particular, the 35 patterns have
been classified in two ways: development phases (architecture, design, etc.) and security
objectives (confidentiality, availability, etc.). Using such classifications, analysts are able
to navigate among the 35 patterns and identify candidates for application. Moreover,
the authors also associate quality labels with each security pattern, in order to assist
analysts in selecting the best security patterns among candidates, if there are more than
one. Lastly, the approach captures interrelations among patterns, such as depend and
impair, etc., which further complement the selection of security patterns. However, there
is no tool has been developed to support the application of this methodology, requiring
analysts to manually go through the entire analysis process.
Araujo and Weiss [2002] argue that selecting the best security patterns among all the
applicable ones is a knowledge-intensive process, as analysts have to thoroughly read and
understand all the alternative patterns. Therefore, the authors apply the Non-Functional
Requirement (NFR) framework as a complementary representation for security patterns
in order to help analysts to analyze trade-offs among candidate patterns. Their approach
captures forces of security patterns with contribution links to softgoals. In particular,
they have defined force hierarchy to capture the interactions among forces at different
level. As the root force is imposed on the entire system, analysts are able to compare
forces of all candidate security patterns within a particular force hierarchy, and assess
the total satisfaction of the root force so as to choose the best alternative. The authors
have practically applied their approach to enrich 14 security patterns with the force hi-
erarchy. In subsequent research, Mussbacher et al. [2006] formalize this approach and
enable automatic trade-off analysis with tool support. However, this approach does not
support analyzing the application context of security patterns, and thus analysts have to
first manually identify applicable patterns among a large number of security patterns.
Hafiz and Johnson [2006] survey existing security patterns and their classification
schemata. Specifically, the authors compare different classification schemata (e.g., log-
ical tiers, system viewpoint, and security concepts, etc.), and discuss their advantages
and disadvantages. Considering the evidence from the comparison, the authors construct
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Table 2.3: A comparison of security pattern selection techniques
Technique
Pattern Identify Applicable Patterns Trade-off
Number Classification Interrelationship Applicability Tool Method Tool
[Scandariato
et al., 2008]
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an organization of security patterns based on threat model (STRIDE) and system lev-
els, [Hafiz et al., 2007]. In subsequent work, Hafiz et al. [2012] further improve their
pattern schema by defining a comprehensive pattern language, involving all the 96 pat-
terns in the pattern organization. A pattern language describes the interrelations among
patterns and offers analysts a guidance in selecting the next pattern to consider.
Fernandez-Buglioni [2013] has proposed a systematic process for selecting and applying
security patterns during the entire lifecycle of software development. To select appropri-
ate patterns to apply, he leverages a multi-dimensional classification schema to categorize
patterns, e.g., via architectural levels, lifecycle stages, and domains, etc. [VanHilst et al.,
2009]. In addition, the approach also captures interactions among security patterns using
pattern diagrams, in order to facilitate the pattern selection. Specifically, the abstract/in-
stantiate relations among security patterns have been emphasized to play an important
role when building pattern diagrams [Fernandez et al., 2008].
Summary
Table 2.3 summarizes and compares the four approaches that we reviewed before. To select
the best security pattern, we have identified two main steps: firstly, identify applicable
patterns from the pattern catalog; secondly, perform trade-off analysis on all the applicable
patterns in order to select the best one.
In the first step of analysis, all the approaches rely on pattern classifications to navigate
through the entire pattern catalog. In addition, the interrelationships among patterns
have been investigated to different extents, assisting analysts in identify relevant patterns
that can be applied. The above two types of support can help to reduce the range of the
pattern catalog, as they actually capture part of context of security patterns. However,
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such supporting techniques cannot include all kinds of context, and thus analysts still
have to manually assess the applicability of security patterns. In addition, none of the
reviewed approaches has tool support for identifying applicable patterns.
In the second step of analysis, the NFR-based approach is dedicated to analyze trade-
offs among candidate patterns, which can be automated with a support tool. On the
contrary, other approaches acknowledge the need of performing such trade-off analysis,
but do not specify analysis methods nor have tool support.
2.4.3 Impact of applying security patterns
The application of a security pattern amounts to applying a security mechanism (i.e.,
the solution of the security pattern) to fulfill a security requirement (i.e., the problem of
the security pattern). However, as a side effect of such application, the applied security
mechanism will inevitably impact the original system requirements (both security and
non-security requirements), which has been acknowledged and taken into account by
several security analysis approaches. For example, Hatebur et al. [2007] deal with the
impact of security mechanisms by iteratively performing the security requirements analysis
and security mechanism analysis. In particular, if the precondition of an applied security
mechanism (encapsulated in concretized security problem frames) cannot be satisfied,
then new security requirements are derived from that precondition, demanding a new
round of security analysis.
Nuseibeh [2001] first proposes a requirements Twin Peaks model to demonstrate the
interactions between requirements and architecture at an abstract level. Heyman et al.
[2011] specialize the twin peaks model in the security area, leading to a Security Twin
Peaks model that emphasizes the bi-directional impact between security requirements
and security architectural design. Building on this conceptual model, the authors pro-
pose a constructive process for co-developing secure software architectures and security
requirements using security patterns. In particular, they identify three key notations for
co-development, which should be incorporated in the specification of security patterns:
firstly, the components and behavioral requirements that are introduced by a security
pattern; secondly, the roles and expectations that explain how the newly introduced com-
ponents interact with existing ones; thirdly, the residual goals that are considered by a
security pattern and need to be taken into account when instantiating the pattern.
Similarly, built on the Twin Peaks model, Okubo et al. [2012] propose a method
TMP-SA (Twin Peaks model Application for Security Analysis) which elicits security
requirements during the elaboration of software architecture. In particular, the authors
implement the mutual refinement process on top of their previous security analysis frame-
work MASG (Misuse case with Assets and Security Goals) [Okubo et al., 2009], which in-
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volves security concepts asset, security goal, threat, attack, and countermeasure. To unify
the analysis within both peaks, the authors consider not only architecture-independent
artifacts but also architecture-specific artifacts. For example, the approach can detect
architecture-specific threats, from which countermeasures are derived.
Although the above reviewed approaches contribute to the analysis of impact of se-
curity mechanisms, they focus on only the impact imposed on security requirements and
omit the impact on non-security requirements (either functional or non-functional require-
ments). In addition, all theses proposals are performed manually, which cannot be applied
to analyze large-scale systems.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we first present an in-depth survey on the state of the art in the area
of security requirements engineering in Section 2.1, from which we disclose several gaps
in analyzing security requirements of STSs. In light of such gaps, we specifically survey
related techniques. In Section 2.2 we review security analysis techniques beyond software
which can be incorporated in the holistic approach in order to tackle security issues
for particular artifacts, as well as approaches that are intended to holistically analyze
system security. Next, we examine existing approaches which profile attackers, reuse
attack knowledge, or deal with multistage attacks in Section 2.3. Such examination
helps us to get a deep understanding of the challenges in holistically analyzing attacks
of STSs. Finally, in Section 2.4, we survey existing security pattern repositories, as well
as techniques that select security patterns, shedding light on how to effectively reuse
existing knowledge. We also pay attention to the impact of security mechanisms imposed
on system requirements and discuss related approaches.
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Chapter 3
Baselines
Creation always involves building upon something else. There is
no art that doesn’t reuse. And there will be less art if every reuse
is taxed by the appropriator.
Lawrence Lessig
In this chapter, we describe existing techniques, based on which we develop our frame-
work. We first introduce the requirements problem, which specifies fundamental tasks
that need to be addressed during requirements analysis (Section 3.1). Then, we describe
the goal-oriented requirements modeling languages i* [Yu, 1997] and Techne [Jureta et al.,
2010], based on which we develop the three-layer requirements modeling language (Sec-
tion 3.2). In addition, we also introduce a contextual goal modeling language [Ali et al.,
2010], which is used for modeling attack patterns and security patterns. After that we
present existing security pattern repositories, which help analysts to reuse provable secu-
rity knowledge (Section 3.3). Lastly, we describe CAPEC attack patterns which we use
to identify realistic attacks (Section 3.4).
3.1 Requirements Problem
Zave and Jackson [1997] define a Requirements Engineering (RE) ontology in order to
specify the requirements problem. Their definition consists of three concepts: a Require-
ment is an optative property that specifies stakeholder needs, expected to be satisfied by
the system-to-be; a Domain Assumption is an indicative property that is relevant to the
system-to-be; a Specification is an optative property, which can be directly implemented
by the system-to-be in order to satisfy stakeholder needs. On the basis of these three
concepts, the requirements problem amounts to finding a collection of specifications S,
which can satisfy all requirements R under domain assumptions D. Thus, the requirements
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problem is represented as D,S ` R, meaning that domain assumptions and specifications







Figure 3.1: An illustration of the requirements problem from [Zave and Jackson, 1997]
As illustrated in Fig. 3.1, requirements are phenomena in the problem world, and
specifications offer a way for phenomena in the system-to-be to satisfy the requirements.
Due to the complexity of STSs, the requirements problem needs to be extended to account
for phenomena in all the three conceptual layers. We will describe such extensions in detail
in Chapter 4.
3.2 Goal Modeling Languages
Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering has received much attention in RE research, as
an intuitive means of capturing stakeholder goals and understanding underlying motiva-
tions for system requirements [Horkoff and Yu, 2011]. Over the last two decades, many
Goal Modeling Languages (GML) have been proposed to model and analyze requirements,
such as NFR [Chung, 1991], i* [Yu, 1997], KAOS [Dardenne et al., 1993], Techne [Jureta
et al., 2010], etc. Specifically, several advantages are offered by such GMLs, which fit well
our needs of dealing with holistic security requirements of STSs.
• GMLs capture stakeholder requirements as goals which can be and/or refined to
detailed ones. Such and-or tree structure can capture alternative solutions that
satisfy stakeholder requirements. In particular, many satisfaction analysis techniques
have been proposed in order to select the best alternative for fulfilling root level
goals [Horkoff and Yu, 2013]. By inheriting such a feature from GMLs, we are able
to capture and analyze alternative holistic security solutions for STSs.
• The social aspect of security requirements analysis has been paid an increasing at-
tention in the past fifteen years, which is particularly important for STSs. The i*
modeling language [Yu, 1997] has emphasized the need of social modeling in require-
ments analysis. In particular, it offers concepts and relations to model social actors
and their dependency. Many security requirements analysis approaches have been
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proposed based on i* so as to analyze social and organizational security issues, such
as [Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Giorgini et al., 2005b]. In this
thesis, we also base our approach on such social modeling constructs.
• Techne [Jureta et al., 2010] is a recently proposed requirements modeling language,
which maps Zave and Jackson’s requirements ontology into goal model concepts. As
such, it provides the theoretical foundation of using GMLs to solve the requirements
problem. In addition, it extends the requirements problem with priorities among
stakeholder requirements, which further enhance the selection among alternative
requirements specifications [Horkoff et al., 2014a]. Since we intend to tackle the
requirements problem of STSs, we adopt the mapping and corresponding constructs
defined in Techne.
In the remainder of this section, we first introduce the two particular GMLs (i.e., i*
and Techne), on the basis of which we develop our three-layer requirements modeling
language (Chapter 4). After that, we introduce a contextual goal modeling language,
which extends a goal modeling language (Tropos[Bresciani et al., 2004]) with notions of
context in order to model and analyze requirements in different contexts [Ali et al., 2010].
In particular, we leverage this extended modeling language to model attack patterns
(Chapter 5) and security patterns (Chapter 6) in terms of goal models with context,
enabling semi-automatic context analysis for those patterns.
3.2.1 i*
i* was developed by Yu [1997] as a goal- and agent-oriented modeling and reasoning
framework. Different from other GMLs, such as NFR or KAOS, i* promotes the notion of
actor as a first-class citizen, where an actor is an active and autonomous entity involved
in a system. In particular, i* can model and analyze requirement goals for system actors
from their perspectives via Strategic Rationale (SR) diagrams, as well as capture the
social interactions among actors via Strategic Dependency (SD) diagrams.
In order to model an actor’s strategic rationale, four intentional elements have been
defined, i.e., goal, task, softgoal, and resource, which are essential to the i* modeling
language. A goal is a state of affairs that is desired by an actor and has clear-cut criteria
of achievement; a softgoal is similar to a goal but does not have clear-cut criteria for its
satisfaction; a task represents an action that is executed by an actor in order for achieving
some goal; a resource is an entity (either physical or informational) that is required by
an actor in order to perform a task. In particular, the achievement of such intentional
elements is captured using means-end links, which shows how a means (i.e., a task) can
be used to reach an end. In particular, the end can be a goal to achieve, a task to
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accomplish, a resource to produce, or a softgoal to satisfice. In addition, a task can be
decomposed into one or several sub-elements via the task decomposition links. Lastly, all
such intentional elements can be linked to a softgoal using contribution links, indicating
to what extent the intentional element contributes to the fulfillment of the softgoal. Such
contribution links are typically used to evaluate and compare alternative requirements
specifications.
An actor’s goals can be fulfilled either by herself or by other actors. The former case
is captured by using the decomposition and means-end links described above, while the
later case is modeled by using dependency links. In particular, i* defines four types of
dependencies, each of which corresponds to one particular intentional element, such as
goal-dependency. The i* strategic dependency diagram is intended to capture such depen-
dency relationships among actors, presenting the interaction network in an organization.
The i* models are typically developed during early requirements stage, helping to
understand why a new system is needed. In addition, on top of the i* models, techniques
have been developed to capture and select solutions in goal models, such as [Horkoff and
Yu, 2010]. The i* framework has been widely adopted by the research community in fields
such as requirements engineering and business modeling. Specifically, Tropos [Bresciani
et al., 2004], as an agent-oriented software engineering methodology, has been built on
the i* meta-model and supports the entire system development lifecycle using intentional
goal models.
3.2.2 Techne
Jureta et al. [2010] propose Techne as a new generation of requirements modeling lan-
guage, which is defined based on a revised requirements core ontology [Jureta et al.,
2008]. The concepts defined in Techne can not only represent the requirements problem
defined by Zave and Jackson [1997] (introduced in Section 3.1), but also extend it with
quality and preference in order to better compare alternative solutions. In particular,
stakeholder’s requirements R is captured as goals and softgoals, while system specifica-
tion S includes tasks and quality constraints which operationalize goals and softgoals,
respectively. Moreover, Techne explicitly captures domain assumptions D.
To better deal with the selection of alternatives, stakeholder’s preferences are taken
into account, which are modeled by preference relations between requirements. Specifi-
cally, a preference relation means one requirement is strictly more desirable than another.
As reported in [Horkoff et al., 2014a], by capturing stakeholder’s preferences, Techne rea-
soning is able to choose between alternatives in more cases than i* reasoning, providing
enhanced reasoning power.
It is worth noting that Techne does not include graphical modeling notations but
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an abstract requirements modeling language, which provides the formal foundations for
new modeling languages applicable during early phases of the requirements engineering
process. Thus, when defining our modeling framework in Chapter 4, we borrow concepts
from Techne and define corresponding graphical notations by ourselves (mainly based on
the i* modeling notations).
3.2.3 A Contextual Goal Modeling Language
Ali et al. [2010] argue that requirements should be analyzed in a way that reflects context
settings, as stakeholder’s requirements can vary from context to context. As such, they
have proposed a goal-based framework for contextual requirements modeling and analysis,
in which they relate goals and contexts. In particular, contexts are treated as labels that
can be attached to specific goal model elements, such as shown in Fig. 3.2. Moreover,
they define semantics for contexts that are modeled within goal models. For example, in
the first case of Fig. 3.2, goal G represents a requirement if and only if context C holds.
In the other two parts of the figure, a link between two goals is part of the goal model



















Figure 3.2: Goal models with contexts
In this thesis, we use this contextual goal modeling language to model attack patterns
and security patterns. More specifically, we follow their approach to model contexts, as
illustrated in the Fig. 3.2. It is worth noting that this modeling language extends Tropos,
which is built on the i* meta-model. Since we have decided to also base our three-layer
requirements modeling language on i*, the constructed contextual goal models can be
easily and seamlessly integrated with the three-layer requirements models.
3.3 Security Patterns
Security patterns consist of <security requirement (problem), security mechanism (solution)>
pairs that capture particular ways of solving known security problems. Since patterns
constitute an effective way to encapsulate security expertise, they can significantly help
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analysts who have little security knowledge to perform security analysis. As introduced
in Section 2.4.1, many security patterns have been proposed at different abstraction levels
and several pattern repositories have been established, such as the work done by Asnar
et al. [2011a] and Fernandez-Buglioni [2013].
In this thesis, we propose to make use of security patterns to operationalize security
goals in terms of security mechanisms within each of the three layers. In particular, our
approach not only refers to the security pattern repositories, but seamlessly integrates
those patterns as part of our framework in order to practically apply such patterns in
an effective manner. In this section, we describe existing security patterns in detail.
Specifically, we describe essential concepts of security patterns, which play an important
role in our security requirements analysis.
3.3.1 Pattern Templates
Patterns are structured documents that capture proven solutions for recurring problems.
Different templates have been proposed for documenting patterns. Alexander et al. [1977]
first define a pattern as “a three-part rule, which expresses a relation between a certain
context, a problem, and a solution”. In the same spirit of Alexander’s proposal, Gamma
et al. [1994] develop design patterns to support software design, in which they define
Gang of Four (GoF) template for specifying patterns. Similarly, Buschmann et al. [1996]
propose pattern-oriented software architecture and define POSA template; Coplien [1996]
define software patterns with his own template (i.e., Coplien template), which has been
further used for specifying organizational patterns [Coplien and Harrison, 2004]. These
subsequent approaches have enriched the initial pattern templates (defined by Alexander)
with specific sections according to their own purposes. For example, the POSA template
has an Implementation section to support the downstream application of a pattern, while
Coplien template has a Resulting Context section which describes the influences of a
pattern in detail.
As different templates have their own focuses, they are used by different security pat-
tern developers for particular purposes. For example, Fernandez-Buglioni [2013] specifies
security patterns based on the POSA template, while Scandariato et al. [2008] use the
GoF template and extend it with security aspects. As pointed out by Mowbray and
Malveau [1997], the core concepts of a pattern include Name, Context, Problem, Forces,
and Solution, which should be specified in all patterns. In particular, Context describes
the situations in which the pattern may apply; the Problem presents the problem for which
the pattern offers a solution; Forces are concerns, often contradictory, which have to be
taken into account when determining the applicability of a pattern; Solution describes
fundamental principles underlying the pattern, which address the problem of the pattern.
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Table 3.1: An exemplary security pattern in [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]
Name: Abstract Intrusion Detection System
Context:
Nodes for local systems that need to communicate with each other using the Internet.
Problem:
An attacker may try to infiltrate our system through the Internet. We need to know when an
attack is happening and take appropriate response.
Force:
• Communication. The system is usually more secure if we have a closed network. However, in
today’s world it is better and more realistic to use the Internet or other insecure network to reduce
costs, which may subject our network to security threats.
• Real time behavior. Attacks should be detected before the attack completes its purpose, so that
we can preserve our assets and save time and money. It is difficult to detect an attack when it is
happening, but such detection is imperative if we are to react timely and appropriately.
• Incomplete security. Security measures such as encryption, authentication and so on may not
protect all our systems, because they do not cover all possible attacks.
• Non-suspicious users. Request coming from a non-suspicious address (permitted by a firewall)
could still be harmful and should be monitored further.
• Flexibility. Hard-coding the type of attack can be done easily. But it will be hard and time-
consuming to adapt to attack patterns that change constantly.
Solution:
Each request to access the network is analyzed to check whether it conforms to the definition of
an attack. If we detect an attack, an alert is raised and some countermeasures may be taken.
In this thesis, when integrating security patterns into our framework (Chapter 6), we
exclusively focus on analyzing and reusing knowledge related to these core concepts.
Table 3.1 shows the Abstract Intrusion Detection System pattern [Fernandez-Buglioni,
2013], which has been specified with these core concepts. Specifically, this pattern is in-
tended to prevent attacker from infiltrating into the target system (Problem), which com-
municates with other nodes via Internet (Context). Additionally, a list of considerations
should be taken into account when dealing with this security problem, e.g., detecting at-
tacks when it is happening is imperative for timely reactions, but it is difficult to achieve
(Forces). After balancing such forces for the problem in this context, one solution can be




Attack patterns document reusable attack knowledge, helping analysts with attack anal-
ysis. CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) is a compre-
hensive and well-documented attack knowledge repository, which has been incrementally
built starting from 2007 and includes 504 attack patterns thus far1. In this thesis, we pro-
pose to leverage the reusable attack knowledge of CAPEC in order to practically identify
possible attacks for STSs. Specifically, we consider the following advantages of CAPEC:
• CAPEC involves a wide range of attack categories, from social engineering attacks,
to software attacks, to physical attacks, perfectly meeting our needs for holistic
security analysis of STSs.
• CAPEC attack patterns are well-documented in a structural way, covering different
aspects of an attack. Such detailed and comprehensive information can help ana-
lysts to better understand and apply attack patterns. We will further describe and
illustrate the essential parts of an attack pattern in the following subsection.
• Apart from attack patterns, CAPEC also offers useful pattern categories (e.g., mech-
anisms of attack and domains of attack) that help to navigate through the large
number of patterns.
Similar to the security patterns, instead of only referring to the CAPEC knowledge
repository, we intend to seamlessly integrate the CAPEC attack patterns into our holistic
security analysis framework and promote their practical adoption. As such, in the next
subsection, we describe in detail the specific attack knowledge that is concerned by our
framework.
3.4.1 CAPEC Schema
Attack patterns, as a specific type of pattern, are specified in the same spirit of design
patterns [Gamma et al., 1994], but from an attacker’s viewpoint. Thus, an attack pattern
also specifies the three primary pattern concepts that are proposed by Alexander et al.
[1977], i.e., Context, Problem, Solution. It is worth noting that such pattern concepts are
described from an attacker’s perspective, i.e., what an attacker wants to attack (Problem),
how does the attacker perform the attack (Solution), under what situation (Context).
Beyond these concepts, a CAPEC attack pattern also includes a lot of detailed attack-
related information, such as Mitigations, Severity, Likelihood of Exploit, etc. A full schema




Table 3.2: An exemplary CAPEC attack pattern
Name: SQL Injection (CAPEC-66)
Attack Motivation-Consequences:
• Integrity. Modify application data
• Confidentiality. Read application data
• Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability. Execute unauthorized code or commands
• Confidentiality/Access Control/Authorization. Gain privileges / assume identity
Attack Prerequisites:
• SQL queries used by the application to store, retrieve or modify data
• User-controllable input that is not properly validated by the application as part of SQL queries
Technical Context:






• Determine user-controllable input susceptible to injection
• Experiment and try to exploit SQL Injection vulnerability
Table 3.2 presents the SQL Injection pattern (CAPEC-66), showing the attack knowl-
edge that is related to the primary pattern concepts. A full specification of this pattern can
be found online3, which also contains other detailed attack knowledge. In particular, this
attack pattern can be used to gain privileges to an application (Problem) which use SQL
queries to operate data (Context). To this end, an attacker should first survey the appli-
cation and then determine user-controllable input susceptible to injection, based on which
she can experiment and conduct SQL injection attacks (Solution). Note that this pattern
can also deal with other Problems as specified in the Attack Motivation-Consequences
section, i.e., modify application data.
In our framework, we mainly focus on identifying and selecting attack patterns. Thus,
we exclusively concern the attack knowledge that can be mapped to the three primary pat-
tern concepts. Specifically, we extract the context of an attack from two pattern sections,
Attack Prerequisite and Technical Context ; we analyze the problem of an attack based
on section Attack Motivation-Consequences ; and the solution of an attack is described
in section Attack Execution Flow. In Chapter 5, we will describe a detailed approach to
3https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html
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process CAPEC patterns and effectively make use of the corresponding attack knowledge
to support our analysis.
3.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we describe several existing techniques, based on which we develop our
holistic security requirements analysis framework. We also explain the reasons why we
choose such techniques, and associate them with specific parts of our framework. In
particular, we introduce the Requirements Problem as the theoretical foundation of our
holistic requirements framework (Section 3.1). We base our modeling language on two
goal-oriented modeling languages, i.e., i* and Techne, the advantages and core concepts
of which are introduced in Section 3.2. Moreover, we also introduce a contextual goal
modeling language, which is used for modeling attack patterns and security patterns. In
Section 3.3, we introduce existing security patterns, which we intend to integrate into our
framework in order to practically support analysts with little security knowledge. Espe-
cially, we present different templates that have been used by existing security patterns, on
top of which we have described and illustrated the essential concepts of security patterns
that are used by our approach, including Context, Problem, Forces, and Solution. In line
with the integration of security pattern, we aim to seamlessly incorporate practical attack
knowledge into our framework, helping analysts to identify realistic attacks. Specifically,
we choose CAPEC attack patterns as the attack knowledge source because of their wide
coverage and detailed documentation, and introduce such patterns in detail in Section 3.4.





The most fundamental problem in software development is
complexity. There is only one basic way of dealing with
complexity: divide and conquer.
Bjarne Stroustrup
In this chapter, we present a holistic security requirements analysis framework which
divides an STS into three layers: a social layer (business processes and social actors), a
software layer (software applications that support the social layer) and an infrastructure
layer (physical and technological infrastructure). Within this framework, each layer fo-
cuses on particular concerns and has its own requirements and specifications, which are
captured by goal-oriented requirements models. In particular, specifications in one layer
dictate requirements in lower layers, and we use cross-layer links to capture such depen-
dencies. As such, the framework not only performs security requirements analysis at each
of the three layers, but also takes into account the connections among layers. Eventually,
the framework generates holistic security solutions that can satisfy security requirements
at all layers, achieving holistic security protection.
Specifically, we first describe the rationale of having such a three-layer structure and
how it supports the analysis of the requirements problem in Section 4.1. Next, we propose
a goal-oriented modeling language based on existing techniques (i* and Techne) in Sec-
tion 4.2, which models requirements of STSs based on the proposed three-layer structure.
In Section 4.3, we introduce a systematic process which guides holistic security require-
ments analysis across three layers. The process takes a system’s functional requirements
and high-level security requirements as inputs, iteratively performs security requirements
analysis throughout the three layers in order to generate holistic security solutions. In
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particular, we have proposed a collection of analysis methods that have been formalized
so as to (semi-)automate each analysis step in the process. After that we discuss several
aspects of the proposed framework in more detail, such as potential and applicability,
in Section 4.4. In the meanwhile, such discussions shed light on the motivation of other
parts of the thesis (i.e., Chapter 5-7). In the end, we compare our three-layer framework
with related work (Section 4.5).
4.1 A Three-Layer Structure for STSs
When dealing with STSs, compared to traditional software systems, there is a plethora
of artifacts that need to be accounted for in order to make the entire system work effec-
tively. In particular, we focus on three important aspects of STSs which have received
much attention from the security community, and structure them into three layers. At
the most abstract level, we consider a social layer that conceptualized in terms of social
actors, social dependencies, and business processes. At the next layer, we consider soft-
ware applications that support the social layer, conceptualized in terms of architectural
components. Finally, we consider an infrastructure layer that focuses on the technolog-

















Figure 4.1: The requirements problem extended for STSs
Once structuring STSs into the three layers, we argue that each layer involves specific
phenomena, which compose solutions to deal with security requirements of STSs. Thus,
each layer has its own requirements, which are satisfied by layer-specific specifications
under corresponding domain assumptions. We contend that the original requirements
problem, which was described in Fig. 3.1 (Section 3.1), cannot accommodate the require-
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ments analysis of STSs, as it exclusively focuses on how a machine interacts with the world.
Therefore, we extend the original requirements problem to deal with the requirements prob-
lem of each layer, respectively (as shown in Fig. 4.1). In particular, the Machine in the
original requirements problem has been generalized into Artifacts. Each of these Artifacts
is designed by layer-specific phenomena and satisfies corresponding requirements under
specific domain assumptions in the World. For example, the social-layer requirements
(Rs) are satisfied by business process specifications (Ss) under the social-layer domain as-
sumptions (Ds), i.e., Ss, Ds ` Rs, and other layers have their own requirements problem,
likewise.
Given the three-layer structure, the specifications of one layer determine the require-
ments of lower layers. In particular, as shown in Fig. 4.1, social-layer specifications (Ss)
determine the requirements of software applications (Ra), while application specifications
(Sa) affect the requirements of the infrastructure (Ri) . The semantics of these depen-
dencies is that the achievement of the specification in one layer requires the satisfaction
of requirements in its lower layer. Such dependencies are captured manually, through













[Da, Sa ⊢ Ra]
Infrastructure Goal Model







Figure 4.2: An overview of the three-layer security requirements analysis framework
The three-layer structure and the extended requirements problem serve as the basis for
holistically dealing with security requirements of STS. As shown in Fig. 4.2, our approach
starts with stakeholder security requirements, and analyzes them across layers with regard
54 A Three-Layer Security Requirements Analysis Framework
to layer-specific goals and specifications, resulting in a set of holistic security solutions
encompassing security issues in all three layers. We will present details of the entire
analysis process in Section 4.3.
4.2 A Three-Layer Requirements Modeling Language
In this section, we propose a three-layer requirements modeling language, which we use
to model requirements of STSs in three layers. We first describe the meta-model of
this language. In particular, we focus on explaining the extended concepts used in this
language. After that, we provide the formal definition of each concept, based on which we
define inference rules that support security analysis (we will describe in the next section).
4.2.1 Conceptual Model
We base our modeling language on i* and Techne, and extend them from two dimensions.
Firstly, we extend goals and tasks in order to model requirements of STSs in three layers.
Secondly, we define security concepts that can be used to model and analyze security
requirements. Fig. 4.3 shows an overview of the meta-model of the proposed language,
where the newly introduced concepts are highlighted with dashed rectangles. For the
original concepts, we reuse their definitions as presented in [Yu, 1997; Jureta et al., 2010],
which have been introduced in Section 3.2. For the new concepts, we describe each of






































Figure 4.3: Meta-model of the three-layer security requirements framework
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Illustrative Example
In a smart grid real-time pricing scenario, the energy supplier collects real-time energy
consumption data and balance loads on the power grid. This scenario presents a typical
STS. Firstly, it includes a business process for price generation. Specifically, the energy
supplier will periodically collect load information about the power grid, and generate
appropriate energy prices accordingly in order to regulate the load of the power grid. On
the other side, the energy consumers will adjust their energy usage based on the real-
time price. Secondly, a number of applications are involved in this scenario to support
the interactive process. In particular, a home energy management system is used by
the energy consumer to communicate with the energy supplier and control the smart
appliances in her apartment. Thirdly, physical devices (e.g., energy management server)
are required to deploy the software applications, and networks need to be appropriately
configured to support communications.
We here use a part of the scenario as an example to illustrate our three-layer framework,
the full details of this scenario will be presented in Section 9.1, where we report the case
study performed based on this scenario. In particular, Fig. 4.4 presents the part of scenario
we use for illustration, which focuses on Energy Supplier and related applications and
infrastructure. This figure shows how requirements of STSs are structured and modeled
in three layers, and will be used for demonstrating relevant concepts of the three-layer
requirements modeling language, as indicated in Fig. 4.3.
Extended Requirement Concepts
As we build goal models for different layers capturing different concerns, we specialize Goal
into layer-specific goals that focus on a particular aspect of stakeholder needs. Specifically,
in the social layer, Business Goals represent a stakeholder’s high-level requirements for
his business. For example, the energy supplier has a business goal about applying real-
time pricing strategy to regulate loads on the power grid (i.e., BG1 in Fig. 4.4). Software
Goals represent stakeholder requirements in respect of software applications that are used
to perform corresponding business activities. For example, the energy control application
needs to implement functions to support price calculation (i.e., AG1 in Fig. 4.4). Infras-
tructure Goals represent stakeholder requirements on technical and physical infrastructure
that supports the execution of software applications. For example, the energy supplier
server needs to set up a channel to enable communications between the energy control
application and the smart meter firmware (i.e., IG2 in Fig. 4.4).
Accordingly, we assign Tasks at different layers with specific operational definitions
reflecting the layer. In particular, a task amounts to a Business Activity in the social layer,
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Figure 4.4: An excerpt of the three-layer requirements model of the smart grid scenario
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while in the software layer it is a Software Function, and in the infrastructure layer it is
a Deployment setting. For example, in the social layer, to satisfy the business goal BG1,
a collection of business activities should be performed (e.g., BT1-3 ), which are captured
as tasks in this layer. Note that when identifying and modeling tasks in the social,
analysts should only focus on layer-specific phenomena, while ignore lower-layer concerns.
In this example, analysts only consider what business activities are required to achieve
the business goal, regardless of whether and how software applications are used within the
activities. The benefits of assigning the operational definitions to tasks at different layers
are twofold. Firstly, the operational definitions can help analysts to distinguish tasks
among layers and determine the granularity of tasks; secondly, tasks with operational
definitions can be connected to concepts within additional design models, such as the tasks
of the social layer correspond to the business process activities of BPMN (Business Process
Modeling Notation). As such, the layer-specific goal models are easy to be transformed
into corresponding design models by using available techniques (e.g., [Pimentel et al.,
2012; Halleux et al., 2008]), facilitating system development in later lifecycle stages. To
simplify the modeling constructs, we use the same notion (ellipse/hexagon) to model
goals/tasks in different layers, the layer-specific meaning of these concepts is implied by
the layer to which they belong.
Apart from the above concepts, two relations are also included in the proposed frame-
work. Operationalize is a relation that relates a goal to a task that operationalizes it
within the same layer. For example, in Fig. 4.4, business goal Customer is notified about
the price (BG5) is operationalized by business activity ES sends price to customer (BT3).
Support is a cross-layer relation, which indicates that a goal in one layer supports a task
in the above layer. Thus, the satisfaction of the task requires the achievement of the
goal, while the achievement of the goal cannot imply the satisfaction of the task. For-
mally speaking, the satisfaction of the goal is a necessary condition for satisfying the task,
which is defined below:
support(G, T ) ∧ satisfied(T )→ satisfied(G)
Take business activity BT1 as an example, to execute the activity calculate price, it re-
quires support from Energy Supplier Server Application (ESSA), where the application
goal AG1 must be satisfied. On the other hand, the satisfaction of AG1 is not enough
to guarantee the successful execution of BT1, as it also depends on how Energy Supplier
(ES) use the application to perform the task, i.e., it can also be affected by specific phe-
nomena in the social layer. The support relation is used likewise between the application
layer and the physical layer.
When determining whether a task requires support from the next layer down, analysts
should take into account the layer-specific operational definition of the task. In particular,
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as a task is a business activity in the social layer, analysts should determine whether the
execution of the activity involves any software applications. If so, a support link should be
added to capture such relation. For example, in Fig. 4.4, as ES intends to send price data
to the customer using the application ESSA, the requirements goal AG5 is introduced
to the application layer which supports the business activity BT3, i.e., the satisfaction of
the task in the business layer requires the satisfaction of the goal in the application layer.
The application will, in turn, refine the goal into more detailed tasks and goals within
the application layer.. At some point in the application layer refinement, tasks, which
are application functions, will require support from the physical hardware that deploys
the software application. As shown in Fig. 4.4, to deal with the modeling scalability
problem, instead of modeling the support link for each task in the application layer from
the infrastructure layer, we graphically model the support link from the lower-layer goal
IG1 to the application agent ESSA. Semantically, that support link indicates that all
the tasks of the application ESSA are supported by the goal IG1. In addition to this
default support link, for each application task, within or out of the ESSA actor, analysts
also need to identify whether the task requires additional support from the infrastructure
layer. For instance, the application task Receive and store energy consumption data from
SMF (AT5) requires the Energy Supplier Server to be connected with SMF, otherwise
this function cannot be correctly executed. This is captured in Fig. 4.4 via the supports
link from IG2 to AT5.
Extended Security Requirement Concepts.
Security goals have been treated as a specialization of softgoal in several goal-oriented
security analysis approaches, such as [Chung, 1993; Oladimeji et al., 2006b; Elahi et al.,
2010]. We follow such paradigm and express more detailed and specific security require-
ments. In particular, we define a security goal as a specialization of softgoal, which
represents stakeholder’s security needs with regard to specific assets and time intervals.
Since security requirements can interact notoriously with system functional require-
ments, we denote security goals with a graphical separation from their functional coun-
terparts, as shown in Fig. 4.4. However, security goals are semantically connected with
the goals/tasks via an Interval attribute (explained below). Each security goal is rep-
resented by a template: <importance><security property>[<asset>, <interval>]. Take
security goal SG1 as an example (Fig. 4.4), High Integrity [energy consumption data,
interval(BG1)] represents the security requirement “protecting integrity of energy con-
sumption data during the execution interval of BG1 to a high degree”. We describe the
four attributes of a security goal in detail as follows:

















































Figure 4.6: Overview of assets
• The Security Property specifies a characteristic of security. In this paper, we exclu-
sively focus on confidentiality, integrity, and availability, which are the three main
dimensions of information security ISO [2012]. In addition, we detail sub-properties
of these three security properties based on the taxonomy defined by Firesmith Fire-
smith [2004], as shown in Fig. 4.5. For example, under the security property integrity,
there are four sub-properties data integrity, service integrity, application integrity,
and hardware integrity. Note that the security properties we consider in our work
constitute a starting point and that can be extended in the future.
• The Asset is anything that has value to an organization, such as data or services.
Fig. 4.6 shows an overview of types of assets accommodated by our framework, as
well as the interrelationships among them. In particular, we consider services as
assets at the social layer; applications that execute services are considered as assets
in the software layer; in the infrastructure layer, we analyze hardware as an asset
which deploys applications. Moreover, data is an asset that is considered in all three
layers.
• The Interval of a security goal indicates the time period when the security goal
applies. Haley et al. have pointed out that “Threats can have a ‘time’ element,
stating that the harm will occur only if the violation occurs before or after some point,
or within some interval” Haley et al. [2004]. We agree that the time dimension does
affect system security requirements analysis. In particular, we specify an interval in
terms of the execution period of a task, i.e., interval(task). Note that a goal can
also be used to represent an interval, which is the execution period of all tasks that
operationalize this goal. In this way, the security goals are implicitly connected with
the system functional requirements.
• The Importance of a security goal indicates the priority of a security goal. Possible
values include {very low, low, medium, high, very high}.
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A Security Mechanism is a method that operationalizes a security goal. We define the
security mechanism as a specialization of task. The operationalization relation between
security mechanisms and security goals is a many-to-many relation, i.e., one security
mechanisms can satisfy multiple security goals, and one security goal may require more
than one security mechanisms. In our framework, security mechanisms are also applied
in different layers, and become part of the specification of the corresponding layer. For
example, Auditing is a security mechanism which can be applied in the social layer to
ensure the integrity of a business activity, while Input Guard is a software-specific security
mechanism, which checks all inputs of a software application. It is worth noting that we
import the layer-specific security mechanisms from existing security patterns, which will
be presented in the next section.
4.2.2 Formal Definitions
Based on the above explanation of concepts of our modeling language, we present their
formal definitions. In particular, the formal predicates we defined here will be used
for specifying inference rules which (semi-)automate security requirements analysis (in
Section 4.3).
Concepts
• Definition 1. An Actor denotes an entity of an STS, which has goals and should
perform tasks to satisfy those goals. In particular, an actor can be a social agent
(human), a software agent (application), or a physical agent (hardware), formally,
Actor = Human ∪ Application ∪Hardware. We define A = {a1, ..., an} is a set of
Actors. If a ∈ A, we write actor(a).
• Definition 2. A Requirement is an abstract concept which represents stakeholder’s
needs, including goals, softgoals, tasks, resources, and domain assumptions. For-
mally, Requirement = Goal ∪ Softgoal ∪ Task ∪Resource ∪DomainAssumption.
We define RE = {re1, ..., ren} is a set of Requirements. If re ∈ RE, we write
req(re).
• Definition 3. A Goal represent an actor’s desire, which has clear-cut criteria for
its satisfaction. For our three-layer requirements language, a goal can be a business
goal, a software goal, or a infrastructure goal, formally, Goal = BusinessGoal ∪
SoftwareGoal ∪ InfrastructureGoal. We define G = {g1, ..., gn} is a set of Goals.
If g ∈ G, we write goal(g).
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• Definition 4. A Softgoal is an actor’s desire, which does not have clear-cut crite-
ria for its satisfaction. Usually, a softgoal is used to capture stakeholder’s quality
requirements. We define S = {s1, ..., sn} is a set of Softgoals. If s ∈ S, we write
softgoal(s).
• Definition 5. A Task represents an intention to perform actions, by accomplishing
which an actor can achieve her goals. For our three-layer requirements language, a
task can be an intention to perform business activities, software functions, or infras-
tructure deployments, formally, Task = BusinessActivity ∪ SoftwareFunction ∪
InfrastructureDeployment. We define T = {t1, ..., tn} is a set of Tasks. If t ∈ T ,
we write task(t).
• Definition 6. A Resource is a physical or informational entity that an actor requires
in order to perform a task. We define R = {r1, ..., rn} is a set of Resources. If r ∈ R,
we write resource(r).
• Definition 7. A DomainAssumption is an indicative statement that describes
phenomena that are considered to be unchanged during system development, within
which tasks are performed to achieve the goals. We define DA = {da1, ..., dan} is a
set of DomainAssumptions. If da ∈ DA, we write d assumption(da).
• Definition 8. A SecurityGoal is a specialization of softgoal that focuses on security
concerns, i.e., SecurityGoal ⊂ Softgoal. We define SG = {sg1, ..., sgn} is a set
of SecurityGoals. If sg ∈ SG, we write sec goal(sg). Specifically, we define a
security goal as a four-tuple, which expresses stakeholder’s security needs with regard
to an asset and time interval. ∀sg ∈ SG, sg = (imp, sp, as, int), where imp ∈
Importance, sp ∈ SecurityProperty, as ∈ Asset, int ∈ Interval.
• Definition 9. A SecurityMechanism is a specialization of task which opera-
tionalizes a security goal, i.e., SecurityMechanism ⊂ Task. We define SM =
{sm1, ..., smn} is a set of SecurityMechanisms. If sm ∈ SM , we write sec mechanism(sm).
Relations
• Definition 10. We define REF ⊂ RE×RE is a set of refinement relations. If re1 ∈
RE, re2 ∈ RE, such that re1 can be refined into re2, we write refine(re2, re1) ∈
REF . This relation indicates that requirement re1 can be satisfied as long as re-
quirement re2 is satisfied.
• Definition 11. We define AND REF ⊂ RE × RE is a set of and-refinement
relations. If re1 ∈ RE, . . . , ren ∈ RE, such that re1 can be and-refined into
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{re2, . . . , ren}, we write and refine(re2, re1), . . . , and refine(ren, re1) ∈ AND REF .
Such relations indicate that requirement re1 can only be satisfied when all its and-
refinements (i.e., requirement re2, . . . , ren) are satisfied.
• Definition 12. We define OPE ⊂ T × G is a set of operationalization relations,
which represent how goals can be achieved by tasks. If t ∈ T, g ∈ G, such that g
can be operationalized as t, we write operationalize(t, g) ∈ OPE. Based on this
relation, goal g can be satisfied as long as task t is satisfied.
• Definition 13. We define SUP ⊂ G×T is a set of support relations, which capture
interactions between tasks in one layer and goals in the next layer down. If g ∈
G, t ∈ T , such that t is supported by g, we write support(t, g) ∈ SUP . Based on
this relation, the satisfaction of g is a necessity condition for the satisfaction of task
t, i.e., satisfied(t)→ satisfied(g)
• Definition 14. We define DEL ⊂ A×R×R×A×R is a set of dependency relations,
which represent interactions among actors. If a1 ∈ A, re1 ∈ RE, re ∈ RE, a2 ∈
A, re2 ∈ RE, such that actor a1’s requirement re1 depends on actor a2’s requirement
re2 for requirement re, we write depend(a1, re1, re, a2, re2). In this case, a1 is a
depender who depends for something to be provided; re1 is the requirement of the
depender, which explains why the dependency exists; re is the dependum, which is
the object of the dependency; a2 is the dependee who should provide the dependum;
re2 is the requirement of the dependee, which explains how the dependee intends
to provide the dependum. It is worth noting that both the depender’s requirement
and the dependee’s requirement can be omitted in a dependency relation, which is
in line with the strategic dependency diagram of i*.
• Definition 15. We define CON ⊂ RE×V alue×S is a set of contribution relations,
which represent the influences of requirement elements on softgoals. If re ∈ RE, v ∈
V alue, s ∈ S, such that re contributes to the satisfaction of s to the extent of
v, we write contribute(re, v, s) ∈ CON . In particular, we consider four types of
contributions links, each of which represents a particular extent of contributions,
V alue = {Make,Help,Hurt, Break}.
• Definition 16. We define HAS ⊂ A×RE is a set of has relations, which associate
an actor with her requirements. If a ∈ A, re ∈ RE, such that actor a requires
requirement re, we write has(a, re) ∈ HAS.
Table 4.1 summaries the predicates of all the concepts and relations we have defined
above. Such predicates are used for specifying formal inference rules which support our
security requirements analysis. More details will be presented in the next section.
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d assumption(DomainAssumption : da)
sec goal(SecurityGoal : sg)
sec mechanism(SecurityMechanism : sm)
Relations
refine(Requirement : re2, Requirement : re2)
and refine(Requirement : re2, Requirement : re2)
operationalize(Task : t, Goal : g)
support(Goal : g, Task : t)
depend(Actor : a1, Requirement : re1, Requirement : re,Actor : a2, Requirement : re2)
contribute(Requirement : re, V alue : v, Softgoal : s)
has(Actor : a,Requirement : re)
Apart from the above three-layer requirements constructs, a number of related concepts
and relations will also be used in defining inference rules, which are shown in Table 4.2.
Specifically, the concepts data, service, application, and hardware represent four types
of assets, as shown in Fig. 4.6. The concept threat specifies a threat to systems, which is
used for determining critical security goals. We will describe how to discover threats in
detail in Chapter 5.
For the relations in Fig. 4.6, sg attributes shows all the detailed attributes of a security
goal, such as importance, concerned security properties, etc. The predicate interval of
associates a task with corresponding time interval during which the task is performed.
The predicate is a describes a specialization relation between two entities. The predicate
part of describes the part-of relation between two assets. The predicates has input and
has output present the data flow information of a task. The unary predicates is applicable
and is critical are assertions on security goals. Finally, th attributes details the attributes
of a threat, while threaten presents a security goals is threatened by a threat.
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sg attributes(SecurityGoal : sg, Importance : imp, SecurityProperty : sp,Asset : as, Interval : int)
interval of(Requirement : re)
is a(Entity : e1, Entity : e2)
part of(Asset : as1, Asset : as2)
has input(Task : t,Data : d)
has output(Task : t,Data : d)
is applicable(SecurityGoal : sg)
is critical(SecurityGoal : sg)
th attributes(Threat : th, ThreatType : ty, Asset : as, Interval : int)
threaten(Threat : th, SecurityGoal : sg)
4.3 A Holistic Security Requirements Analysis Process
In this section, we propose a systematic process and a set of security requirements analysis
methods to guide security analysis both within one and across layers. Fig. 4.7 shows an
overview of the analysis process, which starts from security requirements analysis at the
social layer and follows to analyze security requirements at the software layer and the
infrastructure layer, respectively. Specifically, within each layer, we refine and concretize
security goals to identify possible operationalizations in terms of security mechanisms.
Cross-layer analysis aims to propagate the security concerns from one layer to the next
layer down. After security analysis has been performed for all layers, we will obtain a
holistic security goal model, based on which we can obtain a collection of textual alter-
native security solutions that are the final output of our approach. A set of inference
rules is defined to (semi-)automates the security analysis, which has been implemented
in Disjunctive Datalog [Eiter et al., 1997]. All such rules can be automatically inferred
by our prototype tool, which will be introduced in Chapter 8. In the remainder of this
section, we will go through each analysis step and explain corresponding security analysis
methods we have proposed.








































Figure 4.7: An overview of the three-layer security requirements analysis process
4.3.1 Security Goal Refinement
Having stakeholder’s initial security needs as input, analysts should iteratively refine them
into more concrete counterparts in order to capture more precise needs of stakeholders and
eventually operationalize such needs. Our framework supports three refinement methods,
which operate on the three attributes of security goals, respectively. The refinement
methods have been formalized as inference rules to better support analysis, as shown in
Table 4.3.
Fig. 4.8 presents a series of examples of security goal refinements based on security
goal High Integrity [energy consumption data, interval(BG1)] (Fig. 4.4), involving all three
refinement methods. The type of each refinement is explicitly annotated in the figure,
and the reference models that are used for corresponding refinements are presented in the
left part of the figure. Using this example, we explain the three refinements methods and
their corresponding inference rules (Table 4.3) in detail below.
It is worth noting that Table 4.3 specifies the formal semantics of the proposed inference
rules, but does not show the exact implementation in Disjuctive Datalog. This is because
Disjuctive Datalog has a couple of restrictions on the representation of rules, and thus not
all the proposed inference rules can be directly implemented. For example, it does not
allow disjunction expressions in the body part of a rule. Instead, we create an individual
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rule for each of those disjunctive expressions. Therefore, showing all such specific rules
may introduce extra difficulties for understanding the overall semantics of our rules.
Table 4.3: Inference rules for refinement methods
No. Content
REF.P #create(sec goal(SG2)) ∧ sg attributes(SG2, IMP, SP2, AS, INT ) ∧ and refine(SG2, SG1)
← is a(SP2, SP1) ∧ sg attributes(SG1, IMP, SP1, AS, INT )
REF.A #create(sec goal(SG2)) ∧ sg attributes(SG2, IMP, SP,AS2, INT ) ∧ and refine(SG2, SG1)
← part of(AS2, AS1) ∧ sg attributes(SG1, IMP, SP,AS1, INT )
REF.I.1 #create(sec goal(SG2)) ∧ sg attributes(SG2, IMP, SP,AS, INT2) ∧ and refine(SG2, SG1)
← interval of(INT1, G1) ∧ interval of(INT2, G2)
∧and refine(G2, G1) ∧ sg attributes(SG1, IMP, SP,AS, INT1)
REF.I.2 #create(sec goal(SG2)) ∧ sg attributes(SG2, IMP, SP,AS, INT2) ∧ refine(SG2, SG1)
← interval of(INT1, G1) ∧ interval of(INT2, G2)
∧refine(G2, G1) ∧ sg attributes(SG1, IMP, SP,AS, INT1)
REF.I.3 #create(sec goal(SG2)) ∧ sg attributes(SG2, IMP, SP,AS, INT2) ∧ refine(SG2, SG1)
← interval of(INT1, G) ∧ interval of(INT2, T )
∧operationalize(T,G) ∧ sg attributes(SG1, IMP, SP,AS, INT1)
Security property-based refinement. Refining security goals via security properties
helps the security analysis to cover all possible aspects of security. The rule REF.P means:
if the security property SP2 is a specialization of the security property SP1 (according
to the hierarchy of security properties shown in Fig. 4.5), then the security goal SG1 that
concerns the security property SP1 will be and-refined into a sub security goal SG2, which
concerns SP2 and inherits all other attributes from SG1. For example, in Fig. 4.8, security
goal SG1 that concerns security property Integrity is refined into four sub-security goals
by applying rule REF.P. In particular, in accordance with the reference model Fig. 4.8-a,
the derived security goal SG2, SG3, SG4, SG5 concern security properties Application
Integrity, Data Integrity, Service Integrity, Hardware Integrity, respectively.
Asset-based refinement. Refinements of security goals can also be done by refining
assets according to the corresponding part-of relations. Thus, a security goal can be
and-refined to sub-security goals, each of which concerns part of the asset of the original
security goal and remains other attributes unchanged (i.e., rule REF.A). Note that the
part-of here stands for an abstract relation, which can apply to various objects, such as
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data schema, software architecture etc. As shown in Fig. 4.8, security goal SG3 that
concerns asset Energy consumption data is refined by applying the rule REF.A according
to the part-of relations (shown in the reference model Fig. 4.8-b). Thus, the derived secu-
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Figure 4.8: Security goals refinements
Interval-based refinement. Since an interval specifies the temporal period for which
a security goal is concerned, a security analyst can put more detailed constraints on a
particular time interval by refining a long interval into short ones. As we use the execution
period of requirement goals/tasks to specify intervals, the interval-based security goal
refinements are carried out based on the structure of the system requirements model.
Specifically, the rules REF.I.1 and REF.I.2 say if interval INT1 of security goal SG1
can be (and-)refined into INT2, then we can obtain a new security goal SG2 which
(and-)refines SG1 via its interval. Rule REF.I.3 has similar meaning but focuses on the
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Figure 4.9: Exhaustive refinements for the root security goal
operationalization relation. As shown in Fig. 4.8, the security goals SG6 and SG7 have
been and-refined via the interval attribute according to the reference model (Fig. 4.8-c).
Refinement strategies. Note that a refinement process can be flexible in the sense
that different refinement methods can be applied in any sequence and to any extent.
In particular, there are two strategies for refining security goals. Firstly, a step-by-step
refinement strategy. After each time of security goal refinement, analysts should check
with stakeholders whether all the refined security goals are needed. If a refined security
goal is not required by stakeholders, analysts must exclude it from subsequent refinement.
In such a way, analysts are able to capture stakeholder’s precise security needs which
normally cannot be easily expressed during the initial stages of security analysis. Pruning
uninteresting goals allows analysts to reduce the refinement space. With the support of
our prototype tool (Chapter 8), once analysts choose a refinement dimension for a selected
security goal, the tool can automatically perform the refinement analysis and graphically
create sub-security goals. For example, the security goal model that is shown on the
right side of Fig. 4.8 is derived from a step-by-step refinement analysis, representing one
possible way to refine the root security goal SG1.
Secondly, an exhaustive refinement strategy, which is intended to explore all the pos-
sible refinements of one security goal. Such refinement can be automated by using the
prototype tool. For example, considering the same root security goal SG1 and correspond-
ing reference models in Fig. 4.8, we have created an exhaustive refinement model to show
all the possible refinement paths, which contains 117 security goals and 264 refinement
links in total (Fig. 4.9). This strategy contributes to the completeness of analysis, but
the exhaustive refinements will result in many redundant security goals and complicate
the subsequent analysis. Some form of pruning is necessary to manage such complexity.
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of these two strategies, we propose to
adopt a hybrid strategy to refine security goals. In particular, analysts should first apply
the step-by-step strategy to identify stakeholder’s exact security needs, and then perform
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exhaustive refinement to explore all security goal refinements.
4.3.2 Security Goal Simplification
To release analysts from scrutinizing all the detailed security goals, we define simplification
methods to identify critical security goals that need to be further analyzed, allowing us
to exclude others. In particular, we perform applicability analysis and threat analysis to
determine the criticality of security goals, which will be introduced in detail, respectively.
Based on the results of the two types of analysis, we then present how to determine the
criticality of a security goal, finishing the simplification analysis.
Applicability analysis. By saying that a security goal is applicable, we mean it is sen-
sible with regard to the meaning of its attributes (security property, asset etc.), otherwise
it is inapplicable. To determine the applicability of security goals, firstly, we consider
whether the security property is applicable to the type of asset. For example, if a security
goal aims to protect the Application Integrity of a Data asset, then it is inapplicable.
Secondly, we check the data-related security property (e.g, Data Integrity) based on the
involvement of the data during the target interval. For example, if a security goal concerns
the Data Integrity of a data asset during a specific time interval, but the data is actually
not involved in that time interval, then the security goal is inapplicable. To accommodate
this analysis, we specify data flow information for each task, i.e., the input and output of
each task.
On the basis of the above rationales, we have proposed five inference rules to facilitate
the applicability analysis, which are shown in Table 4.4. Take rule APP.1 as an example:
given a security goal SG, which considers data-related security properties for an asset
AS during the execution interval of a task T, if the asset is a data asset and it is an
input/output of the task T, then this security goal is determined as applicable. According
to these rules, in Fig. 4.8, security goal High Data Integrity [water consumption data, new
price is available (BG3)] is inapplicable, because the asset water consumption data is not
involved in the execution period of BG3.
Threat analysis. For each applicable security goal, we identify threats that impair the
satisfaction of the goal, which helps us to determine its criticality. To this end, we need
to either incorporate existing threat analysis approaches (e.g., [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005;
Asnar et al., 2011b]), or import threat knowledge about the target system from existing
reports, if available. Regarding this need, in our subsequent research, we have proposed
a systematic security attack analysis approach which can holistically identify attacks on
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Table 4.4: Inference rules of applicability analysis
No. Content
APP.1 is applicable(SG)← (sg attributes(SG, , data confidentiality, AS, INT )
∨sg attributes(SG, , data integrity,AS, INT )
∨sg attributes(SG, , data availability, AS, INT ))
∧interval of(INT, T ) ∧ data(AS)
∧(has input(T,AS) ∨ has output(T,AS))
APP.2 is applicable(SG)← service(AS) ∧ (sg attributes(SG, , service integrity,AS, )
∨sg attributes(SG, , service availability, AS, ))
APP.3 is applicable(SG)← application(AS)∧(sg attributes(SG, , application integrity,AS, )
∨sg attributes(SG, , application availability, AS, ))
APP.4 is applicable(SG)← hardware(AS)∧(sg attributes(SG, , hardware integrity,AS, )
∨sg attributes(SG, , hardware availability, AS, ))
STSs (detailed in Chapter 5). We will explain the rationale of having this holistic attack
analysis approach in Section 4.4.
Each identified threat is specified with name, type, threatened asset, and threatened
interval, based on which we can automatically identify security goals that are threatened
by the threat. Note that we specify the threat type using the STRIDE threat categories,
as each of these categories is matched to a particular type of security property [Hernan
et al., 2006], e.g., the threat type Tampering is mapped to the security property In-
tegrity. We have defined a series of rules TH.1-3 to automate such threat analysis. For
example, as specified in TH.1, if a security goal SG concerns a security property SP
which is a type of confidentiality, and there is a threat TH that belongs to the type of
information disclosure and targets the same asset AS and interval INT of SG, then we
identify that TH threatens SG.
Simplification analysis. The applicability analysis and the threat analysis can be au-
tomated by our prototype tool. Based on the analysis results, we determine whether or
not a security goal is critical: 1) if a security goal is applicable and is threatened by
certain threats, then it is a critical security goal; 2) if a security goal is applicable but
has not been associated with any threats, then the analyst needs to manually determine
the criticality of the security goal. Note that in the second case, for analysts with lit-
tle security knowledge, a conservative solution is to treat all applicable security goals as
critical, which ensure the completeness of the analysis but will increase the complexity of
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Table 4.5: Inference rules of threat analysis
No. Content
TH.1 threaten(TH, SG)← sg attributes(SG, , SP,AS, INT ) ∧ is a(SP, confidentiality)
∧th attributes(TH, information disclosure,AS, INT )
TH.2 threaten(TH, SG)← sg attributes(SG, , SP,AS, INT ) ∧ is a(SP, integrity)
∧th attributes(TH, tampering,AS, INT )
TH.3 threaten(TH, SG)← sg attributes(SG, , SP,AS, INT ) ∧ is a(SP, availability)
∧th attributes(TH, denial of service,AS, INT )
subsequent analysis.
As with two strategies for security goal refinements, the simplification analysis can
also be applied in two ways. Firstly, analysts can apply the simplification analysis to-
gether with the step-by-step security goal refinements, which helps to determine whether
a security goal needs to be further refined. In particular, if a refined security goal is not
applicable, then it will be excluded from subsequent refinements. Moreover, if a refined
security goal is identified as critical, then it does not need to be further refined and will
be analyzed for operationalization in the next step of analysis. For a refined security
goal which is applicable but not critical, analysts can keep refining it to further evaluate
its refinements; if this goal cannot be refined anymore, then analysts have to manually
determine whether it is critical.
Secondly, analysts can apply such analysis to all the exhaustively refined security goals
with the help of the prototype tool. For example, by applying the simplification analysis
to the the aforementioned exhaustively refined security goal model, which contains 117
security goals and 264 refinement links, we identify two critical security goals (i.e., both
applicable and threatened) and seven applicable security goals (that have not been threat-
ened). Although this analysis helps to quickly identify critical security goals, the analysts
need to manually evaluate all other applicable security goals in order to determine their
criticality, which is non-trivial task. Note that since we have proposed to adopt a hybrid
refinement strategy, the simplification analysis should be performed accordingly.
4.3.3 Security Goal Operationalization
For each identified critical security goal, we propose operationalization methods to gen-
erate possible security mechanisms that can satisfy the critical security goal. In partic-
ular, we leverage existing security patterns to help analysts with few security knowledge
to operationalize security goals. The security patterns are taken from existing pattern




















































































Figure 4.10: Selected security patterns in three layers
repositories [Asnar et al., 2011a; Scandariato et al., 2008; Fernandez et al., 2007b], each
of which fits a particular layer in our framework. Fig. 4.10 shows the selected security
patterns we used in three layers, as well as the corresponding security properties achieved
by those patterns. As indicated by Fig. 4.10, one pattern can be applied to multiple
security goals and one security goal can have multiple patterns. In total, we include 21
security patterns in our framework thus far, where 7 patterns are at the social layer, 10
patterns are at the software layer, and 4 patterns are at the infrastructure layer. Note
that the selection of security patterns is not intended to be exhaustive, and can evolve
and expand over time.
To operationalize a security goal, we first identify all candidate security patterns based
on the protected security property of the pattern. For example, as shown in Fig. 4.11, two
critical security goals SG2 and SG3 concern security property data integrity, according
to which two candidate security patterns are identified for each security goal (reference to
Fig. 4.10). This analysis can be automated by our prototype tool. Having the candidate
security patterns, analysts then need to manually check the applicability of such patterns.
In particular, the analysts should check the target system and environment against the
context and forces of the candidate patterns, and then determine which pattern to apply.
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Figure 4.11: An example of the operationalization of critical security goals
In our example (Fig. 4.11), we have determined that Auditing is applicable to achieve
security goal SG2, while others are inapplicable (indicated by red crosses). Note that if a
security goal cannot be operationalized in one layer using layer-specific security patterns,
there may be two possible reasons. Firstly, potential threats to the security goal may
not exist in the current layer, and thus the security goal will be further elaborated and
analyzed in lower layers, which will be shown in the next subsection. Secondly, the selected
security patterns (shown in Fig. 4.10) may not be sufficient to satisfy the security goal,
indicating our current set of patterns is not complete. We will further discuss completeness
in Section 4.4.
It is worth noting that, in our subsequent research, we have proposed a systematic
and tool-supported approach in Chapter 6-7 in order to facilitate the practical application
of security patterns. We will further discuss the rationale of that piece of research in
Section 4.4.
4.3.4 Cross-Layer Security Analysis
After finishing the security analysis within one layer, we switch the focus of our security
analysis to the next layer down, i.e., generating a set of security goals at the next layer
based on the analysis results of this layer. Then, a new round of security analysis will
be performed for the next layer using the newly available information there, as indicated
in Fig. 4.7. In particular, the cross-layer analysis focuses on analyzing the influences of
applied security mechanisms and critical security goals in one layer.
Influences of applied security mechanism When a security goal has been operational-
ized into a specific security mechanism in one layer, the analyst first needs to manually
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Table 4.6: Inference rules of cross-layer analysis
No. Content
CRO.1 #create(sec goal(SG2)) ∧ sg attributes(SG2, IMP, security, A, INT )
∧support(SG2, SM)← operationalize(SM,SG1) ∧ sg importance(SG1, IMP )
∧support(G,SM) ∧ has(A,G) ∧ interval of(INT,G)
CRO.2 #create(sec goal(SG2)) ∧ sg attributes(SG2, IMP, SP,AS, INT2)
∧#create(sec goal(SG3)) ∧ sg attributes(SG3, IMP, security, A, INT2)
∧and refine(SG2, SG1) ∧ and refine(SG3, SG1)← interval of(INT1, T )
∧sg attributes(SG1, IMP, SP,AS, INT1) ∧ support(G,T )
∧has(A,G) ∧ interval of(INT2, G)
check whether this security mechanism needs support from the lower-layer artifacts based
on the specification of the security mechanism. If so, the security mechanism, as a spe-
cialization of Task, will introduce a functional requirement in the next layer down. Such
support analysis is performed based on the instructions we have described in Section 4.2.1.
As shown in the left part of Fig. 4.12, in the illustrating example, the applied security
mechanism Auditing is determined to be implemented by an Auditing Application in the
software layer. Thus, a new software goal Measurement is audited (G1) is introduced to
the application correspondingly.
When it comes to cross-layer analysis, a security mechanism is different from a general
task for its satisfaction; it requires not only functional support but also security support
from the next layer down for its satisfaction. Otherwise, the security mechanism can be
impaired and thus fails to protect the system. As such, given the functional support we
have identified above, our analysis will also cover security support, introducing a security
goal refinement, possibly within another layer, to protect corresponding artifacts. As
illustrated in Fig. 4.12, security goal SG2 is introduced into the software layer in order to
ensure the Security of the Auditing Application. Thus, SG2, together with G1, supports
security mechanism SM1 in the social layer. The inference rule CRO.1 (in Table. 4.6)
has been defined to automate this analysis.
Note that the above analysis should be performed for all security mechanisms that
operationalize security goals. If a security goal is operationalized into several alternative
security mechanisms, all of them need to be analyzed. Thus, we are able to holistically
analyze alternative security solutions once the security analysis has been performed in all
layers.
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Figure 4.13: Cross-layer security analysis for se-
curity goals
Influences of critical security goals For each critical security goal that has been iden-
tified in one layer, we check whether it involves security issues in the lower layer. If
a critical security goal concerns an interval which involves support from the next layer
down, then we further elaborate the critical security goal to cover corresponding secu-
rity issues. Firstly, we want to analyze layer-specific threats to the original asset in next
layer; secondly, we need to take into account security of the supporting artifacts in the
next layer (e.g., software applications and hardware devices), as attackers can indirectly
impair the original asset by exploiting vulnerabilities of the supporting artifacts. For
example, as shown in Fig. 4.13, SG1 is concerned during the execution interval of T1,
which is supported by software goal G1 owned by Smart Meter Firmware (SMF). Thus,
SG1 is and-refined to SG2 and SG3 : SG2 concerns the same asset and security property
of SG1 but focuses on the execution interval of G1, while SG3 concerns security of SMF.
We have defined rule CRO.2 which can be used to automate such analysis.
Once this cross-layer analysis is performed for one layer, iterative security analysis will
be performed for the next layer down until reaching the bottom layer.
4.3.5 Holistic Security Solution Generation
Once security analysis has been performed in all three layers, we can derive a holistic
security goal model that involves various security concerns regarding the system. By
performing backwards analysis on the model, we can automatically generate a set of
holistic security solutions, each of which consists of a number of security mechanisms that
vary from the social layer to the infrastructure layer.
An example of a holistic security goal model is presented in Fig. 4.14, which only
presents the related security goals and security mechanisms due to space limitation. In
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Figure 4.14: Partial view of a holistic security goal model
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particular, each alternative point (AP) in the figure indicates that there are alternative
security mechanisms can be applied to satisfy a security goal. Note that choosing security
mechanism SM2 over SM3 at AP.1 leads to different influences on security analysis of the
infrastructure layer, further resulting in different holistic solutions. In this example, by
performing the backwards analysis, we derive in total four holistic security solutions which
can achieve the root security goal. For example, one holistic solution is to have auditing at
the social layer for ensuring the integrity of the energy consumption data when measuring
energy consumption, to use firewall at the software layer to protect the integrity of the
smart meter application, and to place physical entry control at the infrastructure layer in
order to protect the home gateway.
Overall, our approach eventually produces a collection of alternative holistic security
solutions that is specified in text, which will be passed to later stages of system develop-
ment. Note that our approach currently does not deal with the selection among alternative
security solutions, instead, we propose to use existing goal-oriented satisfaction analysis
techniques to infer the best solution [Horkoff and Yu, 2013].
4.4 Discussions
In this section, we discuss several aspects of the proposed framework in more detail.
Motivations and benefits. The essence of our framework is to separate (security)
requirements analysis of STSs into three different layers, each of which is associated with
a specific solution domain. In particular, each layer corresponds to specific artifacts that
are involved in STSs, such as business processes, software applications, and physical in-
frastructure etc., all of which constitute the entire STSs. Especially, the different domains
of artifacts involve their own phenomena, which are normally analyzed by different peo-
ple who have the specific knowledge background. Such phenomena motivate us to apply
the Divide and Conquer paradigm [Knuth, 1998] to deal with the complexity of the re-
quirements analysis of STSs, i.e., dealing with the requirements problem of each layer
separately and merging the analysis results based on the cross-layer relations. As a re-
sult, we are able to capture alternative security solutions in individual layers, and analyze
them together in a holistic manner and generate holistic security solutions.
Mappings between the three-layer framework and enterprise architecture
framework. Enterprise architecture frameworks were first investigated by Zackman with
the aim of efficiently aligning business requirements with IT systems. In particular, the
Zackman framework provides a comprehensive taxonomy of artifacts of an enterprise,
which is specified in terms of an user’s perspective (e.g., business owner) and a descrip-
tive focus (e.g., function), forming 36 intersecting cells [Zachman, 1987]. Based on this
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taxonomy, The Open Group Architectural Framework (TOGAF) is proposed by the open
group, which divides an enterprise architecture into four categories, i.e., business archi-
tecture, data architecture, application architecture, technical architecture [Haren, 2011].
Although these enterprise architecture models connects enterprise artifacts at different
layers, they do not capture and analyze alternative security solutions across layers.
We argue that our framework and TOGAF framework can complement each other.
On one hand, the architecture categories defined in TOGAF can be intuitively mapped
to our three-layer requirements framework, facilitating the construction of the three-layer
requirements framework. In particular, the business architecture can be mapped to the
social layer, each business activity in the business architecture will be modeled as a busi-
ness task; the application architecture corresponds to the software application layer, an
application function is then modeled as an application task; the technical architecture is
mapped to the infrastructure layer, helping analysts to identify deployment tasks in this
layer. On the basis of such mappings, when TOGAF architecture models are available
for use, analysts are able to build the three-layer functional requirements models in a
bottom-up fashion by asking “why” questions [Yu, 1997]. On the other hand, the holistic
security solutions identified by our three-layer framework can be easily updated in the
enterprise architecture model via the mappings. It is worth noting that, as The Open
Group has provided detailed mappings between the TOGAF architectures and the Zack-
man framework [TOG, 2002], we can thus indirectly establish the mappings between our
three analysis layers and the Zackman framework.
Application. Our approach is applied in the requirements analysis stage of system
development lifecycle, which analyzes stakeholder’s security needs and holistically gener-
ates a set of security solutions across three layers that satisfy the security needs. Such
security solutions will be designed and implemented in later system development stages,
which are out of the scope of this paper. Our approach aims at decomposing the com-
plicated requirements problem into small pieces, each of which is tackled by a specialized
person or team. In other words, our approach offers a framework of collaborative anal-
ysis, involving business analysts, software architects, and infrastructure designers. As a
result, to exert the power of our approach, a group of people with specialized domain and
security knowledge of all three layers are required.
Security knowledge reuse. As security knowledge is difficult to acquire Souag et al.
[2015], our framework proposes to incorporate security patterns from existing repositories.
As such, the security analysis results depend on the range of selected security patterns.
Although reusing existing security patterns can facilitate our knowledge-intensive security
analysis, analysts are still required to grasp a full understanding of a security pattern
before applying it, as reported in Araujo and Weiss [2002]. We have noticed this challenge.
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In particular, when selecting a security pattern, we need to manually check the context
of each candidate security pattern in order to determine whether it can be applied in
current system settings. Furthermore, when apply a security pattern, we also need to
first understand how the corresponding security mechanism works.
As a result, although there are more than 100 security patterns available from the
repositories we use [Scandariato et al., 2008; Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013; Asnar et al.,
2011a], our approach does not incorporate all of them. Instead, we currently incorpo-
rate 21 patterns from those repositories (as shown in 4.10), covering different layers and
different security concerns, which serve as the baseline of our approach. When applying
our approach, practitioners can further customize the set of security patterns according
to their security expertise. For example, if practitioners have in-depth understanding of a
specific set of the security patterns in the repositories, they can expand the set of selected
security patterns with this set in order to produce more comprehensive security analysis
results.
Regarding the above challenge, we were motivated to dedicatedly develop a systematic
and semi-automatic approach to further facilitate the application of security pattern. In
particular, we have proposed to model a significant number of security patterns in terms
of contextual goal models, which can semi-automatically check the context of security
patterns and can be seamlessly integrated into our three-layer framework. More details of
this approach will be presented in Chapter 6. In addition, as a security mechanism (i.e.,
the solution of a security pattern) functions over existing system components, the appli-
cation of the mechanism inevitably influences existing system functional requirements.
Such influences have to be captured and enforced in order to correctly analyze system
requirements. In Chapter 7, we will present a novel method which efficiently enforces the
impact of security mechanisms imposed on system functional requirements, completing
the last step of the application of security patterns.
Holistic threat analysis. As presented in Section 4.3.2, our framework relies on
external threat analysis approach to identify threats to STSs. Because the threat analysis
results can significantly influence the overall quality of the results of our holistic security
analysis, it is important to continuously update our framework with regard to the recent
advances in the corresponding research fields in order to timely deal with new challenges.
For the security of STSs, it is important to analyze threats from a holistic viewpoint,
covering different system components. In particular, multistage attacks which assemble
individual attacks from different parts of STSs are imposing a new research challenge,
which has not been tackled by existing approaches.
As such we have developed a holistic security attack analysis approach as part of our
holistic security requirements framework in order to deal with this particular challenge.
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This approach takes an attacker’s perspective to analyze attack strategies, and then op-
erationalizes the strategies into specific attack actions based on a collection of attack
patterns. Details of this approach will be presented in Chapter 5.
Scalability. [Estrada et al., 2006] have acknowledged the scalability problem of the i*
modeling language based on their empirical evaluation. In particular, they have identified
that the lack of mechanisms for modularization is the main cause to this problem. Our
framework, as an extension of i*, also needs to deal with this scalability problem. To
relieve this problem, we have produced interventions which optimize the modularity of
the entire analysis model. Firstly, the division of the three layers appropriately separates
concerns related to different artifacts, and each layer can be modeled separately. With
the prototype tool, analysts can determine the visibility of each layer, and thus can either
browse the entire three-layer model or focus on a particular layer.
Secondly, we visually separate the security requirements model from the functional
requirements model, while maintain the semantic connection between them. Many ap-
proaches have proposed to model and analyze security requirements together with func-
tional requirements, e.g., misuse cases [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005] and Secure Tropos [Moura-
tidis, 2011]. However, considering the complexity of STSs, putting all these models to-
gether can further exacerbate the scalability problem. As such, we semantically connect
the functional requirements model with the security requirement model via the interval
attribute of security goals. In other words, each security goal actually targets a particular
element in the functional requirements model. Such connections can be easily maintained
and analyzed with the support of our prototype tool.
In addition to the above methodological designs, we have also implemented our proto-
type tool with specific features that contribute to relieving the scalability problem, details
of which will be presented in Chapter 8.
4.5 Related Work
In this section, we compare the proposed three-layer security requirements analysis frame-
work with the state of the art we have reviewed in Chapter 2.
NFR-based requirements analysis. Chung [1993] proposes to treat security re-
quirements as a class of NFRs, and apply a process-oriented approach to analyze security
requirements. In a subsequent work, Chung and Supakkul [2006] integrate NFRs with
FRs in the UML use case model, which enable NFRs to be refined through functional re-
quirement models. Another complementary approach introduced by Gross and Yu [2001]
proposes to connect NFRs to designs via patterns. However, all of these NFR-based ap-
proaches mainly focus on information system analysis, and do not support requirements
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analysis in the business layer and the physical layer.
Security requirements analysis. A large number of security requirement analysis
approaches have been proposed over last two decades. Most of these approaches focus on
analyzing security requirements with regard to a particular aspect of information system.
In particular, there are many approaches that focus on the social and organizational
aspect: Mouratidis and Giorgini [2002] capture security intentions of stakeholders and
interdependence among stakeholders; Giorgini et al. [2005b] investigate social relationships
by integrating trusts and ownership into security analysis; Paja et al. [2013] capture and
analyze security requirements of STSs in terms of commitments, using three views; Liu
et al. [2003] analyze organizational risks by analyzing dependencies among social actors.
Another branch of work deals with security requirements for business processes. Rodr´ıguez
et al. [2011] propose an extension of UML activity diagram to model security requirements
as part of the business process model, while Altuhhova et al. [2012] use BPMN constructs
to represent security-related concepts and model secure business process models. Her-
rmann and Herrmann [2006] propose a systematic process to elicit and analyze security
requirements from business processes models.
Most work is dedicated to analyzing security requirements of software, such as At-
tack Tree [Schneier, 1999], Misuse case [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005], and obstacle/anti-goal
analysis [Van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000; Lamsweerde, 2004]. All of these approaches
are complementary to our proposal, as each of them can be fitted into one layer of the
proposed framework. However, none of these approaches take the broad, holistic view
of our framework, dealing with security dependencies between the social, software, and
infrastructure layers.
Security pattern-based analysis. As security patterns have been recognized as
an efficient way of designing system security, over a dozen security methodologies have
been proposed based on security patterns [Uzunov et al., 2012]. As a representative of
these methodologies, Uzunov et al. [2015] propose a comprehensive pattern-driven security
methodology designed for general distributed systems, which is based on a significant num-
ber of well-documented security patterns [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]. This methodology
covers both the requirements analysis stage and the design stage of software development
lifecycle. In the requirements analysis stage, they first elicit secure use cases based on
misuse activities. To satisfy these secure use cases, they then identify corresponding secu-
rity solutions by using security patterns. After passing the security solutions to the design
phase, they apply security solution frames, which consist of architectural level security
patterns and micro process patterns, to generate security system design.
Compared to their methodology, our framework exclusively focuses on the require-
ments analysis stage and has several advantages. Firstly, our analysis targets STSs,
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which involve more heterogeneous components and are more complicated than general
distributed systems. In particular, both social and physical security concerns are taken
into account in our methodology. As such, our analysis can provide more comprehensive
security protections. Moreover, building on goal modeling languages, our approach can
capture and analyze alternative security solutions from a holistic viewpoint, and thus
generates solutions whose effectiveness can be evaluated, helping to select the best pos-
sible solution. Lastly, our methodology is supported by a prototype tool, enabling us to
deal with the complexity of large-scale STSs; while their methodology is performed man-
ually, and they “believe it can be used without tool-support on at least small- to mid-size
projects” [Uzunov et al., 2015].
Security requirements transformation. Many approaches have been proposed
to transform security requirements captured in a high-abstraction level to the security
design in a low-abstraction level in order to maintain security requirements throughout
the entire life-cycle of system development. Mouratidis and Jurjens [2010] connect se-
curity requirements and security designs by integrating Security Tropos with UMLsec.
In particularly, they provide guidelines to transfer Security Tropos models to UMLsec
class diagrams and deployment diagrams. Menzel et al. [2009] propose a model-driven
approach that transfers security requirements, which are captured at the business process
layer, to concrete security implementations/configurations by using patterns. Similarly,
Rodr´ıguez et al. [2010] apply MDA techniques to transform secure business process model
into analysis class diagram and use case diagram .
The above approaches focus on maintaining security requirements identified in the
early stage during later design stages. Orthogonally, our framework looks at security
requirements not in terms of development stages, but different solution domains (business,
software, infrastructure), each of which will produce specific artifacts that constitute
STSs. In addition, these approaches focus on aligning security requirements in a top-
down manner, but not analyze all security requirements in different layers together. On
the contrary, our approach captures alternative security solutions in each of the three
layers and connect them across layers. As such, we are able to generate the best holistic
security solutions, taking into account all security concerns in the three layers together.
Multilayer requirement analysis. A number of approaches have been proposed
to analyze requirements in multiple levels. Lankhorst et al. [2009] provide an integrated
view for enterprise architecture, consisting three layers, to enable impact and change
analysis covering all relevant aspects. Within each of the three layers, they consider
both external services that are delivered by one layer and internal services that specify
how the layer is implemented. Cui and Paige [2012] propose an integrated framework for
system requirement developments, which consists of six levels and aligns requirements with
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business motivations. Specifically, their framework is intended to cover organizational
requirements, product requirements, and hardware/software requirements. Ranjan and
Misra [2006] argue that the goal-based analytic technique should be applied to different
level of abstraction in order to better understand requirements of specific domains.
Although these approaches have conceptually presented the multilayer structure, none
of them have pragmatically developed analysis methods for analyzing (security) require-
ments of STSs. Our approach acknowledges the intention to capture requirements in
different layers of STSs. In addition to the above approaches, we delve into influences of
security requirements in different layers, and have proposed a systematic process and cor-
responding analysis methods to pragmatically analyze security requirements in a holistic
manner.
4.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we present a three-layer security requirements analysis framework, which
is the essential part of this thesis. We have introduced the full details of this framework,
starting from explaining the rationale of the three-layer structure (Section 4.1). Based
on such a structure, we propose a three-layer requirements modeling language which can
capture requirements of STSs in three layers, while maintaining connections across layers
(Section 4.2). Given a three-layer requirements goal model, we have defined a system-
atic security requirements analysis process, which iteratively performs security analysis
in each of the three layers and eventually generates holistic security solutions that satisfy
stakeholder’s security requirements. In particular, we propose a set of security require-
ments analysis methods and define a collection of inference rules to (semi-)automate those
analysis methods. In Section 4.4, we discuss a number of issues of the proposed three-
layer framework, such as the rationale and the potential of the framework. Specifically,
we discuss the challenges in holistic threat analysis and the reuse of security patterns,
based on which we explain how other parts of this thesis (i.e., Chapter 5-7) contribute
to this three-layer framework. Finally, we compare our framework with related work in
Section 4.5.
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Chapter 5
A Holistic Security Attack Modeling
and Analysis Approach
Know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled
in a hundred battles.
Sun Tzu
In this chapter, we present a holistic security attack analysis framework, which comple-
ments our holistic security requirements analysis framework (in Chapter 4). The proposed
attack analysis approach is performed from an attacker’s perspective, taking the three-
layer security requirements goal model as input and exploring possible attacks on the
target system. In particular, our attack analysis consists of two parts: firstly, we identify
an attacker’s strategies by systematically elaborating an attacker’s malicious intentions;
secondly, we leverage CAPEC attack patterns to analyze how attackers implement an
identified attack strategy in terms of realistic attack behaviors. The output of the holis-
tic attack analysis is a set of alternative (multistage) attacks, which are required by our
holistic security requirements analysis framework for identifying critical security goals (as
described in Section 4.3.2).
In the remaining part of this chapter, we first provide the overview of our approach,
explaining the rationale of our approach and presenting challenges that are solved by
the approach (Section 5.1). Then we present the two parts of our approach in detail
in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, respectively. In Section 5.4, we evaluate this holistic
attack analysis approach using a smart grid scenario. It is worth noting that we here
exclusively focus on evaluating this attack analysis approach, while in Chapter 9 we focus
on validating the holistic security requirements analysis framework. Lastly, we present
related approaches and compare them with our proposal in Section 5.5.
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5.1 Approach Overview
Security breaches in STSs have repeatedly resulted in multi-million dollar losses per year
to large organizations, and this cost is on the rise [Ponemon, 2015]. A primary reason for
these breaches is the complexity and heterogeneity of STSs, consisting of people, processes,
technology and infrastructures. All of these heterogeneous components raise a plethora
of security concerns and present a larger attack surface compared to more homogeneous
software systems. In addition, given the increased number of attacks, STSs have become
the ideal target of multistage attacks, as attackers can compose atomic attack actions
associated with different components to perform more dangerous attacks [Mitnick and
Simon, 2011]. Failing to consider such diverse attacks while designing STSs can result in
vulnerable systems.
Many approaches have been proposed to analyze attacks, but focusing on a specific
layer of STSs. For example, Mitnick and Simon [2011] analyze social engineering attacks;
Sindre and Opdahl [2005] propose Misuse Cases to capture attacker’s malicious behaviors
on the business process level; Weingart [2000] surveys and discusses known physical at-
tacks and presents corresponding security methods. However, there is no approach that
takes into account all layers of STSs and holistically identifies attacks. Moreover, a lack
of knowledge about impending attacks introduces another challenge to attack analysis, as
analysts cannot realistically identify how attackers might attack a system and thus have
either false positives or false negatives during security analysis. Although the security
community has summarized practical attack knowledge in terms of 504 CAPEC attack
patterns1, there are no methods which efficiently incorporate such knowledge into attack
analysis. As such, analysts are reluctant to use such patterns in practice, as “the impres-
sive size and scope of CAPEC may make it intimidating for people to jump in” [Shostack,
2014].
Regarding such challenges, we propose a holistic attack analysis framework, which
can holistically analyze the security attacks on STSs. As shown in Fig. 5.1, three-layer
requirements goal models (as introduced in Chapter 4) are taken as input of the attack
analysis framework to provide domain information about the target system. On the
other hand, the outcome of our holistic attack analysis is a set of alternative (multistage)
attacks on the system, which are transferred back to the three-layer security requirements
framework, helping us to analyze critical security requirements (Section 4.3.2). Note
that such final outcomes (i.e., all the attack alternatives) are specified in text, while the
established attack models (i.e., the left part of Fig. 5.1) are only middle products which
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Figure 5.1: An overview of the holistic attack analysis framework
analysis fills the vacancy of threat analysis for our holistic security requirements analysis
framework (as discussed in Section 4.4).
Our proposal takes an attacker’s perspective to analyze security breaches, which has
been advocated as an effective approach [Schneier, 1999; Sindre and Opdahl, 2005]. In
particular, our attack analysis consists of two parts, as shown in the left part of Fig. 5.1.
Each of these two parts addresses a particular challenge of attack analysis, contributing
to the state-of-the-art.
Firstly, we contend that it is important to explicitly analyze the rationale behind an
attacker’s actions, which we call attack strategies. Such strategies can include alternative
attack plans, each of which may consist of multiple steps. For example, to disclose a
data asset, one attack strategy can be finding out all software applications that process
the data and then hacking the applications to disclose the data, or directly hacking the
hardware that stores the data. Several existing approaches can model attack strategies
based on external security knowledge sources, e.g., [Lamsweerde, 2004; Mouratidis et al.,
2004; Elahi et al., 2010]. However, when analyzing holistic and multistage attacks on
STSs, it is very difficult to find available knowledge sources that provide such attack
strategies. Thus, as the first contribution of our holistic attack analysis framework, we
propose to generate an attacker’s strategies by systematically elaborating the attacker’s
malicious intentions (i.e., the top-left part of Fig. 5.1).
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Secondly, after generating the attack strategies which describe what and when to
attack, analysts need to know how an attacker behaves to achieve the attack. In order to
bridge the knowledge gap between attackers and defenders, we leverage CAPEC attack
patterns for realistic attack knowledge. In particular, beyond the existing CAPEC-related
approaches2, we propose a method to semi-automatically select the best attack pattern
among the large number of candidates (CAPEC includes 504 patterns thus far). Therefore,
the second contribution of our holistic attack analysis framework is operationalizing attack
strategies in terms of realistic attack behaviors, based on which we can identify alternative
(multistage) attacks on the target systems (i.e., the bottom-left part of Fig. 5.1).
5.2 Analyzing Attack Strategies via Anti-Goal Refinement
In this section, we present the first part of our holistic attack framework, which generates
attack strategies by iteratively refining an attacker’s high-level anti-goals. In particular,
we focus on how to systematically refine anti-goals in order to obtain comprehensive attack
strategies. Thus, our primary goal is to develop an approach, grounded in real evidence, to
support systematic exploration of attack strategies, producing strategies which are more
complete. To achieve this goal, we perform the following steps.
1. perform a grounded study on three real attack scenarios [Mitnick and Simon, 2011]
in order to investigate how attackers elaborate their malicious intentions in reality,
from which we identify five anti-goal refinement patterns.
2. propose an anti-goal refinement approach, which systematically refines anti-goals
using the identified anti-goal refinement patterns, and eventually reveals attack sce-
narios.
3. evaluate the proposed refinement framework by applying it to a different credit
card theft scenario [Skoudis and Liston, 2005], the result of which shows that our
framework is able to generate a comprehensive attack strategy, which not only covers
the reported attack scenarios, but also reveals new attack scenarios.
5.2.1 Real Attack Scenario Examination
In this section, we examine three real attack scenarios in order to understand attack strate-
gies that have been applied in reality. In particular, we apply the anti-goal modeling to
real attack scenarios, and then investigate the rationale behind each anti-goal refinement
within the modeled scenarios, and finally extract five anti-goal refinement patterns. We
2https://capec.mitre.org/community/citations.html
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first briefly introduce the real attack scenarios that we examine, and then present our
examination on these scenarios in detail.
Sample attack scenarios. To reveal sophisticated attack strategies from the examina-
tion, we define three criteria for selecting the attack scenarios to be examined. Firstly,
the attacks should cover a wide spectrum of attack techniques, from social engineering
to software/hardware hacking. Secondly, we look for multistage attacks that consist of
a sequence of steps, rather than an atomic attack that is launched with a single exploit.
Thirdly, the description of the attacks should present not only attack actions performed
by attackers, but also the intentions motivating the actions.
According to the above criteria, we select three attack scenarios that are documented
in Mitnick’s book [Mitnick and Simon, 2011, Ch. 11]. Each of these attack scenarios
involves both social and technical issues, and consists of multiple attack steps. In this
case, the author narrates the entire attack process in detail, shedding light on both the
why and how for each attack step. The general problems and contexts of these attack
scenarios are as follows:
• Easy Money : Two attackers aim to defeat a security product that is designed for
access control in order to get prize money. The product applies terminal-based
security technique, which identifies system users based in part on the particular
computer terminal being used.
• Dictionary as an Attack Tool : An external attacker intends to steal the source code
of a new electronic game, which is developed by a global company. The source code
is stored on an unknown server of the company.
• The Speedy Download : An external attacker wants to obtain some confidential files
of an accounting firm in order to affect the stock price of publicly traded companies.
The confidential files are stored on the workstation, which can only be accessed from
the company’s local network.
In this section, we illustrate the examination process using the “Easy Money” scenario.
The complete set of examination results can be found in Appendix A.
Construct initial anti-goal models. We first build initial anti-goal models according
to the textual description of the attack scenarios. The construction of anti-goal models
is carried out by combining top-down and bottom-up analysis. The content of each
node is described in natural language, using a particular part of the scenario description.
Fig. 5.2(a) presents the entire anti-goal model that is built from the “Easy Money” attack
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scenario. Note that we capture the attack actions as tasks so as to provide a full view of
the scenario, but our analysis focuses on the anti-goal refinement rather than the anti-goal
operationalization. To easily reference to the elements of the anti-goal model, we annotate
each element with regard to the type of the element. In particular, G stands for Goal, T
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Remark: the label Rx-Py means the refinement Rx falls into the pattern Py (Table 5.2)
Figure 5.2: Anti-goal models that are built from the “Easy Money” attack scenario
Characterize anti-goals. It is our goal to capture anti-goals and their refinements, such
as in Fig. 2(a), in a more structured and abstract way. Thus we characterize each anti-
goal with a structured description language, which is specified in Table 5.1 by using EBNF
syntax.
Each anti-goal is characterized by one threat and one or several attributes (Rule 1).
A threat presents an undesired state that an attacker wants to impose on the targeting
system. We classify threats using an existing, established threat categorization, STRIDE,
provided by Microsoft [Shostack, 2014]. STRIDE is an acronym that stands for six threat
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Table 5.1: The EBNF syntax of the structured description language
Rule 1: <anti-goal> ::= <threat>, <attribute-description>+
Rule 2: <threat> ::= ‘tamper’ | ‘disclose’ | ‘spoof’ | ‘repudiate’ | ‘deny’ | ‘reach’ |‘access’
|‘control’ | ‘defeat’
Rule 3: <attribute-description> ::= <attribute>, <descriptor>
Rule 4: <attribute> ::= ‘asset’ | ‘exploitable target’ | ‘interval’
categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service,
and Elevation of privilege. These threat categories provide comprehensive coverage of
security threats and have been adopted and investigated in both academia and indus-
try [Shostack, 2014; Scandariato et al.]. Note that we describe the threat categories in
terms of their essential actions rather than the full description (Rule 2), as the threat ac-
tions are more succinct and intuitive when combined with other attributes. For example,
instead of specifying information disclosure, we represent this type of threat using disclose.
For the threat Elevation of privilege, we specifically consider three threat actions reach,
access, and control, each of which implies a particular level of privilege. When comparing
the available categories in STRIDE to the anti-goals collected from the real cases, we find
the need to add an additional threat category, specifically, “defeated security mechanism”
which captures the attacker intention to break system protections.
Moreover, we characterize anti-goals with three other attributes (Rule 4): an asset is
anything of value to stakeholders, it is normally the object of a threat; an exploitable
target is a component of a system, which involves assets and has vulnerabilities that are
exploitable by attackers; an interval represents the time period, during which attackers
carry out attacks. Note that values of these attributes are described in text (Rule 3).
By using the structured description language, we characterize the anti-goals in the initial
anti-goal model, resulting in a characterized model as shown in Fig. 5.2(b).
Identify refinement patterns. Once the characterized anti-goal model is obtained, we
investigate each refinement relation in detail, on the basis of which we can identify refine-
ment patterns.
We first investigate the influences of refinement relations on the refined anti-goals, i.e.,
what have been changed from the refined anti-goals to their sub-goals. For example, as
shown in Fig. 5.2(b), the influence of refinement R1 is that the asset of the anti-goals G2
and G3 have been modified from their parent goal G1. After performing such analysis on
all 25 refinement relations in the three attack scenarios, we cluster refinement relations
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Table 5.2: Summarized refinement patterns
No. Pattern Name Pattern Influences Occurrence
P1 Asset-based refinement Modify asset 2
P2 Target-based refinement Add exploitable target 7
P3 Threat-based refinement




Modify threat; modify asset;
remove exploitable target
4
P5 Interval-based refinement Modify interval 2
with similar influences, based on which we summarize five refinement patterns. Table 5.2
presents the identified refinement patterns, as well as their influences and number of
occurrence in the three attack scenarios. Examples of the application of the refinement
patterns can be found in Fig. 5.2(b), where each refinement relation is annotated with its
corresponding refinement pattern.
5.2.2 An Anti-Goal Refinement Approach
The extracted five anti-goal refinement patterns shed light on different ways to refine an
anti-goal, based on which we propose an anti-goal refinement approach. This approach
efficiently leverages the proposed refinement patterns to refine an attacker’s high-level
anti-goals and to generate comprehensive attack strategies, the analysis process of which
is shown in Fig. 5.3. Note that the output of this analysis process is a set of attack
strategies which are specified in terms of anti-goal models. Such models are not the final
output of the entire holistic attack analysis approach, but middle products, which are
used by the attack operationalization analysis that will be described in the next section.
Each of these steps makes use of one particular refinement pattern, and the detailed
guidelines for performing these steps are presented below. It is worth noting that we
describe the anti-goal refinement framework from an attacker’s perspective to clearly
show the rationale of the strategy, but the corresponding analysis is actually performed
by security analysts with a complete set of system information in order to discover all
potential attack scenarios. In particular, the description of each analysis step focuses on
addressing the following issues:
• Rationale. We first describe the rationale of each analysis step, which explains the
design of the analysis process (Fig. 5.3). Note that the proposed anti-goal refinement
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framework is a specific way to analyze attack strategies, and does not exclude other
possible ways.
• Input. We then specify the inputs that are required for performing the analysis step.
It is worth noting that our proposal is a general framework, which is not associated
with specific models. Thus, for inputs, we only describe the types of information
that are required, and all models that capture the corresponding information can be
used.
• Sanity check. Our framework is intended to cover various attacks and thus provides
a comprehensive security analysis. As a result, a single anti-goal can lead to a very
large model. To deal with this complexity, we propose to prune the model as part
of its construction, i.e., performing sanity checks after each analysis step in order to
reduce the refinement space.
• Stop criteria. Finally, we describe the stop criteria of each analysis step.
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Figure 5.3: An analysis process of anti-goal refinement
Step 1: Refine attack interval. System security settings can change over time, affecting
an attacker’s anti-goals. As the first step, an attacker applies the interval-based refinement
pattern in order to concentrate on specific time intervals. Thus, this analysis step requires
specific domain knowledge about the division of time intervals. In particular, for each
interval-based refinement, the analyst should check whether system security settings have
been changed from the original interval to its sub-intervals. If the security settings remain
the same, this refinement will not contribute to disclosing new attack scenarios and should
be pruned. The interval refinement analysis is completed once the finest-grained intervals
have been reached via refinements.
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Step 2: Refine asset. Given a composite asset, it is easier for an attacker to attack a
fine-grained part of the asset rather than attacking the composite asset as a whole. An
attacker can leverage the asset-based refinement pattern to generate sub-goals that focus
on more specific sub-assets. The asset-based analysis takes the system resource schema as
input, which documents “part-of” relations between system resources. To identify system
assets among system resources, we refer to the asset identification process that is specified
in ISO27005:2011 [ISO and Std, 2011, Annex B], which deals with both the primary assets
and the supporting assets. In particular, the primary assets include business processes
and activities and information; the supporting assets include hardware, software, network,
personnel, site, and organization’s structure. This analysis step is completed when all
identified assets in the resource schema are analyzed.
Step 3: Identify exploitable target. Once an attacker has determined the assets he
intends to impair, he needs to find out corresponding vulnerable system components
(a.k.a. exploitable targets), by exploiting which the assets will be damaged. In particular,
an asset can be involved in system components in different ways according to the type
of the components, e.g., an information asset can be accessed by people, processed by
software, or stored in hardware. Note that the asset and the exploitable target of an
anti-goal can be the same, if the asset itself is a vulnerable system component.
We here consider the types of vulnerable system components in line with the list of
supporting assets presented in ISO27005:2011 [ISO and Std, 2011, Annex B.1.2]. As
such, corresponding system information is required, e.g., information of system infras-
tructure, software architecture, and organization structures. When identifying the ex-
ploitable target, analysts should check the risk of exploiting the target, e.g., using the
CORAS approach [Lund et al., 2010]. If the risk is under certain threshold, determined
by the analysts, the target is assumed to be secure and is excluded from this refinement
step. After using the target-based refinement pattern to identify all potential exploitable
targets, this analysis step is complete.
Step 4: Elaborate threat. If an attacker aims to impose a threat to an asset by ex-
ploiting a target, which is different from the asset, then the attacker should identify new
threats that he wants to impose on the exploitable target in order to successfully im-
pose the original threat to the asset. For example, if an anti-goal is intended to disclose
(threat) confidential files (asset) that are stored in a database (exploitable target), then it
can be refined to getting access to (new threat) the same database (new asset) by using
the threat-based refinement pattern.
When applying the threat-based refinement pattern, the system information and re-
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lated security knowledge are required to support the threat elaboration. Specifically, we
refer to 19 STRIDE threat trees as the security knowledge sources, which describe al-
ternative ways about how a threat category can be refined to other categories. As we
specify the threats of anti-goals using the STRIDE threat categories, the application of
the STRIDE threat trees can be seamlessly integrated into this analysis step. In order to
discover all potential attack scenarios, once we identify the new threats to the exploitable
target that can lead to the original threat to the asset, we iteratively analyze the new
threats to the exploitable target through the analysis step 2 and 3, i.e., we treat the
exploitable target as a new asset. Such as in the aforementioned example, the newly
introduced sub-goal “getting access to (new threat) the database (new asset)” concerns
the database as a new asset, which was the exploitable target in the parent anti-goal.
Step 5: Defeat protection. From an attacker’s perspective, security protections are
obstacles to his attacks. If the attacker targets a system component which is protected by
some security mechanisms, such as encryption and firewalls, then he needs to first defeat
the mechanisms in order to achieve their anti-goals. According to the knowledge about
system security design, the attacker can use the protection-based refinement pattern to
generate anti-goals against related security protection mechanisms.
Each of the newly generated anti-goals concerns a specific protection mechanism as
its asset and is intended to defeat it. Similar to the last analysis step, as long as new
assets have been identified in the new anti-goals, subsequent analysis will iteratively refine
assets and identify targets for the new anti-goals, i.e., going back to the analysis step 2.
It is worth noting that during the anti-goal refinement, we focus on identifying which
protection mechanisms need to be defeated by exploiting which targets, not answering
which specific attack techniques to be used to defeat the mechanisms. Once there are no
further security protections to be defeated, i.e., there are no new assets have been found,
the analysis reaches an end as all potential attack scenarios have been obtained.
5.2.3 Evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed anti-goal refinement approach, we applied it to a realistic
credit card theft scenario, which is documented in a textbook [Skoudis and Liston, 2005,
Ch.12]. In this section, we first introduce the evaluation scenario, and then illustrate the
application of this approach to the scenario. Finally, we evaluate the resulting anti-goal
model. Fig. 5.4 presents part of the resulting model, which is used for illustrating the
application of our approach. In particular, we focus on evaluating the usability of our
anti-goal refinement approach and the quality of the analysis results, which are detailed
in the following research questions:
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• RQ1: Can our approach be easily used?
– RQ1.1: How long does it take to apply our approach?
– RQ1.2: Are there any difficulties in applying our approach?
• RQ2: Can our approach effectively identify attack strategies?
– RQ2.1: Can our approach identify realistic attack strategies documented in the
textbook?
– RQ2.2: Can our approach identify additional attack strategies beyond the
strategies documented in the textbook?
Credit card theft scenario. This scenario presents a complicated multistage attack in
reality, which is documented in Skoudis’s hacking book [Skoudis and Liston, 2005, Ch.12]
and is different from the source of the previous three real attack scenarios. Specifically, in
this scenario, there is a widgets corporation which operates more than 200 retail stores.
Each retail store communicates with the central corporate network by using a VPN, and
all credit card transactions are seamlessly moved from individual stores back to the central
database. Each store has several Point-of-Sale (POS) terminals, which access the local
store network using wireless access points. Each store also has a store server, which
processes credit card transactions and forwards the transactions back to the company
server.
Applying the anti-goal framework. As a pre-step, we first processed the scenario de-
scription to extract information that was required by the analysis. Specifically, we cap-
tured the attacker’s high-level malicious intention, i.e., steal customer’s credit card infor-
mation, and modeled it as his root anti-goal (G1 in Fig. 5.4). In addition, we captured
related domain information, such as asset relations and system infrastructure, which was
used to refine anti-goals. Having the root anti-goal and related domain information as
input, we applied the proposed approach (Fig. 5.3) to refine the root anti-goal into op-
erational anti-goals and thus generated a comprehensive attack strategy. We summarize
this process as follows.
1. As the scenario only dealt with the credit card system in a general time span and
did not describe any particular time interval, we opted not to apply the first step.
In other time-sensitive cases, this step would be applied.
2. We refined the asset of the root anti-goal G1 according to the composition relations
among assets. As the entire set of credit card information was composed of informa-
tion of credit cards that were processed in different retailer stores, the root-goal G1
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Figure 5.4: Applying anti-goal refinement analysis to the scenario of credit card theft (excerpt)
should be and-refined to more than 200 sub-goals, each of which was intended to
disclose credit cards of one particular store. Since all the retailer stores had homoge-
neous design and configuration, the attack scenarios about these retailer stores were
the same, i.e., the more than 200 anti-goals were refined in the same way. Thus, as
shown in Fig. 5.4, we only focused on the first sub-goal G2 in later analysis.
3. We identified exploitable threats to the assets. According to the domain knowledge
that the information of credit cards which were used in store A (i.e., CCA) was kept
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in the store server A, G2 was refined to G5, targeting the store server A. In addition,
we refined G1 to G4 because the entire set of credit card information as a whole
was stored in the company database. Note that we will skip the illustration of this
branch in the later analysis steps, which can be found in the full model (Fig. 5.5).
4. As the asset and the exploitable target of G5 were not the same object, we elaborated
G5 to identify which threats should be imposed to the store server A in order to
disclose the CCA. According to the threat knowledge, G5 was and-refined to G6
and G7, which were intended to reach the server and to access into the server,
respectively.
5. As G6 and G7 introduced a new asset store server A, iterative analysis was per-
formed to these two goals from the secondly step until the analysis no longer intro-
duced new assets. As shown in Fig. 5.4, the longest refinement paths {G6, G10,
G15, G17, G18, G19} iterated such analysis three times.
6. After identifying an exploitable target, we checked whether there were security mech-
anisms that were applied to protect the target. Take G21 for example, it was refined
to G22 as an access control mechanism was applied to protect the store server A.
Because G22 promoted the access control mechanism as a new asset, another round
of analysis started from the second step.
7. Performing the iterative analysis on G13 and G22 resulted in the anti-goals G14
and G23, respectively. As the iterative analysis did not introduced new assets, the
anti-goal refinement reached an end.
Results and analysis. The application of our approach finally resulted in an anti-goal
model with 46 anti-goals and 48 refinements (Fig. 5.5), which took me 5 hours to build
(RQ1.1 ). In particular, during the application of our approach, we noticed several
issues. Firstly, the retrieval and application of domain information was time-consuming,
which may raise the scalability problem when applying our approach to large-scale and
complicated scenarios (RQ1.2 ). In our study, we extracted domain information from
the scenario specification, which was then used by different anti-goal refinement methods.
As we did not formalize such information, we had to retrieve and apply it manually,
which was time-consuming. Therefore, in the future, we plan to capture (part of) the
required domain information in our three-layer requirements goal model, allowing us to
automatically retrieve corresponding information when refining anti-goals.
Secondly, we realized that the manual sanity check was important for pruning the
model, relieving the scalability problem. As discovered in our examples, there were cases
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Figure 5.5: Apply the attacker strategy to the credit card stolen scenario (full)
that one asset can be refined into different but homogeneous sub-parts (i.e., the entire set
of credit card information consists of credit card information from different retailers, and
all the retailers were assumed to have the same IT infrastructure in this scenario). Thus,
each of these sub-parts was targeted by a particular anti-goal, and all such anti-goals can
actually be attacked using the same attack strategies. In other words, the refinement
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analysis performed over such anti-goals resulted in the same refinement structure, and
there was no need to perform repeated analysis over each of these anti-goals; As such,
we only focused on one of those anti-goals, and reused the results for all other goals. We
argue that such a decision has to be manually made during the sanity check, as it is very
difficult to automatically determine whether the sub-parts of an assets are homogeneous.
Thirdly, we noticed that it was possible to obtain repeated anti-goals from different
refinement branches, which needed to be merged in order to reduce the scalability problem
(details about this situation will be further discussed in the next section). However, such
checks were performed manually in our study, which was time-consuming and error-prone
(RQ1.2 ). As for future work, we plan to automate such checks and thus further improve
our approach.
By analyzing the and/or refinement operators, we identified that the final model con-
tains a total of 11 alternative attack scenarios. To evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed approach, we carried out a bottom-up analysis to check whether the realistic credit
card theft scenarios (documented in the book) can be covered by the attack scenarios that
were identified by our approach. Specifically, we identified all specific attack actions that
are performed by the attacker based the scenario description, including both successful
and failed attack actions. Then, we checked whether the intention of these actions can
be matched with the leaf goals in the anti-goal model. Our examination turned out that
all the attack actions documented in the scenario can be associated with the leaf goals,
i.e., the identified attack scenarios completely covered the real attack scenarios (RQ2.1 ).
Specifically, among all the 11 attack scenarios discovered by our approach, 6 of them
were reported in the scenario description (2 successful, 4 failed), while the other 5 poten-
tial attack scenarios were not mentioned in the scenario description, revealing previously
unconsidered attacks (RQ2.2 ).
Overall, considering the time and encountered difficulties, we argue our approach can
be easily applied to a middle-scale scenario (RQ1 ). In the meantime, we have identified
a number of issues that need to be improved in our future work. In addition, based on the
comparison between our analysis results and the realistic attack scenario reported in the
textbook, we contend that our approach can effectively identify realistic attack strategies
(RQ2 ).
Threats to validity of the evaluation. A major threat to the conclusion validity is
that the study was only applied to one middle-scale scenario. In the future, we need
to evaluate our approach with more real attack scenarios. In addition, the evaluation
was performed by one of the method designers (i.e., myself), imposing a threat to the
external validity. As such the conclusion we have made before (i.e., the approach is easy
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to apply) is based on a strong assumption that the practitioner has already gained a full
understanding of our approach. As such, we need to further evaluate our approach with
practitioners who were not involved in the method development. Finally, as the entire
evaluation is performed by only one person (i.e., myself), there is threat to reliability. To
tackle such threat, we need to involve more people in our future evaluation.
5.2.4 Discussion
Diversity of anti-goal refinement. As our proposal is based on the examination of
three real attack scenarios that come from the same book [Mitnick and Simon, 2011], and
we acknowledge that examining other scenarios from different sources may have different
results. In addition, the examination process reflects our specific interpretation of attack
strategies, and the outcome of the examination can vary from person to person. Conse-
quently, we acknowledge that the proposed anti-goal refinement framework is a particular
way of refining anti-goals, while there can be other ways for performing such analysis.
Based on the study we have performed over a middle-size credit card theft scenario, we
argue our approach is effective to analyze attacker’s malicious intentions. Moreover, we
will continue to evaluate this method as part of our entire security analysis framework.
Security knowledge sources. We analyze attack strategies by examining three real at-
tack scenarios that are documented in a security textbook [Mitnick and Simon, 2011].
Apart from this book, we have found other potential security knowledge sources. At-
tack patterns were first proposed by Moore et al. [2001] to summarize reusable attack
knowledge from repeated attacks in support of system security analysis. In particular,
CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) is a comprehensive
attack pattern repository, which was first released in 2007 and has accumulated 504 at-
tack patterns [Barnum and Sethi, 2007]. However, these attack patterns indeed describe
low-level attack knowledge about how to use specific attack techniques and tools to per-
form a particular attack, such as “exploit user-controllable input to perform a format
string injection”. Thus, CAPEC attack patterns do not fit our need of analyzing high-
level attack strategies in this paper, but they can be used to operationalize anti-goals and
support security analysis, which will be presented in Section 5.3. Another security threat
knowledge source is the STRIDE threat trees [Shostack, 2014], which focuses on how one
threat can be refined into other threats. However, these threat trees only capture a single
step of threat elaboration and cannot account for multistage attacks. As a result, we do
not examine these threat trees for analyzing attack strategies, but use them as an exter-
nal security knowledge source to support the threat elaboration analysis in our anti-goal
refinement framework.
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Scalability. Our framework is designed to provide a comprehensive anti-goal refinement
analysis, i.e., covering all potential attack scenarios. As such, the scalability issues are
raised due to the large refinement space. To deal with this problem, we have proposed
sanity checks for each analysis step in Section 5.2.2, in order to prune the model as part of
its construction. In addition to the checks, we also observe a further phenomenon which
helps to mitigate scalability. During the anti-goal refinement, it is possible to obtain
repeated anti-goals, i.e., different anti-goals can be refined into the same anti-goals. This
is because one anti-goal can have different influences, e.g., accessing to the server of a
retailer store not only discloses credit card information stored in that server but also
enables the attacker to penetrate the company internal network. As such, it is important
to detect and merge the repeated anti-goals during the anti-goal analysis as new anti-goals
are generated. Otherwise, the repeated anti-goals will be further refined separately and
the size of the model can grow exponentially. Note that merging repeated anti-goals is
performed by adding all refinement links of these anti-goals to one anti-goal and removing
other anti-goals. As such, the derived model is not a tree but a directed acyclic graph
(DAG).
Thus far our attack strategy analysis is performed manually, and we are planning to
extend our prototype tool in order to semi-automate such analysis, especially reducing
the efforts of graphical modeling. We intend to define formal inference rules based on the
five anti-goal refinement patterns that are proposed in Section 5.2.1. By executing those
rules, the tool will be able to automatically perform anti-goal refinement in a step-by-step
manner. To guarantee the correctness of the analysis and to reduce model complexity, the
tool should interact with analysts in order to support manual revision after each analysis
step, allowing the analyst to, for example, perform sanity checks over the refinements.
5.3 Operationalizing Anti-Goals with Attack Patterns
In this section, we present a systematic approach which can efficiently operationalize the
identified attack strategies using CAPEC attack patterns. Based on the operationaliza-
tion results, we can automatically identify alternative (multistage) attacks on the target
system. To this end, we first describe a systematic method to model CAPEC attack pat-
terns as contextual goal models. The benefits of constructing contextual goal models are
twofold: firstly, we are able to semi-automatically check attack context and select suitable
attack patterns to operationalize attack strategies with the support of our prototype tool
(which will be detailed in Chapter 8). Secondly, the contextual goal models can be seam-
lessly integrated with the goal-based attack model, as they share the same core constructs
(e.g., goals, tasks, and domain assumptions). We have pragmatically applied this method
Operationalizing Anti-Goals with Attack Patterns 103
Table 5.3: Pattern-related conceptual mappings
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to model 102 CAPEC attack patterns, which can be reused for operationalizing attack
strategies. Built on such patterns, we then define a systematic process and a collection
of formal inference rules to efficiently select attack patterns for operationalizing attack
strategies in terms of practical attacks.
5.3.1 Model Attack Patterns as Contextual Goal Model
A pattern consists of three primary pattern concepts: Context, Problem, and Solu-
tion [Alexander et al., 1977], which specify a proven solution can be applied to solve
a problem in certain context. Attack patterns, as a specific type of pattern, are specified
in the same spirit, but from an attacker’s viewpoint, i.e., what an attacker wants to attack
(problem), how does the attacker perform the attack (solution). Based on the semantics
of attack pattern attributes3, we have identified relevant attack pattern attributes that
specify problem, context, solution, and indirectly map them to the contextual goal model
elements, as shown in Table 5.3.
On the basis of these mappings, we propose a systematic method to model attack
patterns as contextual goal models. Specifically, we take the attack pattern CAPEC-66:
SQL Injection as an example to illustrate each modeling step in detail (shown in Fig. 5.6).
The complete specification of this pattern can be found online4.
It is worth noting that the method we proposed here is in line with the method for
modeling security patterns (Section 6.2), but has been adjusted to accommodate specific
concepts in attack patterns.
3A full CAPEC schema, https://capec.mitre.org/data/xsd/ap_schema_v2.7.xsd
4
https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/66.html
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Figure 5.6: An example attack pattern model
Modeling Attack Pattern Problems
A Problem solved by an attack pattern is actually the malicious intention that an attacker
wants to achieve, which will be modeled as a Goal in the goal model. Specifically, we
identify such malicious intentions from the attack pattern attributes Attack Motivation-
Consequences and Domains of Attack.
To seamlessly integrate the attack pattern analysis with previous attack strategy anal-
ysis, we specify the malicious intention of each attack pattern using structured anti-goals
(which was introduced in Section 5.2.1). In particular, we focus on the Threat that is
imposed by an attack pattern and the Target that is exploited by an attack pattern,
which are important for automatic pattern matching (which will be described in the next
subsection). The threat information is elicited based on the attack impact specified in
Attack Motivation-Consequences. As the CAPEC schema enumerates a total of 18 types
of attack impacts, we map these impacts to STRIDE threat categories (Table 5.4), using
these categories as the Threat attribute in the resulting anti-goal. We elicit the target
information with respect to Domains of Attack of an attack pattern. In particular, the
CAPEC schema includes six specific domains, and we identify typical attack targets for
each of these domains, as shown in Table 5.5. In the attack pattern example (Fig. 5.6),
the pattern has an impact “Read application data”, which is mapped into the threat In-
formation Disclosure as modeled in the anti-goal G4. In addition, as this pattern is under
the software domain, we specify the Target attribute of G4 as software.
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Modeling Attack Pattern Context
The context of an attack pattern specifies under which situation the attack can be applied
to achieve an attacker’s malicious intention. Thus, we model such context and associate
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it with the operationalization link between goals and tasks in the goal model, where the
goals can only be operationalized into the tasks if the context holds (e.g., context C1
shown in Fig. 5.6).
We obtain the context information of an attack pattern by looking at the attack pat-
tern attributes Attack Prerequisites and Technical Context. As the context information
is specified in natural language, analysts have to manually check such context during the
application of attack patterns. After reviewing the context information of 102 attack
patterns, we propose a set of formal predicates for specifying context, which can be au-
tomatically checked against the three-layer requirements goal model (Section 4.2). Such
predicates include protected by, communicate, use technique, use data from, and accept
user input, detailed reasoning with these predicates will be presented in Section 5.3.2.
It is worth noting that the proposed predicates do not express contexts that cannot be
captured and checked in the three-layer requirements goal model. Such contexts are nor-
mally too detailed to capture in the domain model, for example, “The targeted application
runs with elevated OS privileges”. These cases will require manual analyst intervention
via an interactive pop-up in the tool.
In our example, the SQL Injection pattern has an attack prerequisite “SQL queries
used by the application to store, retrieve or modify data”, which is then formalized using
the predicate use technique as shown in Fig. 5.6. Note that if there are several pieces of
context information, they are specified in a conjunctive way, i.e., all of them have to hold
in order to apply the corresponding attack pattern.
Modeling Attack Pattern Solutions
Solutions of attack patterns are specific attack actions that are performed by attackers
using concrete attack techniques. We elicit such information from the attack pattern
attribute Attack Execution Flow, and model each attack action as a task in the goal model.
In particular, we focus on capturing the alternative attack actions for implementing the
attack.
When modeling the solution section of the pattern, we first create a general task to
summarize the overall attack that achieves the previously modeled anti-goals, such as T1:
Perform SQL Injection shown in Fig. 5.6. The Attack Execution Flow is specified in terms
of a sequence of attack steps that are required to fulfill the attack, thus, we capture this
information as sub-tasks, and-refining the general task. In our example, the tasks T4, T9,
and T14 are individual attack steps specified in the Attack Execution Flow. Moreover,
within each attack step, the attack pattern also describes alternative attack techniques
that can be used for performing the attack step. Thus, we model each of these techniques
as a refinement to the corresponding attack step. For example, in Fig. 5.6, the tasks T2
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and T3 present two alternative attack techniques that can be applied to perform taskT4.
Note that when specifying the tasks, we reuse the original description provided by attack
patterns, maintaining their security expertise in the model.
Applying the Modeling Method
I have spent three person-days pragmatically applying the proposed method to model
102 (out of 504) attack patterns. In particular, during the modeling practice, I noticed
that this modeling task requires modelers to first thoroughly understand the rationale
of the pattern to be modeled. On average, each pattern costs me 10-20 minutes to
model, depending on the complexity of the pattern. The obtained models can be (re-
)used to operationalize attack strategies in a semi-automatic way, using our prototype
tool (Chapter 8). A full list of modeled attack patterns can be found in Appendix C.
These attack patterns are selected under the following criteria: first, the select patterns
should cover all attack pattern domains (as shown in Table 5.5) in order to assist our
attack analysis with comprehensive attack knowledge. Secondly, the pattern specifications
need to be complete, i.e., all the attack pattern attributes that are required to build the
contextual goal model should be well documented. In particular, each CAPEC pattern
has been specified with an attribute Completeness, valuing from Hook, Stub, to Complete,
and thus we focus on patterns that have complete specification.
It is worth noting that most attack patterns under the Social Engineering and Physical
domains have only incomplete specifications. In order to preserve the comprehensive
coverage of the selected patterns, instead of dropping all such incomplete patterns, we
identify the required pattern attributes in accordance with the overall description of those
patterns. As such, the constructed models for these patterns are comparatively simple.
In some extreme cases, an attack pattern model may only consist of one goal with task
operationalizes the goal. Such phenomena, on one hand, disclose the needs for the pattern
community to further develop the incomplete patterns. On the other hand, as the analysis
results of our approach are affected by such attack patterns, we should keep revising the
established models in accordance with the recent advances in the field of attack patterns.
In the CAPEC repository, each attack pattern has been documented with related
patterns that are more abstract or more detailed to it, using ChildOf relations. We also
capture such relations among the modeled 102 patterns, establishing pattern hierarchies,
which can help us to reduce the complexity of the attack operationalization analysis. Such
attack pattern hierarchies are presented in Appendix B.
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5.3.2 Attack Pattern Selection and Application
In this section, we present a tool-supported systematic process for operationalizing attack
strategies and eventually generating a collection of realistic attack alternatives that can
satisfy an attacker’s root anti-goal. The overall attack operationalization process is shown
in Fig. 5.7, each analysis step is detailed below. In particular, this analysis process takes
the attack strategy model (i.e., the anti-goal model generated in Section 5.2) as input,
while eventually produces a set of alternative attacks that are specified in text. It is worth
noting that all inference rules defined for the the attack pattern analysis (e.g., Table 5.6)

































                    














Figure 5.7: A systematic process for attack strategy operationalization
Select A Leaf Anti-Goal
The operationalization analysis takes the attack strategy model as an input, which is
obtained from our attack strategy analysis (as presented in Section 5.2). An example
of the attack strategy model is shown at the top of Fig. 5.8, which specifies what an
attacker intends to attack and why. To operationalize different attack strategies, we need
to iteratively perform operationalization analysis for each leaf anti-goal in the attack
strategy model (i.e., G8-G11 ). As highlighted in Fig. 5.8, we select anti-goal G10 for
illustration.
Find Relevant Attack Patterns
To select appropriate attack patterns that operationalize the given anti-goal, we first
identify all relevant attack patterns according to the problem we have modeled for each
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attack pattern. Since the problem of an attack pattern has also been modeled as structured
anti-goals, we can identify relevant patterns by matching the threat and target specified
in the structured anti-goals. Such match is automated using the inference rule REV
(Table 5.6): given an anti-goal G1 which imposes a threat TH to a target TA1, if an
attack pattern AP has an anti-goal G2 (as its problem), where G2 imposes the same
threat TH to a category of target TA2 that TA1 belongs to, then the attack pattern AP
is relevant to the anti-goal. For example, as shown in Fig. 5.8, we identify CAPEC pattern
SQL Injection is relevant to G10, as G10 can be matched with the problem G2 of SQL
Injection according to rule REV . Similarly, the other two patterns CAPEC-186 Malicious
Software Update and CAPEC-100 Overflow Buffers are also identified as relevant to the
anti-goal G10. Note that, in Fig. 5.8, we use pentagons to represent collapsed attack
pattern models in order to provide a better overview of the operationalization analysis
(an excerpt of an uncollapsed pattern model is indicated in the bottom left corner).
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Figure 5.8: Operationalize a leaf anti-goal using attack patterns
When performing the attack pattern selection analysis, we take into account the pat-
tern hierarchies in order to select the most appropriate patterns. For example, as the SQL
Injection pattern has four children patterns which are also relevant to G10, we model them
as refinements of SQL Injection, as shown in Fig. 5.8. According to such a hierarchy, a
pattern and its ascendants represent only one operationalization alternative rather than
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Table 5.6: Inference rules for attack operationalization
REV relevant to(AP,G1)← has threat(G1, TH) ∧ has target(G1, TA1) ∧ has(AP,G2)
∧has threat(G2, TH) ∧ has target(G2, TA2) ∧ isa(TA1, TA2)
CR1 communicate(A,B)← depend(A, ,B)
CR2 communicate(A,B)← depend(B, ,A)
CR3 use technique(A,R)← has(A,R) ∧ resource(R)
CR4 use data from(A,B)← depend(A,R,B) ∧ data(R)
CR5 accept user input(A)← depend(A,R,B) ∧ data(R) ∧ human(B)
CR6 protected by(A,SM)← sec goal(SG) ∧ has asset(SG,A) ∧ operationalize(SM,SG)
APP applicable to(sql injection,G)← relevant to(sql injection,G) ∧ has target(G,TA)
∧use technique(TA, sql query)
ALT1 achieved(G1) ∨ ... ∨ achieved(Gn)← refine({G1...Gn}, G0) ∧ achieved(G0)
ALT2 achieved(G1)← and refine(G1, G0) ∧ achieved(G0)
multiple alternatives.
Identify Applicable Attack Patterns
After finding attack patterns that are relevant to an anti-goal, we further check their
context to determine whether these patterns are applicable in current system context.
We import the three-layer requirements goal model as the domain model that captures
system context, against which we can automatically check the attack pattern context. To
this end, we have defined a number of inference rules that specify the implication relation
between the formal context predicates and the goal model predicates, which are shown
as CR1-6 in Table 5.6. In particular, the formal context predicates are put in the left
hand side (i.e., the head of the rule), while the right hand side (i.e., the body of the
rule) presents the corresponding facts in the three-layer requirements goal model. For
instance, rule CR1 and CR2 express that if there is a dependency relation between two
actors, it implies the context that the two actors are communicating with each other.
Detailed information about the formal predicates of the three-layer goal model can be
found in Section 4.2. Overall, given a three-layer goal model, we can automatically apply
the above context rules to infer system context.
On top of these context check rules (i.e., CR1-6), we have defined specific applicability
rules for each attack pattern, as different patterns require different contexts. For example,
the rule APP shown in Table 5.6 is specifically defined for the pattern SQL Injection.
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This rule says if the sql injection pattern has been identified as relevant to an anti-goal
G, and the target of G uses the technique sql query, then the sql injection pattern is
applicable to operationalize G. The entire set of pattern-specific applicability rules, which
we have defined for all the 102 attack patterns, can be found in Appendix D. All these
inference rules can be automatically inferred to assess the applicability of attack patterns.
It is worth noting that the context check rules (i.e., CR1-6) only apply to context that
can be captured in by our three-layer requirements goal model (i.e., the domain model).
For contexts that cannot be captured in the domain model, we define specific predicates
for each of them. In particular, such predicates are manually checked using question rules,
which let our prototype tool interact with analysts for checking the corresponding context.
For example attack pattern CAPEC-10: Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables has
a context “The application uses environment variables”, which cannot be captured in
our three-layer requirements goal model. Thus, we describe such context the predicate
use detailed technique, and define a corresponding question rule as below:
question(use detailed technique, TA, environment variables)←
relevant to(capec 10, AG), has target(AG, TA),
not use detailed technique(TA, environment variables),
not no use detailed technique(TA, environment variables)
The above rule means that when the attack pattern capec 10 (i.e., Buffer overflow via
environment variables) is relevant to an anti-goal AG which targets TA, if there is neither
positive nor negative evidence about TA uses environment variables, then a question will
be presented to analysts for checking that context. Based on the answers from analysts,
our prototype tool will automatically update context specification using corresponding
predicates (i.e., use detailed technique and no use detailed technique in this case). As
such, the same context does not need further check, i.e., one such context only needs to
be manually check once. Overall, with the support of our prototype tool, analysts are
able to semi-automatically identify applicable attack patterns.
When identifying the applicable pattern, we also consider the hierarchy among pat-
terns. As “parent” patterns focus on a more abstract problem, concerning a more general
context, we first check the parent patterns. If a parent pattern is identified as inappli-
cable, then all its children patterns will be identified as inapplicable without additional
checking; if a parent pattern is applicable, then we will further check each of its children
patterns. For example, as shown in Fig. 5.8, we first check the context of SQL Injection,
Malicious Software Update, Overflow Buffers, (i.e., C1, C2, C3 ), which turns out that
only SQL Injection is applicable (i.e., C1 holds). Then, we further check the context of
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children patterns of SQL Injection, and identify that only pattern Blind SQL Injection is
applicable.
Generate Alternative Attacks
Once identifying all applicable attack patterns to an anti-goal, we unfold the collapsed
applicable attack patterns (i.e., the pentagon notations in Fig. 5.8) and show detailed
attack behaviors (i.e., the solution part of an attack pattern model in Fig. 5.6). As such,
we complete the entire attack model, including both the attack strategies and attack
behaviors.
Once the entire attack model is obtained, we want to answer the question “Is the root
anti-goal achievable?”, “If so, how many different combinations of attack behaviors can
be performed to achieve the goal?”. To this end, we define inference rules to exhaustively
explore the space of alternatives, which has been implemented in Disjunctive Datalog
and can be inferred by our prototype tool using the DLV inference engine5. As shown in
Table 5.6, the rule ALT1 means if a goal G0 is alternatively refined by sub-goals G1...Gn,
then the achievement of each sub-goal serves as an alternative to achieve G0. On the
other hand, if a goal G0 is and-refined by sub-goals G1...Gn, then the achievement of all
the sub-goals is required to achieve G0, i.e., no more alternatives are introduced. This
rationale is implemented as the rule ALT2. By applying these two rules to the root
anti-goal of the attack model, we are able to obtain all the alternative attacks.
All the identified alternative attacks will be specified in text, which will be used to
assess the criticality of security goals as specified in our holistic security requirements
analysis (Section 4.3.2). It is worth noting that before using the identified attacks for
criticality analysis, risk assessments over such attacks are required in order to prioritize
them. Specifically, only attacks that are at high risk to damage systems will be used to
in the criticality analysis. As a result, the holistic attack analysis currently has not been
fully integrated with the three-layer security requirements analysis, which will be further
discussed in Chapter 10.
5.4 Validation
In this section, we focus on validating the entire holistic attack analysis approach, in
particular, whether the approach can help analysts to effectively identify attacks. To this
end, we applied it to a smart grid scenario, which was first described in Section 4.2.1
and will be presented in more details in Section 9.1. Since we have evaluated the attack
5www.dlvsystem.com
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strategy analysis in Section 5.2.3, in this case study, we place an emphasis on the opera-
tionalization of attack strategies. In particular, we exclusively evaluate the effectiveness
of the operationalization results, i.e., whether our approach is able to identify realistic
attack actions. To this end, we reference to a comprehensive security analysis performed
on the same smart grid case [Suleiman and Svetinovic, 2013], this study took a total of 16
person-months to identify threats, vulnerabilities and security requirements, the results
of which have been evaluated as realistic and effective.
We took the three-layer requirements goal model of the smart grid scenario as the
domain model, and applied our holistic attack analysis approach to identify alternative
attacks on this scenario. Note that all models that have been built and analyzed during
this study can be found in Appendix E. As some of these figures are too large (containing
more than 1000 elements), we make the vector file of these models online6.
Generate attack strategy. As the first part of our holistic attack framework, we
identified alternative attack strategies following our systematic approach (presented in
Section 5.2). In particular, we started from determining an anti-goal to analyze, which
attacked the integrity of energy consumption data, i.e., {Threat: Tampering, Asset: En-
ergy consumption data, Interval: Real-time pricing is applied}. Having this anti-goal as a
root goal, we manually applied anti-goal refinement patterns based on the domain model
to systematically refine the anti-goal from an attacker’s viewpoint and generated alter-
native attack strategies. The resulting attack strategy model included 53 anti-goals, 39
refinement links, and 20 and-refinement link, implying 12 alternative attack strategies.
Operationalize attack strategy. Once alternative attack strategies were obtained,
we operationalized them in terms of realistic attacks, using the attack pattern approach
presented in Section 5.3. Using the 102 attack patterns we have modeled, we first au-
tomatically identified relevant attack patterns for all the 14 leaf anti-goals in the attack
strategy model, resulting in 368 attack patterns in total. Each of the leaf anti-goals, on av-
erage, was matched with 26 relevant patterns. The full model is presented in Appendix E.
All the identified relevant patterns were automatically organized in a hierarchical manner
to facilitate the applicability analysis. After semi-automatically checking the context of
all the relevant attack patterns, we derived 28 applicable attack patterns for all of the 14
anti-goals, covering social, software, and physical attacks.
Take Fig. 5.9 as an example, which shows an excerpt of the final attack model. A
wide spectrum of attack patterns were identified, varying from social attacks (e.g., rogue
integration procedures), to software attacks (e.g., rainbow table password cracking), to
physical attack (e.g., lock picking). In particular, according to the attack model, we can
identify alternative (multistage) attacks that achieve the root anti-goal, i.e., imposing
6http://disi.unitn.it/~li/ap/validation.zip
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Figure 5.9: An excerpt of the final attack model
the elevation of privilege threat to the energy management application. For instance, an
attacker can first perform the lock picking attack to reach the energy supplier server and
then perform the rainbow table password cracking attack to gain access into the energy
supplier server.
Based on the complete attack model, including both high-level attack strategies and
realistic attacks behaviors, we automatically generate 108 realistic attack alternatives,
each of which consists of one or multiple attacks. To validate the analysis results, we
compared them with a comprehensive security analysis performed on the same smart
grid case [Suleiman and Svetinovic, 2013], the results of which showed that our approach
was able to effectively identify realistic. In particular, we found out that our identified
attack alternatives can cover all the threats to the integrity of energy consumption data
that are reported in [Suleiman and Svetinovic, 2013]. In addition, our results discovered
detailed attack behaviors that can be performed by attackers, and showed how such attack
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actions were composed to form multistage attacks. For example, the comparison study
discovered a high-level threat “Tampering with SM’s firmware” (Table 4, T.5 in [Suleiman
and Svetinovic, 2013]), while our results yielded a corresponding multistage attack which
first performed CAPEC-16: Dictionary-based Password Attack (consisting of four detailed
attack steps) to defeat the password-based authorization and gained access to the smart
meter firmware, and then performed CAPEC-186: Malicious Software Update to tamper
with the smart meter firmware.
Overall, we contend that our approach can be applied to effectively identify realistic
attacks. In the meantime, we acknowledge that additional empirical studies should be
performed to evaluate different aspects of this approach, such as usability and scalability.
5.5 Discussion and Related Work
Attack modeling and analysis techniques. Attack trees are a typical way of represent-
ing attack scenarios. Although there is no unique way of creating attack trees, different
researchers have proposed their own ways to build attack trees, which are related to our
anti-goal refinement framework. Morais et al. [2013] advocate to first build the overall
attack, and then identify the violated security properties and the security mechanisms to
be exploited, respectively, and finally model the concrete attack actions. Paul [2014] pro-
poses a layer-per-layer approach to generate skeletons of attack trees using information
comes from system architecture, risk assessment study, and related security knowledge
base. However, these approaches do not capture the attacker’s malicious intentions and
cannot analyze attack strategies as we define them.
Apart from the attack trees, attack graphs are another way for representing attack
scenarios. An attack graph shows all paths through a system that end in a state where
an attacker achieves his malicious intentions. Phillips and Swiler [1998] first use attack
graphs to analyze network security. Due to the homogeneous settings of machines in the
network, the states of machines (i.e., nodes in the attack graph) and the atomic attacks on
machines (i.e., transitions in the attack graph) can be enumerated. As such, it is possible
to fully automate the generation of attack graphs using a comparatively simple attack
strategy. Take the approach of Sheyner et al. [2002], for example: an attacker starts
from a machine with the root permission, he then iteratively detects a new machine in
the network, logs into that machine, and gets the root permission of that machine until
reaching his target machine. In a recent study, Beckers et al. [2015] propose to apply the
attack graph approach to analyze social engineering attacks, where the states of people
are modeled as nodes and social engineering attacks are captured as transitions between
nodes. However, the attack graph approach only applies to systems that have simple and
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homogeneous components, and is therefore inappropriate for security analysis of complex
socio-technical systems that have heterogeneous components, such as people, software,
and hardware.
Attacker-oriented analysis. Inspired by the Art of War philosophy, i.e.,“Know your
enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles.” [Tzu, 2011],
several approaches have been proposed to model and analyze security attacks from an
attacker’s viewpoint. Lin et al. [2003b] capture the requirements of a malicious user
that subverts an existing requirement as anti-requirements, which are incorporated into
abuse frames to represent threats and analyze security requirements. Lamsweerde [2004]
proposes to use anti-goals to model attacker’s malicious intention, and then exploit al-
ternative attacks by systematically refining such anti-goals. Sindre and Opdahl [2005]
extend traditional use cases to cover misuse cases, which describe harmful behaviors to
a system performed by adversaries . Building on the misuse cases, they propose a sys-
tematic process for eliciting security requirements. Elahi et al. [2010] extend goal models
to model attacker templates which consist of malicious goals and tasks, based on which
they assess system risks and identify countermeasures. All of theses approaches require
attacker knowledge as input, based on which they can analyze the influences of attacks
on systems and identify corresponding countermeasures. In particular, these approaches
make a strong assumption about the availability of relevant knowledge, e.g., “The proposed
framework assumes that analysts have knowledge about vulnerabilities, potential attacks,
and proper countermeasure or can obtain such information” [Elahi et al., 2010].
We argue that performing the attack analysis from an attacker’s viewpoint is a knowledge-
intensive task, where the body of attack knowledge plays an important role. However,
as pointed out by Souag et al. [2015], security knowledge is hard to acquire for software
designers in reality. Without bridging the knowledge gap, the assumptions made in the
above approaches become unrealistic, preventing the real adaption of those attack analy-
sis approaches. Our approach tackles this challenge by building on realistic and reusable
knowledge from existing attack knowledge repository, and can complement the above
attacker-oriented analysis approaches. In particular, our approach identifies alternative
attacks based on realistic attack knowledge, which can be used by those approaches to
perform particular analysis, e.g., analyzing the impact of the attacks.
Attack pattern-based knowledge reuse. Moore et al. [2001] first emphasize the impor-
tance of reusing known attack knowledge, which significantly affects the practicality of
attack analysis methods. Therefore, they define attack patterns, which encapsulate attack
knowledge, in order to facilitate knowledge-intensive attack analysis. In particular, each
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pattern consists of four sections: goal, precondition, attack steps, and post-condition.
Other researchers have been inspired by Moore’s work, and have defined various types
of attack patterns. Gegick and Williams [2005] define software attack patterns in term of
a sequence of events, using regular expressions. Specifically, each event is expressed by
its associated component, such as user, server, hard disk, etc. By automatically matching
such patterns with system design, the approach can assist analysts in identifying system
vulnerabilities. Fernandez et al. [2009] specify attack patterns (i.e., misuse patterns)
using POSA template [Buschmann et al., 2007]. The POSA template includes much
more sections than the initial one defined by Moore et al. [2001], such as context, known
uses, countermeasures, etc., which contribute to the practicality of attack pattern-based
analysis. Although the above approaches contribute to the theoretical foundation of
attack patterns, they have not been pragmatically applied to develop attack patterns.
For example, Moore et al. [2001] illustrate their approach with four patterns, and we are
unaware of subsequent work to develop further patterns; Fernandez has only developed
three misuse patterns, as presented in his recent book[Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013].
Compared to the above theoretical approaches which focus on defining attack patterns,
CAPEC emphasizes the pragmatic development of security patterns, which is initiated as
a baseline catalog of attack patterns along with a comprehensive schema and classification
taxonomy and has accumulated 504 attack patterns thus far. Since CAPEC provides a
significant amount of practical security knowledge, it is receiving an increase in atten-
tion from both academia and industry. Thus, we choose CAPEC as the realistic attack
knowledge source used in our approach.
One of the challenges of using the CAPEC repository is dealing with it’s considerable
size. Kaiya et al. [2014] define term-maps, which link terms in requirements specifications
to specific security terms used in CAPEC, so as to automatically associate attack patterns
to requirements specifications and further derive security requirements. Engebretson and
Pauli [2009] enrich the CAPEC attack patterns with the concepts parent threat and parent
mitigation in order to facilitate the navigation among the large number of attack patterns.
Yuan et al. [2014] map CAPEC patterns to the STRIDE threat categories and develop
a tool to facilitate the retrieval of CAPEC patterns based on such categories. However,
all the above approaches do not check the applicability of attack patterns in terms of
context required by the patterns. Thus, the patterns retrieved by these approaches may
still include many non-applicable patterns, which need to be further checked by analysts
to determine their applicability.
Our approach contributes to the context-based pattern selection by clearly modeling
the context, problems, and solutions of each attack pattern in terms of contextual goal
models, which can be semi-automatically analyzed based on domain models. As such,
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our proposal can help analysts to identify applicable attack patterns in a more effec-
tive manner. Apart from the retrieval and selection issues of CAPEC patterns, existing
approaches only focus on reusing the knowledge of attack behaviors from the CAPEC
patterns, without mining the intention of attacks. For example, Kim and Kim [2014]
extract possible attack behaviors from CAPEC, and specify such behaviors using formal
language in order to simulate attacks within specific system settings. However, their ap-
proach cannot analyze combined behaviors from different attack patterns, and thus can
only detect a limited number of attacks. Our proposal not only analyzes the realistic
attack behaviors but also concerns attacker’s intention as described in Section 5.2. As
such, by associating the CAPEC patterns with an attacker’s high-level intention, we are
able to capture multistage attacks which consist of several attack patterns, revealing a
larger space of attacks.
Practical challenges in reusing attack patterns. Encapsulating knowledge as struc-
tural patterns is an effective way of reusing knowledge. Various patterns have been pro-
posed to relieve knowledge-intensive analysis in different domains, such as requirements
patterns, design patterns, security patterns, attack patterns, etc. Souag et al. [2015] sur-
vey reusable knowledge-based security requirements engineering approaches over the last
20 years, which shows that 9 out of 95 surveyed papers represent reusable knowledge in
the form of patterns (other forms include catalogs, taxonomies, etc.). Although patterns
can be reused in a comparatively easy manner, Araujo and Weiss [2002] have pointed out
that analysts need first to have a thorough understanding of available patterns in order
correctly select and apply them. This issue has been confirmed by us when applying
our approach to the CAPEC patterns. When dealing with a small number of patterns,
this issue will not be a challenge, as the analysts can afford the learning costs. However,
we argue that such issue can impose practical challenges when analyzing a large number
of patterns, e.g., the 504 CAPEC attack patterns. Facing this challenge, our approach
formalizes the context of attack patterns and semi-automates the context-based attack
pattern selection analysis, relieving analysts from scrutinizing the detailed context of all
patterns. We have applied the approach to pragmatically process 102 (out of 504) attack
patterns. Such processing must be performed only once, and the resulting models can be
directly used by our prototype tool.
Security risk assessment. Our attack analysis approach exclusively addresses the chal-
lenge of holistically identifying (multistage) attacks in STSs. All the attacks that are
identified by our approach can possibly happen to a system, however, we do not mean all
of them have to be treated by certain security mechanism. Instead, according to the secu-
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rity requirements engineering process we have surveyed in Section 2.1.1, all the identified
realistic attacks should be further assessed for risks. In particular, only the attacks that
raise unacceptable risks will eventually be treated by corresponding security mechanisms.
Currently, our holistic attack analysis cannot assess risks for the identified attacks. As
a result, when practitioners leverage our approach to analyze security attacks, they are
always encouraged to perform a risk assessment step afterwards. In addition, as a po-
tential extension of our approach, we also intend to incorporate existing risk assessment
approaches (e.g., CORAS [Lund et al., 2010] and OCTIVE [Alberts and Dorofee, 2002])
to accommodate such analysis.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we present a holistic attack analysis approach, which complements our
holistic security requirements framework. In Section 5.1, we provide the overview of
this approach, which takes security requirements and domain models (i.e., three-layer
requirements goal models) as input and eventually produces a set of realistic (multistage)
attacks for STSs, assisting analysts in determining critical security goals (as described in
Section 4.3.2). In particular, we take an attacker’s perspective to discover possible attacks,
and divide our approach into two parts. Firstly, we aim to capture attacker’s high-level
attack strategies, which shed light on what and when an attacker wants to attack. To
this end, we examine three real attack scenarios, based on which we propose an approach
to systematically generate attack strategies (Section 5.2). Secondly, we investigate how
to efficiently operationalize the identified attack strategies in terms of realistic attack
actions, which is reported in Section 5.3. Specifically, we propose a systematic method
to construct contextual goal models from CAPEC attack patterns, and have practically
applied this method to model 102 patterns. Based on these models, we further propose
a systematic analysis process and a collection of formal inference rules so as to semi-
automatically leverage the attack pattern models to operationalize attack strategies. In
Section 5.4, we validate the utility of the holistic attack analysis approach by applying it
to a smart grid scenario, the result of which shows our approach is able to not only identify
realistic threats but also to disclose detailed multistage attacks. Finally, we discuss our
proposal from several aspects, comparing it with corresponding state-of-the-art.
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Chapter 6
Integrating Security Patterns with
Security Requirements Analysis
Good programmers know what to write. Great ones know what to
rewrite (and reuse).
Eric S. Raymond
In Chapter 4 we have proposed to leverage existing security patterns to operationalize
security requirements in terms of security mechanisms. However, several challenges were
revealed during that work, hindering the application of security patterns. Firstly, there are
normally more than one security pattern candidates that can potentially operationalize
one security requirement, and analysts have to manually choose the best pattern to apply,
which a non-trivial task as analysts need to manually compare all candidates. Specifically,
the complexity of such task grows with the number of security requirements. Secondly,
applying security patterns in terms of goal models is laborious and time-consuming, re-
quiring analysts to have a full understanding of a security pattern they are about to
use.
In this chapter, we propose a systematic and tool-supported approach to integrate
existing security patterns into our three-layer framework, facilitating the application of
security patterns. Note that the approach is an extension of the security goal operational-
ization analysis we have introduced in Section 4.3.3, which can be applied in an easier
and more efficient way. As a result, the final output of this approach is an operational-
ized security goal model, which is specific to our holistic security requirements analysis
approach.
Specifically, we define a collection of concept mappings between the constituent con-
cepts of security patterns and contextual goal models, and provide a detailed process
for practically constructing contextual goal models from existing security pattern speci-
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fications. Following this modeling process, we have pragmatically built contextual goal
models for 20 security patterns documented in [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]. On the ba-
sis of such contextual goal models, a systematic process has been proposed for selecting
the most appropriate security pattern and applying it to our three-layer security goal
models (introduced in Chapter 4). Both the construction of security pattern models and
the selection and application analysis are supported by our prototype tool, which will be
presented in Chapter 8.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first describe the rationale of integrating security
patterns with security requirements analysis in detail (Section 6.1). Then, we present how
to establish contextual goal models based on textual security patterns in Section 6.2. In
Section 6.3, we introduce a systematic process for selecting and applying security patterns.
Finally, in Section 6.4, we compare our proposal with related work.
6.1 Security Patterns Complement Security Requirements Op-
erationalization
Requirements Engineering (RE) has been increasingly focusing on security-specific issues,
arguing for an upfront treatment of security in software system design. Goal-oriented
modeling techniques constitute an effective way to capture and analyze stakeholder inten-
tions. Proposals such as Secure Tropos [Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007a], Secure-i* [Liu
et al., 2009], and STS analysis [Paja et al., 2013], have been used by many researchers to
analyze security requirements. In particular, our three-layer security requirements analy-
sis framework, presented in Chapter 4, aims to holistically analyze security requirements
for STSs. However, dealing with security concerns for complex software systems is a labo-
rious and knowledge-intensive process, especially during the operationalization of security
requirements.
Security patterns encapsulate reusable security knowledge that can support analysts
with little security knowledge. Much work has been done to collect and document such
patterns, resulting in several security pattern repositories, such as [Hafiz et al., 2007; Scan-
dariato et al., 2008; Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]. According to a recent mapping study [Ito
et al., 2015], currently there are more than 200 security patterns have been proposed.
However, among 30 recent security pattern approaches surveyed by Ito et al. [2015], only
13% of these approaches (i.e., four approaches) involve tooling. More specifically, these
four tool-supported approaches deal with either the selection of security patterns or the
application of security patterns, but none of them can support both topics. In addition,
these tool-supported approaches only involve a limited number of security patterns (no
more than six patterns). As summarized by Ito et al. [2015], “security pattern research
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is still in its infancy in terms of automation”. As such, security patterns are handled
largely by human, hindering the practical adoption of security patterns in large-scale sys-
tems (e.g., STSs). Especially when selecting security patterns from the large number of
candidates, manual analysis becomes almost impossible.
Regarding the above challenges, we argue that integrating goal-oriented security re-
quirements analysis with security pattern analysis can benefit both types of analysis. On
one hand, goal models capture the rationale for applying security patterns and facilitate
selection among alternatives. On the other hand, since security patterns encapsulate
a large body of security knowledge, they can help to efficiently operationalize security
requirements into specific security solutions.
6.2 Model Security Patterns as Contextual Goal Models
In this section, we first present a contextual goal modeling language, used to define con-
textual goal models for security patterns. In addition, we define mappings between con-
stitutes of security pattern and the contextual goal modeling language, and present a
detailed process for creating a contextual goal model based on security pattern speci-
fications. Finally, we summarize some empirical observations derived from practically
modeling 20 security patterns.
6.2.1 A Contextual Goal Modeling Language
We extend our three-layer goal modeling language described in Section 4.2 with domain
properties in order to model and analyze context within a goal model. A domain property
is a fact related to a particular domain, while a design-time domain property is a domain
property that can be verified at design time by related analysts. For example, “Computer
systems on a local network connected to the Internet” is a design-time domain property,
and analysts can verify this fact during design time according to the designed system
infrastructure. For another example, “The number of users increases significantly” is not a
design-time domain property, as it can only be verified at run-time. Since security pattern
analysis is carried out at design-time, we only capture design-time domain properties to
analyze design-time contexts. A particular context can be arbitrarily complex, consisting
of either a single domain property or could be an aggregation of domain properties of any
complexity, typically, via and/or operators.
It is worth noting that the concept design-time domain property should be distin-
guished from the concept domain assumption. A domain assumption is always assumed
to be true during system designs and does not need to be checked. For instance, in
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Fig. 6.2, “other security measures do not cover all possible attacks” is a domain assump-
tion. As introduced before in Section 3.2, we follow the method defined in [Ali et al.,
2010] to model context within goal models. In particular, each context that is attached to
a goal model element serves as a variation point, with the semantics that the goal model
element is required if and only if the context holds.
Apart from the design-time domain property, we also include two unary relations
mandatory and preferred (nice-to-have) in the contextual goal modeling language. Such
relations were defined by Jureta et al. [2010], where mandatory indicates that a require-
ment must be satisfied and preferred indicates that a requirement is nice-to-have. In
particular, we define the context that is attached to mandatory requirement is a primary
context, while define the context that is attached to preferred requirements is a secondary
context. Such differentiation helps us to select applicable security patterns, which will be
introduced in Section 6.3.2.
6.2.2 A Process for Creating Contextual Goal Models from Security Patterns
To build contextual goal models that capture contents of security patterns, we focus
on analyzing the five essential predefined sections of security patterns, as exemplified in
Table. 6.1. For each of the five sections of the security patterns, we map the content
of the section to concepts of the contextual goal modeling language by considering the
definitions of those concepts. Our analysis results in a concept mapping, shown in Fig. 6.1.
Apart from the concept mapping, we further provide detailed guidelines that constitute
a systematic process for creating a contextual goal model for a given security pattern.
The Intrusion Detection System pattern (Table. 6.1) is used throughout this section to
illustrate the mappings and guidelines, with the corresponding contextual goal model
shown in Fig. 6.2.
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Figure 6.1: Concept mappings between contextual goal models and security patterns
Context section analysis. This section describes the initial context of the security
pattern, in which the security problem occurs and is being solved. We model the context
with one or multiple design-time domain properties. For example, the context C1 in
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Table 6.1: The specification of the Intrusion Detection System pattern [Fernandez-Buglioni,
2013]
Name: Abstract Intrusion Detection System
Context:
Nodes for local systems that need to communicate with each other using the Internet.
Problem:
An attacker may try to infiltrate our system through the Internet. We need to know when an
attack is happening and take appropriate response.
Force:
• Incomplete security. Security measures such as encryption, authentication and so on may not
protect all our systems, because they do not cover all possible attacks.
• Non-suspicious users. Request coming from a non-suspicious address (permitted by a firewall)
could still be harmful and should be monitored further.
• Flexibility. Hard-coding the type of attack can be done easily. But it will be hard and time-
consuming to adapt to attack patterns that change constantly.
Solution:
Each request to access the network is analyzed to check whether it conforms to the definition of
an attack. If we detect an attack, an alert is raised and some countermeasures may be taken.
Consequence:
• Non-suspicious users. A request coming from a non-suspicious address (permitted by a firewall)
is further inspected and analyzed.
• Flexibility. The detection information can be modified to include new attacks.
• There is some overhead in the addition of IDSs to a system.
Fig. 6.2 is the initial context, which is represented by one design-time domain property
DTDP1 extracted from the context section. Note that the context C1 is attached to
the root goal of the security pattern model, which is extracted from the problem section
(introduced below).
Problem section analysis. A problem is a description of a situation, for which
stakeholders do not have a solution. We use one or several goals or softgoals to capture
stakeholder needs concerning such a problem. As the problem is essential to a security pat-
tern, we model the goals/softgoals that capture the problem as mandatory requirements,
which have to be satisfied by security patterns.
We analyze this section sentence by sentence, each of which usually leads to the inclu-
sion of a goal/softgoal. If there are several goals/softgoals, we need to consider the rela-
tions between sentences and determine the refinement structure of these goals/softgoals.
It is worth noting that the description of the problem section may also involve domain
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Figure 6.2: The contextual goal model of the IDS pattern
assumptions, which should be identified and modeled within the refinement structure,
such as “An attacker may infiltrate a system through the internet” shown in Fig. 6.2. The
root element of a goal model constructed through this process must be mandatory.
To integrate the security patterns with security requirements analysis, we extract not
only the specific problems that are solved by the security pattern, but also the high-
level security requirements that lead to those detailed problems. If the high-level security
requirements are not explicitly specified in this section, we need to do further analysis.
In the IDS example, the first sentence presents a domain assumption “Attacker may
infiltrate a system through internet”, which also implicitly presents a high-level security
requirement, i.e., the security of the software application should be protected. The next
sentence “We need to know when an attack is happening” specifies a detailed problem,
which is a refinement of the high-level security requirement. Thus, we obtain a model
fragment as shown in the upper-right corner of Fig. 6.2.
Force section analysis. Forces are considerations, often contradictory, which have
to be taken into account to determine the applicability of a pattern. These considerations
are often related to non-functional requirements (NFRs), such as performance and cost.
We model such forces as preferred softgoals, where stakeholders want to satisfy as many
of such goals as possible. Other forces may belong to domain assumptions, which are
always assumed to be true during the security analysis. For instance, the force Existing
security measures cannot cover all attacks, shown in Fig. 6.2, is a domain assumption,
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under which the IDS security pattern operationalizes the security goals.
This section is specified in an itemized manner. Each item starts with a key word,
based on which we decide whether the force is a preferred softgoal (e.g., Flexibility) or
a domain assumption (e.g., Incomplete Security). It is worth noting that some preferred
softgoals are context-dependent, only needing to be considered in particular context.
For example, the softgoal “Monitor non-suspicious users” only holds under the context
“requests from non-suspicious address could be harmful”. If this context does not hold,
the force does not need to consider. Therefore, we identify another context C2 and add
it to this softgoal.
Solution section analysis. This section describes actions that are carried out by
a security pattern. We model them as tasks, which specify how the “system-to-be” im-
plements a security pattern. Similar to the analysis in the Problem section, the relations
between tasks should also be identified and modeled in an appropriate structure. As shown
in Fig. 6.2, we identify four sub-tasks, which are siblings, for applying the IDS pattern.
Note that, the granularity of solutions varies from pattern to pattern. If the information
provided in this section is too general, we can optionally extract additional information
from other non-essential sections, such as the Structure, Dynamic, and Implementation
sections.
Consequence section analysis. This section describes the consequences of a secu-
rity pattern, which indicates both benefits and liabilities of the pattern. We capture these
influences using contribution links. This section is also documented in an itemized way,
and each item should correspond to one force, documented in the Force section. However,
the correspondence between the Force section and the Consequence section may not be
strict. The Consequence section may introduce NFRs in addition to those described in the
Force section. These NFRs should also be taken into account, via inclusion as preferred
softgoals, when choosing a security pattern. For example, the consequence description
“There is some overhead in the addition of IDSs to a system” (Table. 6.1) indicates the
IDS pattern hurts the performance of a system. The NFR (performance), which is not
initially specified in the Force section, should be added into our model. In other cases,
the preferred softgoals from the Force section may not be mentioned in the Consequence
section. Thus, we need to infer the pattern’s influences on those softgoals based on our un-
derstanding of the pattern, or search for related knowledge from other reliable knowledge
bases.
Some influences on preferred softgoals are also context-dependent. As shown in Fig. 6.2,
the task “Detect attack” can only make the softgoal “Real time behaviour” under the con-
text that there are sufficient and appropriate information about attacks. It is worth noting
that the influences of a security pattern may also depend on its detailed implementations.
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For example, as described in the Authenticator pattern, the consequence “The overhead
depends on the protocol used” cannot be directly modeled. We need to first model two
alternative tasks “Apply a simple protocol” and “Apply a complex protocol”, which refines
the task “Apply an appropriate protocol” and then examine their influences respectively.
6.2.3 Empirical Observations
Thus far we have constructed contextual goal models for 20 security patterns described
in [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]. All the pattern models are listed in Appendix F. During
this exercise, we observed several issues, which may affect the quality of resulting models.
1. The specifications of some security patterns are incomplete, such as missing a section.
2. Not all security patterns are specified in a consistent way. For example, some pat-
terns are specified in a threat-oriented manner, while others are in a function-oriented
manner.
3. The granularity of descriptions may vary greatly among patterns. For instance, the
solution section of some security pattern only describes general idea of the pattern
in one sentence, while some other pattern uses several paragraphs to explain related
security mechanisms.
These observations disclose that processing and modeling textual security patterns are
time-consuming, and additional knowledge related to security patterns is usually required
during this process. This fact further explains why security patterns are not widely
applied. In the meanwhile, it justifies the value of our work, i.e. constructing reusable
contextual goal models for 20 security patterns. In addition, the above observations
also expose the shortcomings in existing security pattern specifications, which should be
tackled by the security pattern community.
6.3 Selecting and Applying Security Patterns to Operationalize
Security Requirements
Take the modeled security patterns as input, we propose a systematic process to select and
apply them to operationalize critical security goals. It is worth noting that the proposed
analysis process can be seen as an extended version of the security goal operationalization
analysis (as presented in Section 4.3.3), which systematically leverages security patterns
that have been modeled as contextual goal models to operationalize security goals. In
this sense, we seamlessly integrate security patterns with security requirements analysis.
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Note that we have implemented a prototype tool, which supports the application of our
approach and will be described in detail in Chapter 8.
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Figure 6.3: Security pattern analysis process
The entire security pattern analysis process is shown in Fig. 6.3, which requires three
types of information as input:
1. The security goal model, which captures functional requirements and security re-
quirements of the target domain. In particular, we use the three-layer requirements
goal models (introduced in Chapter 4) for this purpose. The security requirements
captured in the model are the objects that to be operationalized, while the functional
requirements describe the domain.
2. The context specification describes the environments of the domain, which is com-
posed of a list of design-time domain properties. This specification does not need to
be complete at the beginning of the analysis, and it can be incrementally enriched
during the application of security patterns. In particular, the initial context speci-
fication is derived from the three-layer requirements goal models. Then, during the
context analysis, our prototype tool will interact with users for checking undecidable
context, based on which the tool will update the context specification.
3. A collection of security patterns, which have been modeled in terms of contextual
goal models (follow the method described in the last section). In particular, we here
leverage the 20 security patterns we have pragmatically modeled (Section 6.2.3).
Note that, in Fig. 6.3, each input is assigned a tag, such as IN1. If the input is required
by one activity, the tag of that input will be specified at the end of the description
of that activity. The overall analysis process selects the best security pattern for each
critical security goal, and applies the selected pattern to the security goal model, as well
as updating the context specification. In particular, the final output of this analysis
process is a security goal model with applied security patterns, i.e., solutions modeled in
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contextual goal models. Such a security goal model will be further used and analyzed in
our holistic security requirements analysis, specifically, taking as the input of cross-layer
analysis (Section 4.3.4). In the rest of this section, we describe each step of the process
in detail, and finally illustrate the entire process with the smart grid scenario.
We here take part of a smart grid real-time pricing scenario as an example to illustrate
the security pattern analysis process. This scenario has been briefly described before
(Section 4.2.1), the full description of which will be presented in Section 9.1. Fig. 6.4




high application integrity 
[energy management system,
 database access function]
(S)
high application integrity 
[energy management system,


























send price to 
customer
Communicate 




























Figure 6.4: A part of the security goal model of the smart grid scenario
6.3.1 Generate Security Pattern Candidates
The security goal model contains a number of critical security goals, which are analyzed
one by one in our analysis process. To operationalize a critical security goal, we first
identify security pattern candidates, which can potentially treat the security goal. In
particular, we match the security property of the security goal with the root goal of the
contextual goal model of each security pattern (e.g. Application Security in Fig. 6.2) to
determine whether a security pattern can be a candidate solution to the critical security
goal. The results of this analysis reveal an initial set of security pattern candidates. Such
analysis can be automated by our prototype tool.
It is worth noting that the match process takes the hierarchy of security property into
account, such as described in [Firesmith, 2004; Scandariato et al., 2008]. For example, the
security property Application Integrity is a specialization of Application Security. Thus,
a security pattern which can tackle Application Security can also be applied to tackle the
Application Integrity problem, such as the IDS pattern.
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6.3.2 Security Pattern Selection
Once we have an initial set of the security pattern candidates, which typically contains
more than one pattern, we carry out context-based selection to choose the most appro-
priate security pattern. To this end, we need to check each context to determine whether
it holds within a particular domain.
The primary context, which is attached to mandatory requirements, is essential to the
applicability of a security pattern. Such as shown in the IDS pattern (Fig. 6.2), the root
goal is a mandatory requirement, which is valid when the primary context C1 holds. If
the primary context C1 does not hold, the root goal will be deactivated, i.e., the pattern
becomes inapplicable. In contrast to the primary context, the secondary context mainly
affects the quality of the security pattern in terms of its contributions to the preferred
softgoals. For instance, in the IDS pattern example, if the context C2 does not hold,
its corresponding preferred softgoal will be deactivated, as well as the contribution links
connected to the softgoal.
Having the two types of contexts, we propose two steps for selecting security patterns.
As shown in Fig. 6.3, we first check the primary contexts of security pattern candidates
to filter inapplicable security patterns. After that, if there is more than one applicable
security pattern left, we check the secondary contexts to determine the quality of each
security pattern, based on which we select the best pattern. In particular, we quantify
contribution links {make, help, hurt, break} as {2, 1, -1, -2} respectively to evaluate the
influences a pattern has on the satisfaction of preferred softgoals, aiding in selection of
patterns. Note that other more complicated goal satisfaction analysis techniques can also
be used for this selection, such as those compared and evaluated in Horkoff and Yu [2013]
As manual checking whether a context holds is a non-trivial task, especially for complex
and large models, we propose an interactive process that semi-automates this task. We
propose to formalize the context of security pattern in Disjunctive Datalog rules, allowing
us to automatically check them against the context specification using our prototype tool.
For example, the context C1 (in Fig. 6.2) can be formalized as below:
R1 hold(c1)← node(N1) ∧ node(N2) ∧ communicate(N1, N2, internet)
R2 not hold(c1)← node(N1)∧node(N2)∧no communicate(N1, N2, internet)
R3 undecidable(c1)← not hold(c1) ∧ not not hold(c1)
If neither hold nor not hold can be inferred for a context, then the context is unde-
cidable, and our prototype tool turns to users for manual check. On the basis of users’
answers to a list of yes/no questions, our prototype tool can automatically update the
context specification.
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For each of the 20 security patterns we have modeled (shown in Appendix F), we have
formalized its context expressions. In particular, during our formalization practice, we
noticed that the contexts of security patterns are typically described in a very detailed
manner, e.g., “Enterprise applications in an organization’s internal network are accessed
by a broad spectrum of users that may attempt to abuse its resources”. Such detailed
contexts cannot be captured in our three-layer requirements goal model, and thus most of
them need to be checked by analysts. Although manual checks are still required, our pro-
totype tool can facilitate such checks. In particular, if a context cannot be automatically
checked, the tool can actively pop up dialog to analysts with corresponding questions.
Based on the analysts’ answer, the tool can automatically update the context specifica-
tion. In such a way, one context only needs to be manually check at most once, as the
check results have been updated in the the context specification. Another observation we
have obtained is that contexts of different security patterns have little overlap. As such,
we have almost defined particular predicates for each security pattern.
6.3.3 Security Pattern Application
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Figure 6.5: Applying IDS pattern to the goal model of the smart grid scenario
Thanks to the reusable goal models we have constructed for security patterns, analysts
do not need to manually construct the goal model of a security pattern each time they
want to apply it. Thus, after selecting the best security pattern, the analyst can directly
insert the goal model of the security pattern to the security requirements goal model, as
illustrated in Fig. 6.5. Note that the red cross indicates the context C3 does not hold,
and the corresponding contribution link is deactivated.
To correctly integrate the goal model of a security pattern into the security goal model,
firstly, the analyst needs to merge the softgoals newly introduced by the security pattern
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with the original softgoals by following the techniques proposed by Niu and Easterbrook
[2007]. For example, in Fig. 6.5, the new softgoal Flexibility has been merged with the
original softgoal Flexible. Secondly, the analyst should do a pairwise comparison of all
the old elements with all the new elements to find what new contributions should be
present. As shown in Fig. 6.5, two new contributions links are identified with regard to
the new softgoal Performance. The model shown in Fig. 6.5 is the final output of our
security pattern analysis, which is then used and analyzed in the cross-layer analysis of
our holistic framework (Section 4.3.4).
Impact of security solutions. Once the above steps have been performed, we
realized that the solutions offered by security patterns (i.e., tasks in Fig. 6.5) do not
function by themselves but interact with existing system functions. For example, the
task “Analyze each access request” requires each function that sends access requests to
be recorded. Such impact of security solutions should be captured and reflected in the
functional requirements, otherwise the system specification is incomplete. To this end,
we propose a systematic approach to identify and enforce the impact imposed by security
solutions in Chapter 7.
6.4 Related Work
There are several approaches that model security patterns as goal models. Mouratidis
et al. [2006] extend their security analysis approach Secure Tropos by integrating four
security patterns. Yu et al. [2008] propose to formally specify role-based access control
as a security pattern in terms of i* models, and implement a tool to automatically detect
contexts and apply security patterns. These approaches do not address the pattern selec-
tion issues, while our proposal has a main focus on the context-based pattern selection
analysis. In addition, only a limited number of security patterns are presented in their
work, and no details are provided on how to model security patterns as goal models. In
contrast, we pragmatically target security patterns in existing pattern repositories. We
not only provide a detailed method for modeling security patterns, but also practically
follow the method to model 20 security patterns in [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013].
Araujo and Weiss [2002] apply the Non-Functional Requirement (NFR) framework as a
complementary representation for security patterns, which helps to analyze the tradeoffs
between forces. In particular, they define the force hierarchy to represent interactions
between forces, and model such hierarchy for 14 security patterns. Our approach is in line
with this work, while further incorporates context-based analysis to facilitate the selection
of security patterns. Asnar et al. [2011a] propose a method to design organizational
patterns from SI* models, which deals with system security and dependability. Their
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approach proceeds in the opposite way of ours, they aim to extract security patterns from
goal models, while we aim to apply security patterns in the context of goal model analysis.
Security patterns have been applied downwards. Shiroma et al. [2010] focus on apply-
ing security patterns in the context of UML diagrams. In particular, they have defined
transformation rules to automate this application, rewriting UML diagrams based on the
specification of security patterns. Sa´nchez-Cid and Man˜a [2008] argue that security pat-
terns should not only be used in the early software engineering stage to represent abstract
security solutions, but also need to be applied throughout the entire lifecycle of software
development. As such, they provide a language which describe security solutions to assist
software engineers in implementing security patterns into software applications. These
approaches focus on the development stage of SDLC (Software Development Lifecycle),
which contributes to the implementation of security solutions (included in security pat-
terns). Different from them, our approach applies security patterns in the requirements
stage of SDLC, focusing on identifying and applying the best security solutions that op-
erationalize security requirements.
Hafiz et al. [2007] have presented and discussed several dimensions for classifying secu-
rity patterns, such as security properties, logic tiers, security concepts, system viewpoints
and so on. Such dimensions play an important role in navigating through security pat-
terns, indirectly aiding the selection of security patterns. Our approach uses security
properties for pattern classification, which serves as the first step for identifying relevant
security patterns. After that, our approach further analyze the context of each relevant
pattern in order to determine their applicability.
Other work has also been done on systematically analyzing textual patterns. Gross
and Yu [2001] specify a systematic way to represent, analyze and apply design patterns
by using NFR framework. They illustrate their method based on the study on several
design patterns, and report their experiences in applying their method. However, their
approach does not analyze the context of a pattern and provide no tool support for
pattern selections. Supaporn et al. [2007] focus on generating security grammars, which
are specified in extended-BNF formats, by analyzing descriptions of security patterns. In
particular, they propose to build grammar trees to represent the semantics of security
patterns. We argue such grammar trees can complement our approach, helping us to
better understand and process the textual security patterns.
6.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose to integrate security patterns with security requirements
analysis by modeling security patterns as contextual goal models. We argue that our
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approach contributes to both the operationalization of security requirements and the
adoption of security patterns (Section 6.1). In particular, we define concept mappings
between security patterns and contextual goal models, and provide a detailed process for
establishing contextual goal models based on security pattern specifications (Section 6.2).
We have followed such method to pragmatically model 20 security patterns from a security
pattern textbook [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]. On the basis of such security patterns, we
propose a systematic process to select and apply security patterns and illustrate the
process with a smart grid scenario (Section 6.3). The proposed analysis process can
be seamlessly integrated into our holistic security requirements analysis framework (as
presented in Chapter 4), enhancing the security goal operationalization analysis. Finally,
we compare our proposal with related work (Section 6.4).
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Chapter 7
Analyzing the Impact of Security
Mechanisms
As part of our holistic security requirements analysis framework, we propose to opera-
tionalize security requirements in terms of security mechanisms by using security patterns
(Section 4.3.3), which has been further expanded and detailed in Chapter 6. During such
operationalization analysis, we have identified that the derived security mechanisms do
not function on their own, but impose impact on existing functional requirements. Al-
though related work has acknowledged that the application of security mechanisms can
affect system requirements specifications, there is no systematic approach to describe and
analyze this impact.
In this chapter, we propose to capture and enforce the impact that security mech-
anisms impose over system requirements in order to completely and correctly account
for their integration. Specifically, we investigate in depth a collection of security mecha-
nisms that are well documented in security pattern repositories [Scandariato et al., 2008;
Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013] in order to better understand what they are and how they
function. Based on this study, we propose a conceptual model for security mechanisms,
apply and evaluate this model against 20 security mechanisms. On the basis of the
conceptual model, we propose a systematic process for analyzing and enforcing security
mechanisms on system requirements. In particular, given system requirements specifica-
tions and the security mechanisms to be applied, our approach can systematically and
semi-automatically rewrite the requirements specifications, producing security-enhanced
requirements specifications.
In Section 7.1, we detail the impact of security mechanisms and explain why it is
important to capture and enforce such impact. Then, in Section 7.2, we present a Health-
care Collaborative Network (HCN) scenario, part of which is used for illustrating our
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approach. To analyze such impact, we first present an enriched requirements specification
in Section 7.3, and then define a conceptual model which characterizes security mecha-
nisms from a requirements viewpoint in Section 7.4. On the basis of such specifications,
we propose a systematic way to analyze and enforce the impact of a security mechanism
imposed on system requirements in Section 7.5. In particular, a set of inference rules
have been defined to describe the impact of security mechanisms, semi-automating the
analysis process. In Section 7.6, we evaluate the expressiveness of the proposed concep-
tual model by applying it to 20 security mechanisms (selected from [Scandariato et al.,
2008; Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]). Moreover, using these modeled security mechanisms,
we further evaluate the proposed impact analysis by applying it to the full HCN scenario,
which is presented in Section 7.2. Lastly, we compare our proposal with related work in
Section 7.7.
7.1 Impact of Security Mechanisms
Dealing with security requirements in the early stages of the system development has
become an important topic in Requirements Engineering (RE) and Security research, as
software companies have grown tired of spending millions to fix system flaws downstream.
Security requirements analysis techniques, such as misuse cases [Sindre and Opdahl, 2005],
obstacle analysis [Van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000], Secure Tropos [Mouratidis and
Giorgini, 2007a], involve eliciting security requirements and identifying security mech-
anisms to fulfill those requirements. For example, confidentiality requirements can be
operationalized by the security mechanism encryption. However, security mechanisms do
not function independently but interact with and constrain parts of the target system
in specific ways. As such, when applying a security mechanism, it requires to not only
introduce new functional requirements, but also to modify existing system requirements.
Some approaches have claimed that the application of security mechanisms can influ-
ence system requirements specifications [Heyman et al., 2011; Haley et al., 2008]. How-
ever, these proposals only focus on new functional requirements that are introduced by
a security mechanism and omit their impact on existing functional and non-functional
requirements. In other words, their approaches operationalize security requirements into
only functional requirements. In addition, there are neither systematic methods nor sup-
porting tools available for analyzing and enforcing the impact of security mechanisms on
system requirements.
We argue that system requirements specifications are not be complete unless they
precisely capture such impact. For example, when applying an access control mechanism
to protect a data asset stored in a server, this mechanism imposes global constraints on all
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functional requirements that access a server, which should be reflected in the requirements
specification in order to correctly develop a secure system. Moreover, the quality of the
system functions is affected by the application of security mechanisms, which should be
captured and taken into account in order to select the best functional alternatives. For
instance, applying the access control mechanism to a specific system function will impair
the usability and performance of all related functions provided by the system. Thus, we
believe that a security mechanism is not a localized solution that can be independently
decided upon over other elements of a requirements specification.
In Chapter 6, we have proposed to seamlessly integrate security patterns into security
requirements analysis by modeling security patterns as contextual goal models, which
facilitates the context-based selection among alternative security patterns. After choos-
ing the best security pattern, we apply its corresponding security mechanism (i.e. the
solution of the security pattern), which is modeled using tasks, domain assumptions, and
softgoals. Specifically, the application of a security mechanism amounts to directly at-
taching the security mechanism model into the requirements model via refinement and
contribution links. However, that approach does not consider the impact of the mech-
anism on existing functional and non-functional requirements, capturing and analyzing
which is a non-trivial task. Take the security mechanism VPN (Virtual Private Network)
as an example, which requires endpoints to communicate via a cryptographic tunnel. To
correctly apply the mechanism, all the functional requirements that communicate confi-
dential information should be constrained by this mechanism, and these requirements are
not easy to identify. Moreover, as the VPN mechanism impairs system performance, all
the functional requirements that are constrained by VPN will have a negative influence
on system performance. Such influences have to be taken into account when selecting the
best requirements specification among alternatives.
As a result, we propose to capture and enforce the impact that security mechanisms
impose over system requirements in order to completely and correctly account for their
integration.
7.2 Scenario: The Healthcare Collaborative Network (HCN)
The HCN is a system that enables the exchange of healthcare messages and documents
between and within organizations. The essential parts of the HCN include an admin
server and a message flow server, which communicate with gateways deployed at both
the publisher side and the subscriber side. A full description of the HCN can be found
online1. It is worth noting that this scenario is independently used in this chapter for
1http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks/SG246779
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illustrating and evaluating this impact analysis approach.
Fig. 7.1 shows part of the requirements goal model of the HCN, which captures the
publisher gateway application, modeled using our requirements modeling language (Sec-
tion 4.2). We assign unique identifiers to each node in the figure in order to facilitate the
references in the remaining part of this chapter.
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Figure 7.1: A snippet of requirements goal model of HCN
7.3 An Enriched Requirements Specification
To analyze the impact of security mechanisms imposed on system requirements, we first
define an enriched requirements specification. Such specifications consist of not only goals
(G), softgoal (SG), task (T) (i.e., function), domain assumption (DA) refinement (REF)
and contribution (CON) (as we have defined in Section 4.2.1), but also a new concept task
constraint (TC) which reflects the impact of security mechanisms on tasks. In particular,
a task constraint is specified in terms of task invariants and pre/post-conditions. The
invariants describe properties that have to be true during the entire execution of the task.
The pre/post-conditions describe properties that have to hold before/after the execution
of the task. The value of a task constraint can be either a constant (e.g., user data) or
a predicate (e.g., encrypted(user data)). Thus, an enriched requirements specification is
defined as a 7-tuple, i.e.,
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R = {G,SG, T,DA,REF,CON, TC}
Fig. 7.1 presents an example of a requirements specification, including all these con-
cepts except for task constraints. Note that the notation of the security mechanism shown
in this figure (i.e., tasks with (S) annotation) is only used as a placeholder, which indicates
a security mechanism is applied to operationalize a security goal. In Section 7.4, we will
describe concepts of a security mechanism in detail, replacing such placeholders.
Apart from the enriched requirements specification, we also detail a task with three
additional attributes (i.e., subject, object, and operation) in order to better analyze the
semantics of the task. For example, as shown in Fig. 7.2, we detail the selected task
with a subject publisher gateway application, an object clinical publications, and an op-
eration send. During the requirements elicitation phase, there are two ways to obtain
such expanded attributes: firstly, interactively asking users when needed; secondly, auto-
matically extracting the information from textual descriptions of tasks which have been
elicited from stakeholders (with manual verification). For the second means, we propose
to leverage Nature Language Processing (NLP) techniques, such as proposed in [Li et al.,
2011], to identify the roles of phrases in a sentence and thus to automatically extract the
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Figure 7.2: An example of the enriched requirements elements
7.4 An Enriched Security Mechanism Specification
In this section, we propose a conceptual model to characterize security mechanisms from
a requirements perspective. In particular, a security mechanism is specified in terms of
security tasks, assumptions, security constraints, and quality influences. Since we exclu-
sively focus on analyzing the impact of security mechanisms imposed on the requirements
specification (as introduced in Section 7.3), we intend to map the concepts of the secu-
rity mechanism to the requirements specification concepts as much as possible. In the
remainder of this section, we describe each of the concepts that we use to model a security
mechanism. An example of the VPN security mechanism is used for illustration, which
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Figure 7.3: Modeling security mechanism — virtual private network (VPN)
is shown in Fig. 7.3. Note that the textual specification of this mechanism can be found
in [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013].
Security tasks. A security task is a detailed action performed by a system to achieve
certain security goals. We define the security task as a specialization of task, and use TS
to represent the set of security tasks of a security mechanism. Each security task has
an additional attribute asset, beyond the 3 attributes of regular tasks we have described
before (Section 7.3). This attribute specifies the asset that is protected by a security
task, from which we can infer the impact of the security task. As the target asset of a
security task depends on the application scenario of the security task, the acquisition of
this attribute is specified during the analysis process, described in Section 7.5.
As with all tasks, a composite security task can be decomposed into detailed security
tasks, and we define the set of refinement relations between security tasks as REFS. Note
that we use the root security task to indicate the overall security mechanism, which can
be repeatedly refined till reaching leaf security tasks, as shown in Fig. 7.3.
Assumptions. An assumption specifies an expected state of affairs, under which the
security mechanism can be applied correctly. Normally, these assumptions are captured
during the refinements of security tasks, such as the assumption “All endpoints share the
same public key system”, presented in Fig. 7.3. We map this concept to domain assump-
tion, and use DAS to represent the set of assumptions made in a security mechanism.
Security constraints. A security mechanism does not exist independently, but in-
teracts and constrains existing system tasks in order to ensure that security requirements
are satisfied. Thus, we explicitly capture such interactions between security tasks and
tasks in the requirements model by using security constraints. We use SC to present the
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Table 7.1: Security constraint rules
Global impact of security constraints
Rule 1: constrain(ST, T )← has operation(T, F ) ∧ transfer operation(F )
∧has object(T,O) ∧ protect(ST,O)
∧has constraint(ST, encryption constraint)
Rule 2: constrain(ST, T )← has operation(T, F ) ∧ (protect(ST, F )
∨(access operation(F ) ∧ has object(T,O) ∧ protect(ST,O)))
∧has constraint(ST, authentication constraint)
Rule 3: constrain(ST, T )← has operation(T, F ) ∧ (protect(ST, F )
∨(access operation(F ) ∧ has object(T,O) ∧ protect(ST,O)))
∧has constraint(ST, authorization constraint)
Rule 4: constrain(ST, T )← has operation(T, F ) ∧ protect(ST, F )
∧has constraint(ST, centralization constraint)
Rule 5: constrain(ST, T )← has operation(T, F ) ∧ access operation(F )
∧has object(T,O) ∧ protect(ST,O)
∧has constraint(ST, protection constraint)
Rule 6: constrain(ST, T )← ((has function(T, F ) ∧ protect(ST, F ))
∨(has object(T,O) ∧ protect(ST,O)))
∧has constraint(ST, auditing constraint)
set of security constraints imposed by a security mechanism.
As an initial effort towards such impact analysis, we summarize six security constraints
after investigating more than 40 reusable security mechanisms that are documented in
a security pattern textbook [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013] and a security pattern reposi-
tory [Yskout et al., 2006]. The six security constraints include Encryption Constraint,
Authentication Constraint, Permission Constraint, Centralization Constraint, Protection
Constraint, and Auditing Constraint. Each of these security constraints implies that a se-
curity task constrains specific tasks which have certain properties. Thus, according to the
meaning of each security constraint, we define security constraint rules for each particular
security constraint to identify tasks that are constrained by a security task. The full list
of security constraint rules are shown in Table 7.1. Take the Rule 1 as an example: if a
security task ST has an encryption constraint, which targets the asset O, and there is
144 Analyzing the Impact of Security Mechanisms
a task T that has an operation F , which transfers the asset O, then the task T is con-
strained by the security task ST . Once having a list of security constraints, we need to go
through each security task modeled before to identify whether it imposes certain security
constraint. For example, as shown in Fig. 7.3, we identify that the security tasks st2 and
st9 impose the Encryption Constraint and Authentication Constraint, respectively.
The proposed security constraints are not intended to be complete, but provide good
coverage when considering the content of the 40 investigated security patterns. Additional
constraints, together with their corresponding constraint rules (e.g., Table 7.1), can be
incrementally integrated into our work.
Quality Influences. Each security task not only changes functions of a system, but
may also influence the qualities of the system, either positively or negatively. We use
a set of contribution links to capture such quality influences, which are represented as
CONS. A contribution link is a triple, which specifies the influence imposed by a security
task over system related quality (captured as a softgoal). We define the set of softgoals
affected by a security mechanism as SGS. Thus, the quality influences are defined as:
CONS ⊆ TS × {make, help, hurt, break} × SGS
For example, in Fig. 7.3, security task st4:Establish a cryptographic tunnel in the IP layer
makes softgoal sg5:High transparency, while hurts another softgoal sg3:High performance.
7.5 A Systematic Process for Analyzing the Impact of Security
Mechanisms
In this section, we propose a systematic process to analyze and enforce the impact security
mechanisms impose on the existing system requirements specification, which is shown in
Fig. 7.4. We take the enriched requirements specificationR and the to-be-applied security
mechanism specification M as the input of our analysis, i.e.,
Input: R = {G,SG, T,DA,REF,CON, TC}, M = {TS, REFS, DAS, SC, SGS, CONS}
By systematically analyzing the impact of the security mechanism, our approach will
generate an updated requirements specification, R′, which reflects all the impacts of the
security mechanisms imposed on the requirements specification, i.e.,
Output: R′ = {G′, SG′, T ′, DA′, REF ′, CON ′, TC ′}
We illustrate the analysis process by analyzing the impact of the VPN mechanism
(Fig. 7.3) imposed on the piece of requirements specification of the HCN scenario (Fig. 7.1).
It is worth noting that if there are multiple security mechanisms need to be applied, all
of them will be analyzed iteratively using the same approach.
Step 1: Integrate Security Tasks. All security tasks, as a specialization of tasks,
are directly incorporated into the initial requirements specification, as well as the refine-





















Figure 7.4: The process for analyzing impact of security mechanisms
ments relations among them (if they exist). As such, the integration is defined as follows:
T = T ∪ TS , REF = REF ∪REFS
As a security mechanism is applied to operationalize a security goal, the root security
task of the security mechanism will replace the placeholder described in Fig. 7.1, and is
directly linked to the security goal. In the illustrating example, the result of integrating
security tasks of the VPN mechanism to the requirements specification is shown in the
right part of Fig. 7.5 (st1-st10 ).
Step 2: Contextualize Security Tasks. Once security tasks are integrated into
the requirements and linked to a particular security goal, the target assets of security
tasks should be determined in order to support the identification of constrained tasks in a
later step. Each security goal in the requirements specification has already been specified
an asset, such as the security goal sec1 is specified with an asset clinical information
(Fig. 7.5). Thus, the security tasks that are applied to satisfy a security goal will inherit
the asset from that security goal. In the illustrating example (Fig. 7.5), all the applied
security tasks have the asset clinical information, automatically derived from security goal
sec1.
Step 3: Recheck Assumptions. When applying a security mechanism to a system
within a particular domain, assumptions made in the mechanism should be further checked
about whether or not it is still an assumption in the domain. Thus, a heuristic question
can be asked, “Is the assumed phenomenon inside the boundary of system design now?” If
so, we need to replace this assumption with a security task which realizes the assumption,
and then add this security task to the set of tasks, i.e.,
T = T ∪ {a|∀a ∈ DAS, inside design boundary(a)}
In this case, the newly added security tasks should be appropriately performed to ensure
that the security mechanism is executed correctly. If the answer to the question is No, the
properties in the assumption keep being assumed to be held, and we add the assumption
to the set of domain assumptions, i.e.,
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Figure 7.5: Impact of the application of VPN (part)
DA = DA ∪ {a|∀a ∈ DAS, outside design boundary(a)}
In our example, the assumption of the VPN mechanism “All endpoints share the same
public key system” is determined to be inside the system design boundary. So we create
a security task based on this assumption (i.e., the st11 in Fig. 7.5), and add this security
task to the set of tasks.
Step 4: Identify Constrained Tasks. After security tasks have been contextual-
ized with the asset information, we now apply the security constraint rules (Table 7.1)
to automatically identify interactions between security tasks in the security mechanism
specification and tasks in the requirements specification, i.e., identifying which tasks are
constrained by a security task.
During the above impact identification, we are concerned about not only the infor-
mation derived from the two specifications (i.e., R and M), but also additional domain
knowledge models, such as data schemes (Fig. 7.6 (a)) and semantic hierarchies of words
(Fig. 7.6 (b)). These models provide auxiliary rules to facilitate the analysis, e.g., the
following rules:
Rule 7: protect(ST,A2)← protect(ST,A1) ∧ part of(A1, A2)
Rule 8: transfer opertiona(O)← send operation(O)
Rule 7 indicates that if an asset needs to be protected, all the parts of this asset also
should be protected. Rule 8 indicates that if an operation is of the type of send, then it
is also of the type of transfer.
In our example, we apply Rule 1 and identify three tasks {t3, t8, t14} (Fig. 7.1), which
are constrained by security task st2. Note that, for illustration purposes, Fig. 7.5 only
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Figure 7.6: Examples of knowledge models
Step 5: Enforce Security Constraints. After identifying all tasks that are con-
strained, we further enforce security constraints on those tasks. In particular, we propose
specific enforcement measures for each of the six security constraints in accordance with
their meanings, which are detailed in Table 7.2. In this table, we first present the impact
introduced by each security constraint. After that we describe the concrete enforcement
measures, which are either adding task constraints or replacing tasks. For example, the
Encryption Constraint adds a new pre-condition to the constrained task, the Protection
Constraint adds a new invariant to the constrained task, and the Auditing Constraint
adds a new post-condition to the constrained task. Apart from imposing task constraints,
the Centralization Constraint replaces the constrained task with the corresponding secu-
rity task. In this case, all the refinement relations that were linked to the constrained
task are now redirected to the security task, and then the constrained task is removed.
According to the proposed enforcement measures, in our example, we enforce the en-
cryption constraint on the constrained task t14 (Fig. 7.5), i.e., adding a new pre-condition
performed(st2) to this task.
Step 6: Apply Quality Influences. Many requirements analysis techniques rely on
qualities, which are normally captured as non-functional requirements (NFRs), to select
alternative requirements [Horkoff and Yu, 2013]. Due to the interactions between security
tasks and tasks, the quality influences introduced by security tasks may affect system
requirements decisions, which need to be re-evaluated.
As the first step of applying quality influences, we correlate the softgoals in SGS with
the softgoals in SG, i.e. checking whether they are the same softgoals. As the same
concept may be presented by different terms in different ways, this correlation analysis
may require additional techniques, such as the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) [Niu and
Easterbrook, 2007]. In the illustrating example (Fig. 7.3), SGS of the VPN mechanism
involves several softgoals among which sg4: Low cost and sg3: High performance have
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been correlated with softgoals in SG (in this particular case, the correlated softgoals have
the same contents). For the softgoals in SGS that are not correlated, the analyst needs to
re-evaluate stakeholders’ non-functional requirements to decide whether to include these
softgoals. In our example, after evaluating the uncorrelated softgoal High traceability, we
decided to consider this software for the entire system, i.e., adding it to the SG (shown
in Fig. 7.5). This integration is defined below,
SG = SG ∪ {sg|∀sg ∈ SGS, uncorrelated(sg) ∧ decide include(sg)}
However, the other uncorrelated softgoals, such as sg2: Good usability, are evaluated and
are determined to not fit in with the current scenario. Once the above correlated softgoals
and newly added softgoals are determined, all their corresponding contribution links in
CONS will be integrated into the requirements specification, i.e.,
CON = CON ∪ {contribute(st, inf, sg)|∀contribute(st, inf, sg) ∈ CONS,∃sg ∈ SG}
After correlating softgoals, we analyze the quality influences of a security task to its
constrained tasks. Specifically, if a security task constrains a task, then all the quality
influences introduced by this security task should be taken into account when evaluating
the constrained task, especially if the constrained task is part of a requirements alterna-
tive. In the example (Fig. 7.5), since t14 is constrained by st2, the correct execution of
t14 requires the appropriate interactions with st2. Thus, when evaluating the require-
ments alternatives that involve t14, such as the alternative tasks {t11,t12} vs. {t14,t15},
Evaluation 149








Total 89 15 27 148
Average 4.45 0.75 1.35 7.4
the influences st2 imposed on the qualities (i.e., sg1, sg2, sg4 ) have to be taken into
consideration.
7.6 Evaluation
In this section, we focus on answering two questions related to the proposed impact
analysis approach. Firstly, we intend to evaluate the expressiveness of the proposed
conceptual model of security mechanisms by applying it to model 20 existing security
mechanisms. In particular, we concern whether the conceptual model can capture specific
semantics of such security mechanisms, and how long does it take for such practical
conceptualization. Secondly, we evaluate the effectiveness of our impact analysis approach
by applying it to a medium-scale HCN scenario, where we report our experiences in the
practical application of our proposal.
Evaluating the Conceptual Model of Security Mechanisms. We applied the proposed
conceptual model to 20 security mechanisms, which are specified as reusable security
solutions in the security pattern textbook [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]. These 20 security
mechanisms are taken from the solution part of the 20 security patterns we have modeled
in Chapter 6. In particular, we focus on capturing and modeling the security constraints
imposed by such security mechanisms. On average, each mechanism cost me 20-30 minutes
to model, and the statistics of the overall results is summarized in Table 7.3.
During this practical modeling session, we found that the six types of security con-
straints (proposed in Section 7.4) were able to capture specific semantics of the 20 security
mechanisms. We captured 27 security constraints in total for the 20 security mechanisms,
on average 1.35 constraints per mechanism. In particular, we contend that each security
mechanism must impose at least one security constraint, indicating the major feature
of the security mechanism. On the other hand, a complex security mechanism can im-
pose multiple security constraints that function together to deliver particular security
features. Such as the VPN example shown before (in Fig. 7.3), which imposes not only
authentication constraints to the communication tunnel, but also encryption constraints.
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In our modeling practice, once we modeled all security tasks, we followed a bottom-up
process to identify the security constraints imposed by each security tasks. Specifically,
we first checked each leaf security task whether it imposed a security constraint, and then
we moved forwards to check the parents of such security tasks. If we had identified that
one security task imposed a security constraint, we would not model such a constraint
for the parent of that security task. In this way, we kept the security constraints at the
detailed level of granularity as much as possible.
From the statistics of other elements of security mechanisms, we observed several
issues. Firstly, on average each mechanism had more than four security tasks, which
implies that security mechanisms are normally described at high abstraction level and
can be further refined into detailed security tasks. Also, this further explains why one
security mechanism may impose multiple security constraints. Secondly, the number
of quality influences we have modeled for the 20 security mechanisms was significantly
larger than any other concepts (e.g., assumptions). Such phenomenon strongly justifies
that security mechanisms can heavily affect the quality of systems, emphasizing the need
of capturing and analyzing the quality influences of security mechanisms.
On the whole, by applying the conceptual model, a single security mechanism had
around 14 nodes on average. Thus, we argue that the conceptual model is scalable to
model a larger number of security mechanisms. In particular, such modeling work is
performed once for all, i.e., the modeled security mechanisms can be reused in our impact
analysis. In this sense, the 20 modeled security mechanisms can serve as the initial
mechanism repository that is used by our impact analysis approach, while additional
mechanisms can be incrementally added to this repository either by ourselves or by other
researchers who have followed our modeling approach. It is worth noting that in this
study we exclusively focus on evaluating the expressiveness of the proposed conceptual
model. In particular, the study was performed by the conceptual model designer and we
did not yet evaluate whether other people are able to model security mechanisms using
our conceptual model. Such study is left for future work.
Evaluating the Impact Analysis Approach. We applied the proposed analysis ap-
proach to the full requirements model that we have built for the HCN scenario, as intro-
duced in Section 7.2. In particular, we adopted our three-layer requirements modeling
language to establish a comprehensive requirements model for the entire scenario, which
contained 66 goals, 7 softgoals, 163 tasks, and 198 refinement links. The complete model
is shown in Fig. 7.7, while the vector file of this model is available online2. In this study,
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Figure 7.7: The complete three-layer requirements goal model of the HCN scenario
termined to operationalize a security goal high data confidentiality [Clinical information,
Data exchange between HCN and Publisher IT system is enabled]. Since the VPN mecha-
nism is a software security mechanism, the impact analysis was performed in the software
layer of the three-layer requirements model, which contains 23 goals, 7 softgoals, 67 tasks,
and 75 refinement links (as shown in Fig. 7.8). To be noted that we here exclusively
report our experience in applying the impact analysis approach, and do not involve issues
such as how to select a security mechanism to operationalize security goals (which is part
of Chapter 6).
With the support of our prototype tool (Chapter 8), we were able to not only graph-
ically model the requirements model and the security mechanism model, but also to
automatically infer the tasks that were constrained by specific security tasks based on the
proposed rules (Table 7.1) and thus to enforce such constraints. In addition, we leveraged
another NLP tool to facilitate generating enriched requirements specification, which can
automatically extract the subject, object, and operation from the description of a task
by using NLP techniques [Li et al., 2011]. However, we encountered practical challenges
when using the tool to automatically extract task attributes, and had to manually specify
many task attributes. This was because the NLP tool extracts the task attributes by
processing the content of each task, requiring the task description to be complete and
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grammatically correct. However, when building the requirements goal model, we did not
specify the full description of a task but the essential part which made sense to most
readers. For example, within the actor boundary of Publisher Gateway Application, we
typically specify a task without claiming its subject as this is implied by the actor model.
As such, the NLP cannot fully automate the extraction of task attributes and required
additional manual effort for specifying such information. Similar challenges have also
been reported by Casagrande et al. [2014], where the authors applied NLP techniques to
process goal models. To tackle this challenge, we plan to improve the NLP tool by taking
into account more semantics of the requirements goal model. Alternatively, we can choose
to always specify the full details of each task.
After specifying the three attributes for each task in the scenario, I spent one hour
to perform the impact analysis for the VPN mechanism. We report and evaluate such
application of our approach in detail below:
• Step 1: We integrated all the security tasks of the VPN mechanism into the re-
quirements model in order to operationalize the security goal high data confidentiality
[Clinical information, Data exchange between HCN and Publisher IT system is en-
abled]. In particular, our prototype tool has good usability which allows us to easily
copy-paste the established security mechanism models into the requirements model.
• Step 2: After inserting the security tasks to operationalize the security goal, the
asset concerned by the security goal were then propagated to the security tasks we
just inserted. This step was automatically executed by our prototype tool.
• Step 3: We then checked the assumption made by the VPN security mechanism.
As we determined that the assumption was inside the system design boundary, it
should be achieved by the system. Thus, we reformed it as a security task, replacing
the previous assumption. This step was performed manually, requiring a through
understanding of the target system, especially on the system boundary.
• Step 4: Since the VPN mechanism contains two security constraints, i.e., the au-
thentication constraint and the encryption constraint associated with two different
security tasks (as previously shown in Fig. 7.3), we then identified constrained re-
quirements tasks by applying corresponding inference rules (Rule 1 and Rule 2 in
Table 7.1). In particular, with the tool support we instantly identified 12 tasks that
were constrained by the two security constraints, which have been highlighted in
Fig. 7.8.
• Step 5: Once contained tasks had been identified, we then followed the enforcement
measures (Table 7.2) to rewrite the specification of those tasks. In particular, we
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added two preconditions to each of the 12 constrained tasks, indicating that before
performing these tasks a cryptographic tunnel must be first established and users
who access the tunnel mush be authenticated.
• Step 6: As the last step, we processed the quality influences of the security mecha-
nism. In particular, we manually checked all the qualities (i.e., softgoals) influenced
by the VPN mechanism against seven qualities required by stakeholders. Eventu-
ally, two qualities were matched with existing qualities, while other three were not.
Among the three unmatched qualities, one was determined to be required by the
stakeholder and thus added to the requirements model, while the other two were
decided to be excluded.
After going through the impact analysis process, the final security enhanced require-
ments specification is shown in Fig. 7.8. In particular, compared to the initial requirements
specification, this rewritten specification comprehensively captured all the functional tasks
that were introduced by the security mechanisms and their impact over initial functional
and non-functional requirements specifications. Overall, we conclude that the proposed
impact analysis approach can be applied to a medium-scale scenario to identify and en-
force impact of security mechanisms within a reasonable amount of time. Beyond this
study, we intend to apply our approach to larger scenarios in order to further assess the
scalability of our approach. In addition, apart from the effectiveness, we want also to
further evaluate other aspects of our impact analysis approach, especially, whether it can
be adopted in reality by other practitioners (i.e., usability).
7.7 Related Work
The interaction between requirements and architecture was first emphasized by Nuseibeh
[2001], where he proposes a twin peaks model to show these interactions at an abstract
level. Heyman et al. [2011] and Okubo et al. [2012] specialize the twin peaks model in
the security area, respectively. They all outline a constructive process for co-developing
secure software architectures and security requirements, but do not consider the impact
imposed by security architecture on other non-security requirements. In addition, none
of these approaches has formalized the interactions between the twin peaks, and there is
no tool has been developed to support the analysis process.
In Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE), stakeholder’s requirements, i.e.,
goals and softgoals should be operationalized into specific functions. As summarized
by Dalpiaz et al. [2014], there are several types of operationalization among existing
GORE approaches, namely: functional requirements operationalization, qualitative op-
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erationalization, adaptation requirements operationalization, and behavior operational-
ization. Most of the existing work about security requirements operationalization falls
into the first category, i.e., operationalizing security requirements into particular func-
tions [Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2002; Haley et al., 2008; Li and Horkoff, 2014]. However,
in this paper, we argue that any single category summarized above is not enough to char-
acterize the operationalization of security requirements. Instead, our proposal aims to
provide a new category of requirements operationalization, which focuses on capturing
various changes on existing requirements specification.
Apart from the type of requirements operationalization, the means of doing the op-
erationalization is also an essential step of the analysis. Letier and van Lamsweerde
[2002] have proposed to leverage operationalization patterns to guide the operationaliza-
tion analysis, while Alrajeh et al. [2009] leverage machine learning techniques to oper-
ationalize goals. As these approaches help to guarantee the correctness of the obtained
operational specification, they can complement our work during the step of enforcing
security constraints, specifically, validating the enforcement rules.
Security, as a cross-cutting concern, has been investigated in an aspect-oriented man-
ner. Gunawan et al. [2009] model both system functional designs and security mechanisms
by using the collaboration-oriented behavior model, and propose to treat each security
mechanism as a security aspect that can be inserted into different places of the system de-
sign. de Sousa et al. [2003] adapt the NFR framework to support aspect-oriented analysis.
Specifically, they illustrate their approach with a security requirements example, as they
treat security requirements as a NFR. However, the above approaches do not consider the
quality influences imposed by security mechanisms.
The impact of security mechanisms has been enforced by using model transformation
techniques. Shiroma et al. [2010] focus on applying security mechanisms onto UML class
diagrams. They automatically enforce the security mechanism by defining transformation
rules in ATLAS transformation language. However, this work focuses on the design phase
and does not consider the impact on the system requirements. Yu et al. [2008] use
i* constructs to model the context, problem, and solution of a security pattern, and
automate the problem matching and application of the security solution by using ATL.
However, their approach highly depends on the semantics of the constructs of i*, such as
dependencies and roles, and cannot be generalized for all security mechanisms, such as
encryption.
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7.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we focus on dealing with a particular challenge which we encountered
during the application of our holistic security requirements framework. In particular, we
propose to capture and enforce the impact that security mechanisms impose over system
requirements in order to completely and correctly account for their integration. To this
end, we first described an enriched requirements specification which can reflect the im-
pact imposed by security mechanisms (Section 7.3). Then we propose a conceptual model
in Section 7.4, which characterizes security mechanisms as security tasks, assumptions,
security constraints, and quality influences. Built on such conceptual model, we propose
a systematic way to analyze and enforce the impact that security mechanisms impose
over the system requirements, which helps analysts to rewrite the initial requirements
specification into a security-enhanced version (Section 7.5). In particular, a set of rea-
soning rules have been proposed in order to semi-automatically identify the exact part
of the requirements specification constrained by security mechanisms. In Section 7.6, we
have evaluated the expressiveness of our conceptual model against 20 security mecha-
nisms documented in existing security pattern repositories. Moreover, we have applied
the proposed impact analysis process to a HCN scenario, the results of which show that
our proposal can help analysts to capture and enforce the impact of a security mechanism
over a medium-scale scenario within reasonable time. Lastly, we compare our proposal
with related work in Section 7.7.
Chapter 8
A Prototype Tool
Give us the tools, and we will finish the job.
Winston Churchill
In this chapter, we present a prototype tool MUSER (MUltilayer SEcurity Require-
ments analysis tool), which is developed to support our analytical methods proposed in
Chapter 4-7, semi-automating holistic security requirements analysis. Generally speaking,
this tool allows analysts to graphically model different models and perform reasoning on
top of such models. We first introduce the architecture of the tool in Section 8.1, based
on which we present a list of features that are offered by the tool in Section 8.2. After
that we describe detailed use cases for each primary feature, shedding light on how to use
the tool to perform holistic security requirements analysis (Section 8.3).
8.1 Architecture
MUSER is a Java-based program, which is developed on top of a professional diagramming
application OmniGraﬄe1 in order to leverage its powerful modeling features and thus
efficiently model requirements models in three separate layers. The graphical models are
automatically transformed into formal expressions (i.e., Disjunctive Datalog), which can
be inferred using the inference engine DLV2. Specifically, upon the requests from analysts,
the tool passes the models together with the analysis requests to the inference engine,
which performs corresponding reasoning tasks. The inference results are then interpreted
as corresponding graphical models in the canvas, presenting to users. In particular, the
architecture of the tool consists of four components: control, view, model, and inference,
as shown in Fig. 8.1. We introduce each of them in detail below.
1http://www.omnigroup.com/omnigraffle
2http://www.dlvsystem.com/

























Figure 8.1: An overall architecture of MUSER
Control component controls the logic of the prototype tool and coordinates other com-
ponents in order to deliver inference functions to users. When receiving user’s inference
requests, it imports related graphical models from the view component, and automati-
cally generates a formal model specification using the formal predicates we have defined
in Chapter 4-5. Then, the control component automatically calls the inference component
to carry out corresponding inference tasks based on the formal model specification. Once
receiving the inference results from the inference component, the control component au-
tomatically updates related model information and graphically presents them in the view
component.
View component supports users with graphical modeling and can graphically show in-
ference results to users. The major requirements for this component include: 1) support
goal-oriented modeling and allow customized notations; 2) support multilayer modeling,
i.e. modeling in different views while keeping connections among them; 3) be connected
with the inference component to support reasoning. We choose a professional diagram-
ming application OmniGraﬄe as the view component of our prototype, meeting all the
above requirements. Especially, this application has many useful modeling features, such
as automatic layout, outline view, and various export formats. In particular, we have
defined a collection of interfaces for the view component, through which the control com-
ponent can interact with graphical models in the canvas. In such a way, the prototype
tool is flexible in the sense that the view component can be replaced by other applications
that comply with the interfaces.
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Inference component implements the inference rules proposed in our approach, and au-
tomates corresponding analytical tasks. In particular, we leverage DLV inference engine3
to carry out inference based on the rules and facts. This component receives requests
from the control component, performs corresponding inference tasks, and then returns
results back to the control component.
Model component is responsible for storing the formal models, which are used by
the inference component. Such formal models are automatically derived from graphical
models built in the view component, and are then stored in text files. Note that if our
analysis involves very complex and large models in the future, the model component can
be upgraded and incorporate specialized database application.
8.2 Features
In this section, we summarize all the features provided by MUSER, which support the
holistic security requirements analysis. In particular, we introduce modeling features and
analysis features, respectively.
Modeling features. Since MUSER is built on top of OmniGraﬄe, it inherits many pow-
erful modeling features from that professional diagramming application, such as automatic
layout, outline view, and various export formats. Apart from such shared features, we
have further customize OmniGraﬄe in order to provide two particular features for the
holistic security requirements analysis. Firstly, we have produced a stencil including all
the modeling constructs proposed in Section 4.2, assisting analysts in building all ana-
lytical models we have proposed in the thesis. Secondly, we have customized the model
canvas to including three different layers. In particular, the visibility of each of these
three layers is configurable, allowing users to view any of the three layers. As such, the
tool can perfectly implement the modularity we advocate in this thesis.
Take Fig. 8.2 as an example for illustration. The modeling canvas is set in the middle,
where users can build their models by leveraging all the modeling features offered by
OmniGraﬄe. In the right part presents, users can find the stencil we have customized
according to our modeling language. Moreover, there is an outline view provided in the
left part, through which analysts can navigate modeling in different layers.
Analysis features. Using the modeling features described above, users can produce
various analytical models required by our holistic security requirements analysis. Based
3http://www.dlvsystem.com/dlv/








Figure 8.2: The modeling interface of MUSER
on such models, our prototype tool offers a collection of features to perform reasoning
over the models, (semi-)automating corresponding analytical methods we have proposed
in this thesis (Chapter 4-7). In particular, we list all the features below, which are
grouped based on the analysis methods they implement.
Thus far, MUSER has been implemented with the following features:
• Holistic security requirements analysis.
– Refine security goals. The tool can automatically perform both step-by-step re-
finement and exhaustive refinement, completing security goal refinement anal-
ysis (Section 4.3.1).
– Identify critical security goals. The tool can automatically check the applica-
bility of security goals and identify threats that are related to security goals.
Features 161
Based on such analysis results, analysts can semi-automatically identify critical
security goals (Section 4.3.2).
– Operationalize security goals. The tool can help analysts to semi-automatically
operationalize critical security goals in terms of corresponding security mecha-
nisms using security patterns, facilitating the analysis described in Section 4.3.3.
In particular, this feature includes the following sub-features, assisting elabo-
rated analysis methods that are introduced in Chapter 6.
∗ Identify security pattern candidates. Given a critical security goal, the tool
can first identify all the relevant security patterns that may be applied
to operationalize the security goal, assisting the analysis described in Sec-
tion 6.3.1.
∗ Check applicability of security pattern candidates. The tool can help ana-
lysts to determine the applicability of each security pattern candidate by
checking the context required by the candidate. If certain context cannot
be checked, the tool will interact with users to obtain corresponding con-
text information. In such a way, analysts can semi-automatically select
applicable security patterns from candidates, as described in Section 6.3.2.
– Propagate security requirements across layers. The tool can automate the cross-
layer analysis described in Section 4.3.4, i.e., generating security requirements
in the next layer down and enabling iterative security requirements analysis in
that layer.
– Generate holistic security solutions. Once having the entire security goal model
that covers security concerns in all three layers, our tool can generate all the
alternative security solutions that satisfy the root security goal, automating the
analysis described in Section 4.3.5.
• Holistic security attack analysis.
– Operationalize anti-goals into attack pattern candidates. Given an anti-goal,
the tool can identify all the relevant attack patterns that may be able to oper-
ationalize this anti-goal, automating the analysis presented in Section 5.3.2.
– Check applicability of attack pattern candidates. The tool can automatically
determine the applicability of an attack pattern by checking the context required
by the pattern. If some context cannot be checked, the tool will ask for manual
check via pop-up dialog. In such a way, analysts are able to semi-automatically
select applicable attack patterns to operationalize anti-goals, as described in
Section 5.3.2.
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– Generate of alternative (multistage) attacks. Once a complete attack model is
established, our tool can automatically generate all the alternative (multistage)
attacks, supporting the analysis introduced in Section 5.3.2.
• Security mechanism impact analysis.
– Identify constrained requirements tasks. The tool can automatically identify
all the requirements tasks that are affected by a particular security constraint,
assisting the impact analysis described in Section 7.5.
– Enforce impact of security mechanisms. Once the constrained requirements
tasks have been identified, our tool can automatically enforce the impact of the
security constraints on such requirements tasks, based on corresponding rules
introduced in Section 7.5.
Figure 8.3: Perform analysis using MUSER control panel
Since MUSER is developed on top of OmniGraﬄe, all the above analysis features
are executed via the MUSER control panel, as shown in the right part of Fig. 8.3. In
particular, analysts should first select elements from the canvas, which they want to
analyze. After that, they can perform specific analysis by clicking corresponding buttons
in the control panel. Once the analysis is completed, our tool will update the canvas in
order to show the analysis results.
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8.3 Use Cases
In this section, we present detailed use case specifications for each analysis feature we
have introduced in the last section in order to guide potential users. In particular, we
specify the following attributes for each use case: Name, Actors, Preconditions, Basic
Flow, Post-conditions. Note that we here only present the basic execution flow of each
use case, and ignore the alternative flows. This is because the tool currently is not robust
enough to tackle different exceptions, and thus the users are expected to follow the basic
execution flow. In the future, we will keep improving the tool to deal with exceptions.
Table 8.1: The use case specification for refining security goals
Name: Refine security goals
Actors: Analysts, Stakeholders
Preconditions:
• Stakeholder’s initial security needs (i.e., the root security goals) have been elicited
• The three-layer requirements goal model has been built
• The resource schema has been imported
• The security property hierarchy has been specified
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple security goals from the canvas, which are intended to be refined
2. Choose the refinement dimension in the control panel (e.g., asset-based refinement)
3. Choose the refinement type in the control panel (e.g., one-step refinement)
4. Click the refinement button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• The selected security goals as been refined into expected sub-goals
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Table 8.2: The use case specification for identifying critical security goals
Name: Identify critical security goals
Actors: Analysts, Security experts
Preconditions:
• The data flow information has been specified
• The threat information has been imported
• The resource schema has been imported
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple security goals from the canvas
2. Click the simplification button in the control panel
3. Manually determine the criticality for each security goal that is applicable but non-critical.
Post-conditions:
• The criticality of the selected security goals has been determined
Table 8.3: The use case specification for identifying security pattern candidates
Name: Identify security pattern candidates
Actors: Analysts
Preconditions:
• Critical security goals have been identified
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple critical security goals from the canvas
2. Click the operationalization button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• The selected security goals are operationalized into a list of security pattern candidates
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Table 8.4: The use case specification for checking applicability of security pattern candidates
Name: Checking applicability of security pattern candidates
Actors: Analysts, Domain experts
Preconditions:
• Security pattern candidates have been generated
• The context specification has been loaded
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple security pattern candidates from the canvas
2. Click the operationalization button in the control panel
3. For contexts that cannot be automatically checked, users need to manually check them via
pop-up dialog
Post-conditions:
• The applicability of the selected security pattern candidates have been determined
Table 8.5: The use case specification for propagating security requirements across layers
Name: Propagate security requirements across layers
Actors: Analysts
Preconditions:
• Critical security goals have been operationalized
• The three-layer requirements goal model has been built
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple security mechanisms or critical security goals from the canvas
2. Click the cross-layer analysis button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• The selected security mechanisms or critical security goals have propagated their corresponding
security concerns into the next layer down
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Table 8.6: The use case specification for generating holistic security solutions
Name: Generate holistic security solutions
Actors: Analysts
Preconditions:
• The three-layer security goal model has been built
Basic Flow:
1. Select the entire three-layer security goal model from the canvas
2. Click the holistic analysis button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• All holistic security solutions are generated and listed in the control panel
Table 8.7: The use case specification for operationalizing anti-goals
Name: Operationalize anti-goals into attack pattern candidates
Actors: Analysts
Preconditions:
• The goal-oriented attack strategy model has been established
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple leaf anti-goals from the canvas
2. Click the attack operationalization button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• The selected anti-goals have been operationalized into a list of relevant attack patterns
Table 8.8: The use case specification for checking applicability of attack pattern candidates
Name: Check applicability of attack pattern candidates
Actors: Analysts, Domain experts
Preconditions:
• Attack pattern candidates have been generated
• The three-layer requirements goal model has been built
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple attack pattern candidates
2. Click the attack context analysis button in the control panel
3. For contexts that cannot be automatically checked, users need to manually check them via
pop-up dialog
Post-conditions:
• The applicability of the selected attack pattern candidates have been determined
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Table 8.9: The use case specification for generating alternative (multistage) attacks
Name: Generate of alternative (multistage) attacks
Actors: Analysts
Preconditions:
• The goal-oriented attack model has been established
Basic Flow:
1. Select the entire goal-oriented attack model from the canvas
2. Click the attack generation button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• All attack alternatives are generated and shown in the control panel
Table 8.10: The use case specification for identifying constrained requirements tasks
Name: Identify constrained requirements tasks
Actors: Analysts
Preconditions:
• The enriched requirements model has been built
• The applied security tasks have been contextualized
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple security constraints from the canvas
2. Click influence analysis button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• All the requirements tasks that are impacted by the selected security constraints are identified
Table 8.11: The use case specification for enforcing impact of security constraints
Name: Enforce impact of security constraints
Actors: Analysts
Preconditions:
• The requirements tasks that are constrained by the security constraints
Basic Flow:
1. Select one or multiple security constraints from the canvas
2. Click the enforce impact button in the control panel
Post-conditions:
• The impact of the security constraints has been enforced on the constrained requirements tasks
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8.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduce a prototype tool (MUSER), which was developed to support
various analysis methods we have proposed in Chapter 4-7. The prototype tool is imple-
mented in Java, its architecture has been introduced in detail in Section 8.1. We then
present a list of features that are accommodated by the tool in Section 8.2. In order to
facilitate users to easily use the tool, in Section 8.3, we have described detailed use cases
for each analysis feature of the tool.
Chapter 9
Validation
We need science. We need empirical evidence. We can’t just use
mathematical reasoning to deduce the nature of the world.
Rebecca Goldstein
In this Chapter, we validate our holistic security requirements framework by applying
it to two case studies. The first case study was performed by myself based on a smart
grid scenario, in which I focused on evaluating the efficiency of both the three-layer re-
quirements modeling language and the holistic analysis framework. The detailed research
questions are described in Section 9.1. In particular, we first describe this scenario in
detail in Section 9.1.1. After that we evaluate the modeling of the three-layer require-
ments goal model in Section 9.1.2, and report our experiences in performing the holistic
security requirements analysis and evaluate the analysis results in Section 9.1.3. It is
worth noting that, during this case study, we adopt the approaches proposed in Chap-
ter 5 and Chapter 6 (i.e., holistic attack analysis and security pattern analysis) to produce
models/information required by the holistic security requirements framework, supporting
corresponding analysis. Lastly, we discuss the threats to validity in this case study.
The second case study was performed by a Master student based on a large-scale
medical emergency response system. The focus of this case study is to evaluate whether
our approach has the potential to be adopted in reality by people who were not involved in
the development of the approach. We first describe the scenario in detail in Section 9.2.2
Then, we present the three-layer requirements model constructed by the student and
evaluate usability of our modeling language in Section 9.2.2. Based on that model, in
Section 9.2.3, we describe and evaluate the holistic security requirements analysis results.
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9.1 Case Study 1: A Smart Grid Real-Time Pricing Scenario
In this section, we validate our approach by applying it to a real-time pricing scenario
of smart grid advanced metering infrastructure, which is a typical STS. In particular, we
intend to investigate scalability and efficacy of our approach, each of which corresponds
to one research question as presented below. In addition, we have further decomposed
these questions into fine-grained ones, which can be measured and answered during the
case study.
• RQ1: Is our approach scalable for large-scale STSs?
– RQ1.1: Can we efficiently construct three-layer requirements models for large-
scale STSs?
∗ RQ1.1.1: Is it easy to collect domain information for constructing the
models?
∗ RQ1.1.2: How much effort is required to build the models?
– RQ1.2: Can we efficiently perform holistic security analysis for large-scale
STSs?
∗ RQ1.2.1: Is additional security knowledge/expertise required?
∗ RQ1.2.2: Are there any difficulties in applying the analysis methods?
∗ RQ1.2.3: How much effort is required to perform the security analysis?
• RQ2: To what extent can our approach is effective for holistic security protection?
– RQ2.1: Can holistic security solutions be identified?
– RQ2.2: How many security solution alternatives are identified?
This case study was performed based on the information of the scenario we have
collected from literature [NIST, 2012; Cuellar and Suppan, 2013], which is detailed in
Section 9.1.1. In particular, we first constructed a three-layer requirements model, which
captured requirements of different artifacts involved in this scenario, as well as connec-
tions among them (Section 9.1.2). On the basis of this three-layer requirements model,
we applied our holistic security analysis framework step by step, establishing a three-layer
security goal model. On the basis of this model, we explored alternative security solu-
tions that can provide comprehensive protections to the entire system (Section 9.1.3). It
is worth noting that, at the end of Section 9.1.2 and Section 9.1.3, we also evaluate corre-
sponding research questions. Finally, we discuss the threats to validity and corresponding
countermeasures in Section 9.1.4.
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9.1.1 Scenario Description
Real-time pricing is a scenario based on the smart grid advanced metering infrastructure,
in which the energy supplier collects real-time energy consumption data and balances
loads on the power grid. This scenario presents a typical socio-technical system. Firstly,
it includes a business process for price generation. Specifically, the energy supplier pe-
riodically collects load information of the power grid, and generates appropriate energy
prices accordingly in order to regulate the load of the power grid. On the other side, the
energy consumers will adjust their energy usage based on the real-time prices. Secondly,
a number of applications are involved in this scenario to support the interactive process.
In particular, a home energy management system is used by the energy consumer to com-
municate with the energy supplier and control the smart appliances in her apartment.
Thirdly, physical devices (e.g., personal PC) are required to deploy the software applica-
tions, and the network needs to be appropriately configured to support communications.
Detailed information of this scenario can be found in [Cuellar and Suppan, 2013]. As our
approach requires particular information of the smart grid scenario across different layers,
we also refer to other complementary sources of information (e.g., [NIST, 2012]).
As this system involves a wide range of artifacts that vary from business processes to
physical devices, it is difficult to carry out a thorough security analysis to protect the
entire system. As reported by the National Vulnerability Database, on average, 15 new
vulnerabilities of the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA, a system for
remotely monitoring and controlling power grids) are publicly disclosed each day. Not
surprisingly, the presence of these vulnerabilities leads to many attacks on smart grid
systems [Flick and Morehouse, 2010]. As such, our approach aims to provide a systematic
and holistic way to analyze security requirements for all parts of the system.
9.1.2 Building Three-Layer Requirements Models
As the first step of the case study, we built the three-layer requirements model for the
smart grid by following the conceptual model proposed in Section 4.2.
We constructed the requirements models layer by layer, starting from the social layer.
Since we have separated concerns into different layers, in this first layer, we exclusively fo-
cused on the social and business aspects of the scenario, while ignored technical issues. In
particular, we modeled three social actors Energy Supplier, Customer, and Smart Meter,
where Customer depends on Energy Supplier for sending the real-time price of energies,
and Energy Supplier depends on Smart Meter for measuring energy consumption infor-
mation. Fig. 9.1 shows the requirements model we have built for the social layer. When
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Figure 9.1: The requirements model in the social layer
inition we have assigned to the social layer. For example, we iteratively elaborated the
business goal Realtime pricing is applied until obtaining concrete business process activi-
ties that are performed within this scenario, such as Calculate price. Benefiting from the
operational definition, we are able to know when to finish the requirements modeling in
the social layer. It is worth noting that we here followed a top-down process to create
the requirements model, however, it can also be performed in a bottom-up manner (or a
hybrid way) by using existing business process models, if available. In particular, we can
first model each business process activity as a task in the social layer, and then identify
goals achieved by such tasks by asking “why” questions.
Once the requirements model in the social layer was finished, we then analyzed sup-
port links between the social layer and the to-be-created application layer, following the
instructions we presented in Section 4.2.1. Specifically, we checked whether each leaf-task
is purely performed by people. If not, we then identified the software applications involved
in this activity, based on which we modeled elements of the application layer including
supporting links relating the two layers. For example, based on the domain specification,
we identified that the task Receive energy consumption data from SM is executed by using
Energy Supplier Server Application. Thus, we modeled this application as an actor in the
software application layer, and further identified a requirements goal of the application,
i.e., Be able to communicate with SM, which supports the task in the social layer.
By analyzing the support links between layers, we obtained a list of application ac-
tors, each of which has one or several requirements goals. Based on such models, we then
elaborated requirements for each actor in the software layer, until reaching detailed appli-
cation functions (i.e., the operational definition of software tasks). Similar to the analysis
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in the social layer, the construction of requirements model in this layer can be done via a
bottom-up manner, if there are software architecture models available for use as inputs.
Once the requirements model in the software layer was finished, we then moved to the
infrastructure layer, building this requirements model in a similar way. Eventually, we
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Figure 9.2: A three-layer requirements model of the smart grid realtime pricing scenario
Evaluation. I spent around four days gathering information from different sources. Most
available specifications do not provide information required for all of the layers, as they
were not originally developed for holistic analysis. Therefore, we have to synthesize such
information in order to gather a complete understanding of the system. Additional effort
is required in order to make information from different sources consistent. Overall, in this
1The full model file, http://disi.unitn.it/~li/SoSyM/model_rtp.pdf
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Table 9.1: Statistics of the three-layer requirements model (smart grid)
Layer Actor Goal Task (and)Refine Operationalize Dependency
All 16 60 57 44 43 21
Social 3 12 9 11 8 2
Software 5 22 20 14 16 6
Infrastructure 8 26 28 19 19 13
case study, it was not easy to collect related domain information (RQ1.1.1 ).
The main reason for this difficulty is the method of data collection. According to Leth-
bridge et al. [2005], data collection technique can be classified into three levels: directly
interacting with subjects to collect data in real time; directly collecting raw data without
interacting with subjects; reusing available information from other independent studies.
Our data collection belongs to the third level, which leads to the difficulties that we have
to synthesize information from different sources while make them consistent We argue
the other two levels can avoid those difficulties and simplify the data collection, which we
plan to adopt in subsequent studies.
After collecting and understanding sufficient information for this scenario, I took one
day to construct the three-layer requirements model (RQ1.1.2 ), as shown in Fig. 9.2.
The statistics of the model is presented in Table 9.1, which shows the entire model con-
tains 133 nodes and 108 links. Thanks to the conceptually divided layers, the modeler
only needed to take into account layer-specific concerns when constructing models for a
particular layer. In addition, the prototype tool can easily show/hide particular layers,
enabling us to quickly switch views between a specific layer and the entire model. In
particular, as we build our tool on top of a professional diagramming tool, our prototype
tool inherits good usability of that tool and thus easily facilitates the graphical model-
ing task. Overall, because of both the conceptually separated layers and the prototype
tool, we believe a typical analyst is able to tackle the complexity of STSs and build the
three-layer requirements model once related information has been collected and available
(RQ1.1 ).
9.1.3 Analyze Security Requirements in Three Layers
Having the above three-layer requirements model as input (Fig. 9.2), we applied our
approach step by step to generate the holistic security goal model, starting from the
root security goal. In particular, we started from analyzing a high-level security need
of stakeholders, i.e., protecting confidentiality of customer information during the time
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interval of applying realtime pricing. We iteratively performed security requirements
analysis throughout all three layers in order to construct a holistic security goal model,
based on which we generated a collection of holistic security solutions that satisfy the root
security goal. In the remaining part of this subsection, we report our experiences about


























Figure 9.3: A full resource schema considered in this case study
Security goal refinement and simplification. Given a high-level security goal, we need
to refine it until we are able to identify critical security goals. We applied a hybrid
refinement strategy (as described in Section 4.3.1), leveraging the advantages of both
the step-by-step strategy and the exhaustive strategy. We first adopt the step-by step
strategy to elaborate an initial security goal into more fine-grained goals, in order to
better understand the exact security needs of stakeholders. In particular, we followed
an intuitive order for performing the refinement analysis, i.e., first refine via security
properties (reference to the taxonomy in Fig. 4.5), then via assets (reference to a full
resource schema shown in Fig. 9.3), and finally via interval (reference to Fig. 9.2). Our
prototype tool can automate such refinement and pop up an alert if one dimension cannot
be refined anymore, i.e., achieving the bottom elements in the reference model.
After each refinement, we evaluated the results by asking “are all the elaborated secu-
rity goals needed by stakeholders?”. If a refined security goal is not needed by stakeholders,
then it was excluded from subsequent analysis. In particular, we here used our collected
knowledge of the case to answer the above question from stakeholder’s perspective. As
shown in the top part of Fig. 9.4, after elaborating security goal SG2 via the asset dimen-
sion, we found out the stakeholder’s exact security need is to protect the confidentiality
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of customer personal information, and the stakeholder does not care about other parts
of customer information, e.g., smart appliance information. Thus, in the subsequent
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Figure 9.4: Refine security goals in the social layer
As we decided that the security goal SG4 can reflect the stakeholder’s needs, we
performed exhaustive refinement analysis to explore all possible refinements of SG4. Once
the exhaustive refinements were obtained, we then performed the simplification analysis
over all the exhaustively refined security goals (Section 4.3.2), which was automated by
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the prototype tool. It is worth noting that the simplification analysis requires threat
knowledge about the smart grid system, which we imported from our holistic attack
analysis as introduced in Chapter 5.
The results of the simplification analysis are shown in the bottom part of Fig. 9.4,
where SG12 was identified as a critical security goal (highlighted in red), SG14 was iden-
tified as an applicable one (highlighted in green) that requires manual assessment for its
criticality, and all other security goals are not applicable and should be excluded from
subsequent analysis. As SG14 expresses the security need for protecting data confiden-
tiality of customer personal information during the energy usage adjustment, we assessed
that it is very likely to be threatened by threats originate from lower-layers and thus
classified it as a critical security goal.
Security goal operationalization. Once critical security goals are identified, we per-
formed the security pattern-based operationalization analysis (as elaborated in Section 6.3)
to operationalize the critical security goals. We first automatically generated a list of se-
curity pattern candidates for each critical security goal, and then check the context of
each candidate in order to determine whether they are applicable. In particular, among
the current collection of the selected security patterns in the social layer (see Fig. 4.11
in Chapter 4), there was only one security pattern (i.e., access control) can be applied
for tackling data confidentiality. As such, each of the two critical security goals identified
from the last step (as shown in Fig. 9.4) was first operationalized by an access control
mechanism. Then, we checked the context of access control which is “Any environment in
which we have resources whose access needs to be controlled” [Asnar et al., 2011a]. Note
that for our approach, such context holds by default, which can be inferred by the par-
ticular attributes of security goals (i.e., security property and asset). As such, according
to our pattern analysis method, this access control pattern was applicable.
Cross-layer analysis. Once we finished operationalization analysis in one layer, we then
performed the cross-layer analysis (Section 4.3.4). Based on cross-layer links modeled in
the three-layer functional goal model, we automatically performed such analysis which
transferred security concerns to lower layers, targeting corresponding system components
there (e.g., software applications, physical devices). In particular, the critical security goal
SG12 high data confidentiality [customer personal information, interval(ES sends price
to customer)] (Fig. 9.4) was and-refined into two security goals in the application layer:
one goal concerned the same asset and security property with SG12, but focused on a
particular interval when the supporting application sends the price to customer; the other
security goal exclusively concerned the security of the supporting application (i.e., energy
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supplier server application) instead of the original asset (i.e., customer personal informa-
tion). Similarly, we performed such cross-layer analysis for another critical security goal
SG14 (Fig. 9.4). We did not encounter any difficulties at this step.
Holistic security solution analysis. By iteratively performing the security analysis in
each of the three layers, we finally ended up with an entire holistic security goal model,
which is shown in Fig. 9.5 (The full model file can be found online2). We performed the
backwards satisfaction analysis over this holistic security goal model in order to identify
all possible holistic security solutions for the entire system (Section 4.3.5), resulting in 21
holistic security solutions in total.
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Figure 9.5: The entire security goal model across three layers
2http://disi.unitn.it/~li/thesis/validation_hsgm.pdf
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Each of these holistic security solutions consists of specific solutions from different
layers, covering different system components. For example, we list one holistic security
solution below, which consists of ten security mechanisms (each mechanism is a solution
introduced by a security pattern). In particular, there is one security mechanism in the
social layer, four security mechanisms in the software layer, and five security mechanisms
in the infrastructure layer. It is worth noting that the satisfaction of the stakeholder’s root
security goal requires all these ten security mechanisms to be implemented, which may
cost a large amount of money. This is mainly because we have taken a holistic viewpoint,
considering all the related systems components.
An exemplary solution (10 mechanisms):
• Social Layer: Access control to energy adjustment
• Software Layer: Firewall (Home), Security Pipe (between ESSA and HEMS),
Server sandbox, Limited View (HEMS)
• Infrastructure Layer: Cabling security (Home), Equipment sitting and pro-
tection (PC), Equipment sitting and protection (Home Gateway), Equip-
ment sitting and protection (ESS), Cabling security (Company2)
Given the alternative holistic security solutions, we need to select the best alternative
in subsequent analysis. To this end, we can elicit both the positive and negative influences
of security patterns from their specification (e.g., [Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013]), as detailed
in Chapter 6. Based on such information, different goal model selection algorithms can be
applied to evaluate the solutions against desired system goals and qualities, allowing us
to choose the best alternative [Horkoff and Yu, 2013]. This part of analysis is not covered
in this case study.
Evaluation and reflection. Throughout the entire case study, we realized that addi-
tional security expertise was required in several places (RQ1.2.1 ). Firstly, during the
simplification analysis, for security goals that have been classified as applicable but not
critical by our inference rules, analysts need to manually assess their criticality. In par-
ticular, analysts should assess whether the security goal might be threatened by threats
originate from lower-layers, in which the expertise of analysts can affect the assessment
results. If an analyst has little security knowledge, she can adopt a conservative strategy,
i.e., treating all applicable security goals as critical and further analyze them in the lower
layers. However, as a result, the complexity of subsequent analysis can be increased.
Secondly, during the security pattern analysis, we noticed the need of manual check over
the pattern analysis results, requiring additional security knowledge. Specifically, when
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determining whether a security pattern is applicable to operationalize a security goal, we
should take into account the interval of the security goal which is normally not captured
in the pattern context. For example, in our case (Fig. 9.4), security goal SG12 focuses
on protecting the data confidentiality of customer personal information during the time
interval ES sends price to customer, during which the access control mechanism is inap-
propriate to apply. It is worth noting that the need of performing manual check over the
pattern analysis results is due to the incomplete context description of security patterns.
Thus, such problem can be relieved along with the improvements of security patterns.
During the case study, we discovered two difficulties in performing our analysis (RQ1.2.2 ).
Firstly, when performing the security goal refinement, we noticed that refining a security
goal in the social layer is more complicated compared to the analysis in other layers, as it
involves more manual analysis. In the social layer, we started from a high-level security
goal, which is by nature broad and may not reflect the stakeholder’s real needs. Thus,
we needed to adopt a hybrid refinement strategy, which first uncovers the stakeholder’s
security needs more precisely. In the software layer and the infrastructure layer, the root
security goals were derived from the security concerns in the upper layers, which had al-
ready captured stakeholder’s more precise security needs. As such, we can directly apply
the exhaustive refinement strategy, which is fully automated by our tool. Secondly, we
have realized that our current collection of security patterns were not enough to cover all
threats we analyzed in the case study. Specifically, in our case study, the critical security
goal SG12 we identified in the social layer (Fig. 9.4) was threatened by a social threat
“Inappropriately post customer data to public media”, which should be tackled by security
solutions, such as security training. However, our set of security patterns (Fig. 4.10) only
included access control as a candidate solution to this problem, which is not applicable in
this case. Considering this challenge, we plan to further enrich the collection of selected
security patterns in the future.
After collecting all required information and constructing the three-layer requirement
goal model, with the support of our tool, I spent six hours to perform the holistic security
analysis (RQ1.2.3 ). Regarding the scale of this scenario (Table 9.1), the time span is
reasonable. Although there were several difficulties we encountered during the case study
(as discussed above), overall, we argue that our approach can be efficient for dealing with
holistic security requirements analysis (RQ1.2 ).
As we have specified and illustrated before, our case study finally resulted in 21 holis-
tic security solutions in total (RQ2.2 ), each of which consists of specific solutions from
different layers, covering different system components (RQ2.1 ). Thus, we argue our se-
curity analysis results have a good coverage of security concerns and effectively contribute
to holistic security protection.
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An important advantage of our approach is systematically guiding analysts through a
comprehensive security analysis process, covering different layers of an STSs. During this
process, we have observed that the support links modeled in the three-layer requirements
model are especially important for connecting security analysis across layers. With the
tool support, the entire analysis can be performed in a fast and reliable way. In addition,
by capturing and arranging security requirements in a holistic security goal model, we can
identify alternative security solutions. Since implementing holistic security solutions is
likely to be expensive, it is particularly important to identify and evaluate all the possible
alternatives upfront, among which analysts can select the most appropriate solution within
their budget.
Due to the intrinsic complexity and heterogeneity of STSs, the holistic security analy-
sis involves a wide spectrum of security issues, which requires a large amount of security
knowledge and thus makes the analysis even more complicated. As a response to this chal-
lenge, our approach has a particular focus on knowledge reuse, facilitating this knowledge-
intensive analysis. Firstly, we have encapsulated part of required security knowledge into
corresponding inference rules, which can be automatically inferred by the prototype tool.
It is worth noting the inference rules we defined in this paper are domain-independent,
which can be applied to all types of systems. In the future, we can incrementally define
more inference rules to capture domain-specific knowledge in order to facilitate analy-
sis in the corresponding domains. Secondly, we leverage reusable security patterns to
help analysts to effectively generate proved security solutions that operationalize security
goals. Although the entire analysis still requires some security expertise (most of which
is domain-specific), this is difficult to avoid all together. Based on our case study, we
argue that analysts with basic security knowledge are able to apply the security analysis
within a reasonable time. As a future work, we plan to perform case studies with more
participants to further evaluate this claim.
Through the case study, we have identified factors that can affect the quality of the
analysis results, which should be carefully improved in future work. In particular, the
collection of selected security patterns directly determines the holistic security solutions
we can produce at the end of our security analysis. We have identified in the case study
that the current set of security patterns used by our approach is not enough for tackling
some threats identified in the case study, in the future, we will incorporate more patterns
so as to have a better coverage.
9.1.4 Threats to Validity
As there are different ways of classifying validity in the literature, we here adopt the clas-
sification used by Runeson and Ho¨st [2009], which has an focus on case study research
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in software engineering. In particular, we discuss interval validity, external validity, con-
struct validity, and reliability, respectively.
Internal validity. Internal validity considers the causal relations between factors
investigated in the case study. When evaluating the difficulty of modeling three-layer
requirements models, we focused on whether the modeler is able to conceptually build
the three-layer requirements model. However, in practice, both the utility of the modeling
tool and the analyst’s modeling experiences with the tool can affect the overall difficulty
of this modeling task, which introducing a threat to internal validity. Although our tool
is developed on top of a professional diagramming tool which has very good usability,
people who are not familiar with this tool or have little experiences with modeling may
encounter difficulties when building the three-layer requirements model. In the future, we
intend to evaluate the difficulty of conceptually modeling the three-layer model and the
difficulty of graphically modeling the three-layer model, respectively.
In addition, as our approach relies on external security knowledge (i.e., security pat-
tern) for generating security solutions, the effectiveness of our analysis results is not only
determined by our approach, but also by the security patterns used by our approach.
Although we have already incorporated 21 security patterns in our approach, covering
security solutions in different layers, we have already noticed that current selection of se-
curity patterns is not enough for dealing with threats that we have identified in this case
study. As a result, in subsequent research, we will incrementally incorporate additional
security patterns in our approach, keeping the reused security knowledge with the recent
advances in security patterns.
External validity. External validity is concerned with to what extent it is possible
to generalize the findings of our case study. Because of the inherent complexity of STSs
(e.g., our analysis model contains more than two hundred elements), a holistic security
requirements analysis takes a considerable amount of effort. As a result, in this case
study we only focus on one particular security goal, imposing a threat to external validity.
To tackle this threat, in the future, we plan to analyze more security goals concerning
the same scenario. In addition, considering the reason of this threat (i.e., the overall
complexity of the case study), we plan to separate the validation into two parts in order to
reduce the inherent complexity of the holistic security requirements analysis. Specifically,
the first part will focus on constructing the three-layer requirements model of STSs, i.e.,
the validation described in Section 9.1.2; and the second part will focus on performing
holistic security requirements based on the three-layer requirements model, as described
in Section 9.1.3.
Another threat concerns the security background of the analyst. The case study
reported in this paper is performed by me, who is the method developer and has related
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security expertise. However, we have not evaluated our approach with participants with
little security knowledge. As such we do not have practical evidence yet that shows
our approach can be applied by those who are not experts in security, although our
approach does incorporate security patterns to help analysts to reuse security knowledge.
Therefore, we intend to further evaluate our approach with people who is not involved in
the method development and has limited security knowledge, observing differences in their
performance when compared to this case study. Driven by this need, in our subsequent
research, we have further evaluates our approach with a Master student who meets the
above criteria. We will report our subsequent study in detail in the next section.
Construct validity. Construct validity concerns to which degree a test measures
what it claims to be measuring. In our case study, we measure both the number and
coverage of holistic security solution alternatives, based on which we determine the ef-
fectiveness of our analysis results. We acknowledge the quality of the obtained security
solutions is a further factor, which may play a role in assessing the effectiveness of our
approach. As a countermeasure to this threat, we intend to have security experts to assess
the quality of the generated holistic security solutions.
Reliability. Reliability is concerned with to what extent the data and the analysis
are dependent on the specific researchers. Since the case study is performed by only one
person, there is a threat to reliability of the analysis results. To tackle this issue, in the
future, we first plan to have peer researchers to evaluate the analysis results. In addition,
we will plan to include more than one analysts who work together to apply our approach.
9.2 Case Study 2: Medical Emergency Response System
In this section, we report another case study in which we applied our holistic security
requirements framework to a medical emergency response system. This case study is
grounded on a Master thesis [Robin, 2015]. The Master student was first taught the three-
layer security requirements modeling language, and then used the prototype to perform
the holistic security requirements analysis under the supervision of Prof. Mylopoulos and
myself. In particular, the focus of this case study is preliminarily assessing whether our
approach can be adopted by people who were not involved in the development of our
approach and has limited security knowledge.
9.2.1 Scenario Description
The medical emergency response system we analyzed in this study is based on the technical
report Serenity-Consortium [March 2007], taken from an EU project SERENITY 3. The
3http://eu-serenity.sourceforge.net/
184 Validation
essential components of this system are smart items, which can measure data and exchange
it with other smart equipments. For example, a smart item equipped with an infrared
thermometer measures the temperature of a patient and transmits such information to
medical emergency system via its communication interfaces. In such a way, different
smart items that monitor particular parameters (such as temperature, sound, vibration,
pressure, and motion) can be connected in a flexible network, delivering real-time data of
patients to the medical emergency system.
The medical emergency system is subject to an increasing number of attacks, e.g.,
illegal disclosure of information, transmission of false data, authentication and/or autho-
rization violations, and a holistic security protection is required. In particular, vulner-
abilities originate from different layers, all of which should be taken into account when
analyzing security requirements. For example, users may misuse the smart items and
make it function incorrectly; the communication among smart items are in plain text; the
smart item devices may be exposed to the public and be manipulated or destroyed.
In this case study, we focused on a particular healthcare scenario, in which patients are
continuously monitored after hospitalization (e.g., after cardiac infarction), the system is
responsible to react to abnormal situations, which are determined based on the monitored
data. A patient must be kept constantly in contact with her doctor and hospital and
transfers information about her cardiac activity to the medical emergence system. In
addition, both the patient’s personal information (e.g., age, sex, and family history)
and his body condition information (e.g., asleep or awake, walking or sit down) are also
collected and passed to the system. As such, there is a strong security need that the
confidentiality of such information should be protected from disclosure.
Such a scenario involves a multitude of social actors (patients, doctors, social workers,
etc.), software applications (e-health application, control station application, etc.), physi-
cal devices (PDAs, computers, smart items, etc.), existing in different layers. In addition,
the scenario requires the integration of different medical services, such as remote diagnosis
and first-aid services.
9.2.2 Modeling the Medical Emergency Response System
In this section, we report the modeling practices performed by the Master student. In
particular, different from the previous case study, we decided to follow a bottom-up man-
ner to construct the three-layer requirements goal model in the social layer, helping us to
grasp the overall understanding of the scenario.
Modeling business process. Fig. 9.6 shows the business process that was built for the
medical emergency scenario. In particular, this process starts from the event that the pa-
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tient feels dizzy and request for assistance. Once MERC (Medical Emergency Response
Center) received the request from the patient, she needs to check the availability of desig-
nated doctors and social workers. The doctor then asks patients for related medical data
through his e-health terminal and analyzes them to determine appropriate treatments.
After that the doctor writes an e-prescription and uploads it to the system, which can be
accessed by the patient.
Figure 9.6: The business process model of the medical emergency scenario
In case that the designated doctor is not available, MERC obtains a list of qualified
doctors from the database and check their availability by sending them a message. Then,
MERC selects the doctor who first replies the message and assigns him the emergency
task. All the medical data of the patient is passed to that doctor in the meantime.
Once receiving all the patient data, the doctor should determine appropriate treatments
and issue an e-prescription. In case the doctor needs additional information, she can
interrogate the patient through her e-health terminal.
After the patient receives the e-prescription via her e-health terminal, she can either
go to pharmacy in person to buy the prescribed medicines or ask MERC to deliver such
medicines to her home. In the later case, MERC should check the availability of social
workers. After selecting the most suitable social worker, MERC needs to notify that so-
cial worker and authorizes her to access the patient’s e-prescription. Once a social worker
received the task assignment from MERC, she then goes to the nearest pharmacy to buy
all the required medicines. In particular, when the social worker reaches pharmacy, the
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pharmacy worker needs to authenticate the social worker through her personal terminal.
If and only if the authentication is successful, the social worker can get the prescribed
medicines. Otherwise an error report will be generated and sent to MERC. When deliv-
ering the medicines to the patients, the patient and the social worker should authenticate
each other via their personal terminals.
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Figure 9.7: The three-layer requirements goal model for the medical emergency scenario
Build the three-layer requirements goal model. Based on the above business process
model, the student then built the requirements goal model in the social layer. In par-
ticular, each business process activity was mapped into a business task, from which he
established the goal model following a bottom-up manner, i.e., asking “why a business
task is required”. Once he built the goal model in the social layer, he then analyzed the
cross-layer links between the social layer and the to-be-created application layer, based on
which the requirements goal model in the application layer was established. By further
analyzing the cross-layer links between the application layer and the infrastructure layer,
he then finished the requirements goal model in the infrastructure layer. Eventually, a
full model was obtained, as shown in Fig. 9.74.
Specifically, Table 9.2 shows the detailed statistics of the entire model, which is even
larger than the full model of the previous case study. We here briefly describe the strategic
dependencies and cross-layer support relations within this model. In the business layer,
MERC ’s primary goal Provide medical services depends upon all other actors in this
layer. For example, MERC has a business goal Specialized health service provided, the
satisfaction of which depends on Doctor who further depends on First Aid Worker to
4The vector model file can be found at, http://disi.unitn.it/~li/thesis/validation_model_mers.pdf
Case Study 2: Medical Emergency Response System 187
Table 9.2: Statistics of the three-layer requirements model (medical emergency)
Layer Actor Goal Task (and)Refine Operationalize Dependency
All 24 182 166 117 157 20
Social 7 29 56 19 55 12
Software 9 64 46 43 47 6
Infrastructure 8 89 64 55 55 2
execute some tasks. Other social actors also depend on MERC for certain goals, such as
Patient depends on MERC for medical services.
In the application layer, e-Health Application is used by many social actors, including
Doctor, Social Worker, Pharmacy and Patient. As such, the corresponding business
tasks of such actors are supported by e-Health Application. In the meantime, e-Health
Application further depends on Control Station Application, which is mainly used by
MERC, for fulfilling a couple of goals.
In the physical layer, MERC Server and Control Station Server depends on each other,
functioning together to support Control Station Application. In addition, e-Health Ter-
minal depends on Control Station Server for several goals so as to support the functions
of e-Health Application.
Evaluation and discussion. As reported by the Master student, the overall modeling
practice is time-consuming. In particular, he spent around a month in collecting data
for the case study and comprehending the entire scenario. There are several reasons for
such a long time: firstly, this medical emergency system is a large STS and the analyzed
scenario has more complex business logic than the smart grid scenario we described in
the first case study. Secondly, similar with the previous case study, we did not have
the opportunity to directly interview stakeholders and collect data from them. Instead,
we can only indirectly search for existing reports or documents from different sources
to complete the entire picture of the system. Especially, the Master student has little
background knowledge about this scenario before. Overall, this result further emphasizes
the need of involving different experts in the modeling practice, from whom the analyst
can directly and easily obtain required information.
Once all the information has been collected, the Master student spent another month
in building the three-layer model:“it took me approximately 2 months to complete the
three-layer holistic model for our case with numerous revisions”. Compared to the first
case study, the modeling time has sharply increased. For one thing, we realized that the
difficulty of modeling can grow very fast when the scenario became complicated. For
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another thing, as the student was unfamiliar with the modeling tool (i.e., OmniGraﬄe),
we found out afterwards that he did not exert the full power of the tool, which we believe
affected his modeling performance. For example, the tool offers the feature to select all
similar objects (i.e., goals), without using this feature the student has to manually operate
on each individual object one-by-one. As a result, in the future study, we should spend
more time in teaching the powerful features of our modeling tool.
Although the modeling is time-consuming, as acknowledged by the student:“The pro-
cess became a lot easier because of the framework and its three layer approach, as the
multilayer security requirement analysis framework was easy to understand and as I had
to model in different layers the process became intuitive after the first layer”. As such,
we argue that the complexity of the model is inherited from the scenario itself, and our
framework can contribute to the modularity of such complex systems.
Lastly, within this modeling practice, we have discovered that building the require-
ments model in a bottom-up manner is an efficient strategy. This is because that we have
assigned layer-specific operational definitions to tasks in each layer. In particular, for this
study, the student first built a business process model for this scenario, the benefits of
which are twofold: firstly, by modeling the business process, the student was able to have
a better understanding of the scenario, facilitating his subsequent modeling tasks. Sec-
ondly, the activities of the business process model can be mapped to tasks in social layer,
directly facilitating the modeling in the social layer. Especially, as the student mentioned
that “the modeling in social layer is most difficult part of the three-layer modeling”, we
should pay more attention to support the social layer modeling. As such, we propose to
follow such bottom-up process to construct requirements goal model in the social layer.
9.2.3 Security Requirements Analysis Results
Build reference models. In order to perform security requirements analysis for the
medical emergency system, the student was asked to collect additional information and to
build corresponding models, which were used in refining and simplifying security patterns
(as introduced in Section 4.3). In particular, the student generated a resource model,
shown in Fig. 9.8. Each resource presented in this figure is involved in a particular part
of the scenario. Moreover, the student produced a data flow model, which was described
in terms of the input and output of requirements tasks. Thanks to the business process
model built before, this data flow information can be easily obtained. As our analysis
needs to know potential threats to the system, the student was asked to collect the threat
information, and eight possible threats were eventually identified from literature. In
particular, each of the eight threats was classified and specified in terms of threat type,
threatened asset, and threatened interval, as introduced in Section 4.3.2. It is worth noting
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that we here did not require the student to adopt our holistic threat analysis approach
(Chapter 5) to identify system threats, because the focus of this case study is evaluating
the practical adoption of the holistic security requirements analysis approach. Also, the
full application of our attack analysis approach (including the learning period) may require
another considerable amount of time, which cannot be afforded in this case study. As
future work, we definitely need to further evaluate the attack analysis approach, which
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Figure 9.8: The resource model related to the medical emergency system
Holistic security requirements analysis. Once all reference models have been built, the
student performed holistic security requirements analysis, following the analysis process
described in Section 4.3. In particular, the student iteratively refined and concretized
security goals with the aim of identifying security mechanisms to operationalize such
security goals. When using our prototype tool to semi-automate the analysis, the student
strictly followed the use cases we have specified in Section 8.3. During the analysis process,
the student was asked to perform the analysis by himself. In case he had questions or
doubts about the analysis process, he turned to me for clarification and help.
Overall, the student spent one week going through the entire analysis process and es-
tablished the complete holistic security goal model as shown in Fig. 9.9 (the corresponding
model file can be found online5). This model was much more complicated than the one
we obtained in the first case study. Especially, by performing the holistic security solution
analysis, it ended up with more than 73000 alternatives. For example, Table 9.3 shows two
exemplary holistic security solution alternatives, both of which provided security solutions
in all three layer. Note that these two alternatives had the same solutions in the social
and software layers and only differed in the infrastructure layer. This was a common case
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and only differ in some particular parts. Given such a huge amount of alternatives, there
was a strong need of selecting the best solution, which will be implemented in our future
work.
Evaluation. Overall, the Master student was able to carry out the entire approach with
the tool support, including both the modeling of the three-layer requirements goal model
and the holistic security analysis over that model. However, the time spent for performing
the approach was much longer than the first case study performed by myself, especially
in the modeling session. There are several reasons account for this result: firstly, this case
study is concerned with a large-scale STS, which is more complicated than the first case
study. Secondly, the student was not familiar with the modeling tool, while the proficiency
for using the modeling tool does matter the modeling performance. Especially, such a
problem was further exacerbated by the complexity of the case study. As a result, in
the future study, we should spend more time teaching analysts to exert the full power of
the modeling tool. Thirdly, similar to the first case study, the Master student collected
domain information of all three layers from different sources and then synthesized them
all together, which was a non-trivial task. As we have discussed about the framework in
Section 4.4, the ideal case for applying our approach is interacting with stakeholders in
specific layers (e.g., business analysts, software architects, etc.) and directly extracting
necessary domain information from them.
Although the application of our approach was time-consuming in this study, we argue
this is due to the inherent complexity of the large-scale system, which cannot be avoided
altogether. As reported by the student, on one hand, the student acknowledged the
complexity of performing holistic security requirements analysis on such a complicated
STS; on the other hand, the student did appreciate the (semi-)automation of analysis
supported by our tool, without which the corresponding analysis task is impossible to
complete. Therefore, we conclude that our approach did help the student to deal with
such complexity.
Discussion. During the analysis process, we observed several issues, based on which we
further discuss our approach as below.
Firstly, during the security goal refinement analysis in the social layer, the student
tried to use the exhaustive refinement feature offered by the tool. Due to the high com-
plexity of this scenario, the exhaustive refinement results in more than 800 security goals.
After performing the simplification analysis over such security goals, 9 critical security
goals were identified and another 58 security goals were identified as applicable (but non-
critical). Then, the student went through all the applicable security goals to determine
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Table 9.3: Two exemplary holistic security solutions
Layer Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Social
Control pharmacy access to doctor e-
prescription;
Control access to MERC
Control pharmacy access to doctor e-
prescription;
Control access to MERC
Software
Input guard for authorization application;
Limited view for e-health terminal access;
Secure access layer for e-health application;
Firewall for controlling access to e-health
application;
Server sandbox for control station applica-
tion;
Firewall for localization application;
Limited view for control station applica-
tion;
Secure access layer for control station ap-
plication;
Server sandbox for hospital application
system;
Secure access layer for hospital application
system
Input guard for authorization application;
Limited view for e-health terminal access;
Secure access layer for e-health application;
Firewall for controlling access to e-health
application;
Server sandbox for control station applica-
tion;
Firewall for localization application;
Limited view for control station applica-
tion;
Secure access layer for control station ap-
plication;
Server sandbox for hospital application
system;
Secure access layer for hospital application
system
Infrastructure
Physical entry control to PDA;
Physical entry control to e-health termi-
nal;
Cabling security between PDA and
MERC;
Cabling security between PDA and control
station server;
Physical entry control to control station
server;
Physical entry control for MERC server;
Physical entry control to localization
server;
Physical entry control to localization
router
Physical entry control to PDA;
Physical entry control to e-health termi-
nal;
Cabling security between PDA and
MERC;
Cabling security between PDA and control
station server physical entry control to
control station server;
Physical entry control for MERC server;
Physical entry control to localization
server;
Cabling security between localization
server and MERC;






their criticality, which was a time-consuming task. Such scale of analysis complexity was
due to the complicated domain model (Fig. 9.7) and resource model (Fig. 9.8). As we
have proposed in Section 4.3.1, it is advisable to adopt a hybrid refinement strategy to
deal with such complexity, which can avoid analyzing security goals that were actually
not desired by stakeholders.
Secondly, during the security goal operationalization analysis, we noticed that some de-
tailed security goals, which were concerned with the same security property and asset but
differed in their concerned interval, may share the same security mechanisms. Therefore,
once such security goals were operationalized into corresponding security mechanisms, the
obtained security mechanism instances should be merged as one single instance. In other
words, such phenomena require a manual check after the operationalization analysis.
Lastly, the security analysis results of this case study turned out to be over 73000
alternative security solutions. Intuitively, such a huge amount of alternatives is due to
the complicated scenario. In order to have a better understanding of the scalability
of our approach, We delveed into the holistic security goal model (Fig. 9.9) to further
examine where the alternatives come from, . In particular, by looking at the syntax of
the holistic security goal model, we identified that some security goals were and-refined
into multiple sub-goals (up to eight), which was the main cause of the complexity. For
example, if each of the eight sub-goal is operationalized into two security mechanisms, only
this branch of model can have 28 alternatives, which can exponentially grow when other
branches of models are taken into account. By having a close look at the semantics of the
holistic security goal model, the above complex and-refinement structure is reasonable
and does need to be captured and analyzed. For example, one business activity involved
multiple stakeholders and software applications, among which confidential information
was transferred. As such, it was reasonable to identify all such related actors and to
impose corresponding security requirements on each of them (one security goal per actor),
which then lead to the complex and-refinement structure.
9.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we present two case studies that we have performed to validate our holistic
security requirements framework. The first case study was performed by myself, focusing
on evaluating the expressiveness of the three-layer requirements modeling language and
the efficacy of the holistic analysis framework, which is reported in Section 9.1. The
results of the study show that our approach is able to be applied to large-scale STSs and
to generate holistic security solutions to satisfy system security requirements. Based on
the threats to validity we have discussed for the first case study (Section 9.1.4), we have
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carried out the second case study, which was performed by a Master student under the
supervision of Prof. Mylopoulos and myself. This case study is presented in Section 9.2,
the results of which shows our approach can be adopt by people who were not involved
in the development of our approach and has limited security knowledge.
Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the entire thesis and sheds light on our future work. In Sec-
tion 10.1 we conclude the contributions of each part of this thesis. In Section 10.2 we
discuss the limitations of our proposal and envision future research topics we intend to
investigate.
10.1 Conclusions
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive framework that assists
security analysts in analyzing security requirements and generating security solutions for
STSs in a holistic manner. To this respect, instead of dealing with security in a piecemeal
fashion, we proposed a three-layer security requirements analysis framework, which takes
into account the security concerns in different parts of STSs. Also, this framework can
deal with the inherent complexity of STSs by dividing them into three conceptual layers,
and thus tackles the original problem in a divide-and-conquer manner. In particular,
we consider a social layer, a software layer, and an infrastructure layer. Each of these
layers accounts for particular artifacts that need to be designed in STSs. Based on such
division, we concern specific security requirements and solutions in each layer while take
into account the connections among layers. In such a way, we eventually generate holistic
security solutions which provide comprehensive protection for STSs. The proposed frame-
work consists of a three-layer requirements modeling language and a systematic analysis
process for holistically analyzing security requirements across three layers. Specifically,
different analysis methods have been formalized in Disjunctive Datalog, based on which
we have implemented semi-automated support for the entire analysis process.
An important input required by the above holistic security requirements analysis
framework is a collection of threats to the system, which are used to determine the crit-
icality of security requirements. Because of the complexity of STSs, it is challenging
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to identify all potential attacks, especially multistage attacks which assemble individual
attacks from different parts of STSs. The identification of multistage attack within a
socio-technical setting has not not been addressed by existing approaches, imposing a
new research challenge. Therefore, we have developed a holistic security attack analysis
approach as part of our holistic security requirements framework in order to deal with
this particular challenge. This approach takes an attacker’s perspective to analyze attack
strategies, and then operationalizes the strategies into specific attack actions based on a
collection of attack patterns. In particular, we not only advocate taking the attacker’s
perspective but pragmatically analyze attacker’s intentions via realistic attack scenarios.
Moreover, driven by the same pragmatic thought, we leverage practical attack knowledge
from existing attack patterns to operationalize attacker’s anti-goal in terms of concrete
attack behaviors. Specifically, we have modeled 102 existing attack patterns as contextual
goal models, enabling semi-automatic selection among such attack patterns.
One important analysis step of our holistic security requirements analysis is to op-
erationalizing security requirements in terms of security mechanisms. However, such
analysis is a laborious and knowledge-intensive process, especially for large-scale STSs.
This challenge has been further exacerbated by the fact that security knowledge is nor-
mally hard to acquire for system analysts. As a response to such a challenge, we have
developed a systematic approach to efficiently leverage security patterns to accomplish
the operationalization analysis, constituting another important part of the holistic secu-
rity requirements framework. Similar to the attack pattern analysis, we have proposed
to model textual security patterns as contextual goal models in order for semi-automatic
analysis. In particular, we have delved into the practical details about the modeling of
security patterns, and have provided systematic instructions about how to establish con-
textual goal models from textual security patterns. In addition, we have pragmatically
followed such instructions to model 20 reusable security patterns.
During the operationalization analysis, we have realized that two typical operational-
ization methods (i.e., function operationalization and quality operationalization) are not
enough to support the operationalization of security requirements. Specifically, opera-
tionalizing security goals into security mechanisms not only introduces new functions to
the system specification, but also influences existing system functions. Ignoring such im-
pact will result in incomplete or even faulty requirements specifications. As such, we have
proposed a conceptual model for security mechanisms, based on which we have defined
a systematic analysis process to capture and enforce the impact of security mechanisms
imposed on existing system functions.
We have developed a prototype tool to provide semi-automated support for the holistic
security requirements analysis, facilitating the practical adoption of our framework. The
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tool was initially designed to support the three-layer security requirements modeling and
analysis, and has been incrementally enhanced to support the subsequent holistic attack
analysis and security pattern analysis. In particular, the tool helps analysts to deal with
the scalability issues in two ways: firstly, the tool is built on a professional diagramming
application and can well separate the modeling tasks in terms of layers, perfectly imple-
menting the modularity feature provided by our approach. In addition, the prototype tool
inherits many useful modeling features from the diagramming application, relieving the
scalability problem, especially when modeling large-scale STSs. Apart from the modeling
support, our prototype tool also provides useful analysis support, i.e., (semi-)automating
different analysis methods proposed in this thesis. Our tool performs automatic analy-
sis over target models, and then reflects the analysis results in the graphical canvas. In
particular, the prototype tool can automatically generate part of the analytic models,
relieving analysts from manually creating the models.
Apart from the above proposals, we have also performed two case studies with the
aim of collecting empirical evidence about the efficacy of our approach. Specifically, the
first case study was performed by myself on a real smart grid scenario, in which I adopted
the entire proposal in this thesis to holistically analyze security requirements in order for
protecting the metering data. The results of the study show that our approach can identify
holistic security solutions across three layers, and it is scalable to large-scale STSs. In
addition, we have also observed several issues that help us to improve our approach. For
the second case study, we applied our approach to another large-scale STS (i.e., medical
emergency response system). In particular, we adapted our study design from the first
study and had a Master student to apply the holistic analysis approach, who was not
involved in the development of our approach and has limited security knowledge. The
student was first taught the three-layer security requirements analysis framework, and
then used the prototype tool to perform the holistic security requirements analysis under
the supervision of Prof. Mylopoulos and myself. According to the evidence we collected
from this case study, we contend that our approach can be applied by people other than
the method developers.
10.2 Discussion
In this section, we first discuss limitations of the approaches we have proposed in different
parts of the thesis. Next, inspired by our current proposal, we envision a number of future
research directions,
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10.2.1 Limitations
We discuss the limitations of our current proposal from three different aspects: security
knowledge, empirical evaluations, and tool supporting.
Security Knowledge. Since our approach relies on external security/attack knowledge
to perform corresponding analysis, the analysis results are affected by such external knowl-
edge sources. As identified by our case study, the current selection of security patterns
is not enough to cover all threats we have analyzed in the case study; and of course,
there can be further threats that turn out to be not covered by selected security pattern.
Therefore, we need to continuously incorporate additional security patterns into our ap-
proach, reacting to emerging threats. Apart from the coverage of the external knowledge
sources, the quality of the external knowledge sources can also affect our analysis results.
When practically processing existing security patterns and attack patterns, we have al-
ready identified that some of the patterns are incomplete, failing to accommodate all the
required knowledge. To deal with this limitation, we should keep updating our processed
security/attack patterns with regard to the recent advances in the corresponding research
fields.
On the other hand, we argue that this limitation is not specific to our approach, but
is generally applied to all the security analysis approaches that propose to reuse existing
knowledge. As reported in [Souag et al., 2015], the research about knowledge reuse is still
immature, especially lacks automation support. Different from most existing approaches
that only mention the idea of knowledge reuse, our approach has delved into the practical
adoption of knowledge reuse, and thus has encountered the above limitations.
Empirical Evaluations. Although we have performed case studies to evaluate each part
of the thesis, we have acknowledged the needs of collecting further empirical evidence in
regard to the follow aspects: firstly, the case study we have performed with a Master
student provides preliminary evidence that our approach can be adopted in reality by
people that were not involved in the design of the approach. However, we need to further
evaluate our approach with a significant number of participants. To this end, controlled
experiments would be the ideal empirical method to collect such empirical evidence. For
this thesis, the reason of choosing case study as the empirical evaluation method (instead
of controlled experiment) is that the full application of our approach is difficult to control
in terms of time. This argument has also been further verified by our second case study,
in which the student took around three months to completely apply the entire approach.
The main reason of this challenge is because our approach is intended to solve a very
complex and difficult problem, i.e., holistically analyzing security requirements for large-
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scale STSs. To address this challenge, we have planned to first divide the entire approach
into independent parts, and then perform controlled experiments for each of these parts.
For example, we can separate the modeling session from the analysis session. In addition,
a more practical solution is to combine the evaluation of the approach with a security
course, in which students are required to step-by-step adopt the approach during the
entire semester.
Secondly, we need more empirical evidence to account for the quality of our analysis
results. To this end, we plan to have experienced security experts to revise and vali-
date the holistic security solutions produced by our approach. In addition, by involving
security experts in the empirical evaluation of our approach, we also want them to pro-
vide comments and suggestions from a practical perspective, helping us to improve our
approach to tackle more practical problems. In such a way, we want to promote the
practical adoption of our approach.
Thirdly, we have encountered problems of information collection in both of the two case
studies (to different extents). We argue that by involving corresponding domain experts
and directly interacting with them, we are able to collect the information required by
our approach with much less effort. Consequently, we need to collect more empirical
evidence to support such an argument. Ideally, we want to perform further case studies
or action research over a realistic project, in which we are able to directly interact with
corresponding domain experts.
Integration. In this thesis, we have first proposed the three-layer security requirements
analysis framework as an essential contribution (Chapter 4), and then incrementally pro-
pose several approaches that support the application of the three-layer framework (Chap-
ter 5-7). As specified in corresponding chapters, such supporting approaches are applied
to a particular analysis step of the holistic security requirements analysis. In particular,
for each of such supporting approaches, we have demonstrate and evaluate its utility, as
presented in corresponding chapters. However, due to a number of theoretical and practi-
cal gaps, such supporting approaches cannot be fully integrated with the holistic security
requirements analysis, indicating limitations of this thesis.
Specifically, the holistic security attack analysis (Chapter 5) identifies alternative at-
tacks on systems, which are an important input required for identifying critical security
goals. However, beyond such alternative attacks, analysts also need to know the risk level
caused by such attacks. In other words, risk assessment should be performed based on the
alternatives attacks, which is currently not included in our holistic security attack anal-
ysis. As a result, in order to fully integrate the holistic attack analysis into the holistic
security requirements analysis, we need to further extend our current proposal with an
200 Conclusions and Future Work
additional risk assessment module.
For the security pattern analysis (Chapter 6), our proposal targets software security
patterns Fernandez-Buglioni [2013], which has been specified in POSA templates. How-
ever, the organizational security patterns Asnar et al. [2011a] are documented in a different
template, which does not specify the Force section. In order to apply our approach, we
need to manually complement such information, which is a non-trivial task. Moreover, at
the infrastructure layer, currently there are little security patterns have been proposed,
and thus we have to turn to other knowledge sources (e.g., ISO27002) to tentatively cre-
ate security patterns by ourselves, which are incomplete and require for verification. Such
practical obstacles hinder the full application of our security pattern analysis in social
and infrastructure layers, which should be addressed in the future.
Automated Tool Support. In this thesis, we have developed a prototype tool to semi-
automate a number of proposed methods, supporting corresponding analysis. However,
we have acknowledged that part of thesis is able to be (semi-)automated but has not yet.
Specifically, for the attack strategy analysis, which was introduced in Section 5.2, we have
learned and summarized a number of anti-goal refinement methods from realistic attack
scenarios. Currently, we manually follow those methods to refine attacker’s malicious
intentions, but we believe this analysis can be automated to further simplify the holistic
attack analysis. The challenge for automating such analysis is about the sanity check,
which is performed after each step of refinement. This is because such check does require
specific domain knowledge and is normally performed by people. Therefore, a semi-
automatic support can be an appropriate solution, i.e., the tool first helps analysts to
automate one step of anti-goal refinement and then asks for manual check afterwards.
Moreover, as we developed our prototype tool on top of a commercial diagramming
tool, our tool cannot be widely distributed because of permission issues. As a result, for
people who do not have the permission of the diagramming tool, our prototype tool is
unusable. To solve this limitation, a possible solution is to base our prototype tool on
other non-commercial diagramming tool. As introduced in Chapter 8, we have specified a
collection of interfaces in our prototype tool for interacting with graphical models. Thus,
as long as a non-commercial diagramming tool can provide similar interfaces, we are
able to easily plant our prototype tool onto that diagramming tool. We argue that this
is actually a trade-off between usability and availability. On one hand, the commercial
diagramming tool offers very good usability which is important in large-scale modeling; On
the other hand, the non-commercial tool can be widely distributed, although its usability
might not be good. The reason why we choose to use the commercial tool is because in
this thesis we intend to exclusively focus on the efficacy of our holistic analysis approach
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without bothering to deal with the distribution of the tool. Once our approach has been
proven as efficient and useful, then we will start concerning the public availability of our
prototype tool.
10.2.2 Ongoing Work and Future Research Directions
Inspired by the proposal in this thesis, we have identified some additional research direc-
tions that we intend to investigate. In the remainder of this section, we first introduce a
piece of ongoing research about operationalizing requirements with aspectual mechanisms.
Apart from this work, we introduce a number of future research lines.
Operationalizing Requirements with Aspectual Mechanism. Requirements opera-
tionalization amounts to transforming a problem into corresponding solution space, i.e.,
from stakeholder requirements to a specification of the system-to-be. Typically, there are
two complementary ways of performing such operationalization as specified in [Dalpiaz
et al., 2014], targeting functional requirements and quality requirements, respectively.
Firstly, a functional requirement is operationalized into a function, which makes the re-
quirement operational and is able to be implemented by the system-to-be. Secondly, a
quality requirement is operationalized as a constraint on a metric that makes the quality
requirement measurable at runtime. In particular, the functions and quality constraints
that have been used to operationalize stakeholder requirements together constitute a
specification, which are in the same spirit of IEEE standard for requirements specifica-
tions [Committee and Board, 1993].
However, these two ways of operationalization are not enough to represent the oper-
ationalization practices in the real world. In particular, we argue that such operational-
ization methods can be applied to deal with “standalone” requirements that function by
themselves instead of functioning over other requirements. For example, “The system
should measure energy load” can be operationalized into a measurement function, i.e.,
applying the functional operationalization. On the other hand, apart from the standalone
requirements, there are requirements that interact with other requirements, as introduced
by Robinson et al. [2003]. We argue that these two operationalization methods are not
enough for operationalizing such “interactive” requirements. For example, considering a
persistence requirement “a website should remember the states of user activities (e.g.,
adding items into the shopping cart)”. If we apply HTTP cookies as a solution to satisfy
this requirement problem, we not only need to add functions such as read/write cookies,
but should also modify existing functions that affect the states of user activities, i.e.,
constraining such existing functions in the specification to appropriately operate cookies
once changed the user states.
202 Conclusions and Future Work
We propose mechanisms as a complementary operationalization method to tackle the
above challenge. A mechanism is a system of causally interacting parts and processes
that produce one or more effects. In this respect, mechanisms are aspectual in that they
require several elements of a specification to work together to fulfill a requirement, unlike
their functional and quality cousins. In particular, we have observed many requirements
operationalization instances that fall into the category of mechanisms, such as security,
performance, and usability requirements, etc.
Currently, we are investigating a specification language for describing mechanisms.
On one hand, we intend to specify a mechanism as a set of rewrite rules over specifica-
tions. As such, the requirements operationalization amounts to a specification rewriting
problem. On the other hand, we want to preserve the Church-Rosser property during the
specification rewriting.
Runtime Adaptive Security Design. Our proposal in this thesis focuses on designing
secure STSs at the design time, which constitutes an important step in achieving system
security. As contended by Bruce Schneier that “Security is a process, not a product”, we
want to move to the next step of the security process, i.e., designing adaptive security at
runtime. In particular, we want to achieve two objectives: firstly, adjust security designs
in a real-time manner to protect the system from different attacks. Secondly, as security
is not free, the security mechanisms should be switched off whenever possible.
In order to achieve such research objectives, we want to adopt control theory, estab-
lishing a feed-back loop to constantly check the system environment and to react corre-
spondingly. To this end, we need to first precisely capture the system context, based on
which we can determine the security situation. We argue that our holistic attack analysis
approach (Chapter 5) can contribute to this task. Specifically, as we analyze attacker’s
intentions via anti-goal models and associate them with concrete attack actions, we are
able to detect the attack progress of multistage attacks, and thus take countermeasures in
time. Next, for the countermeasures, we should be able to specify a collection of options
of security mechanism reconfiguration, which will be applied at runtime to deal with
particular security situation. For this part, we need to grasp more security knowledge
regarding this task, and we intend to start from a particular application domain, such as
cloud computing.
Flexible Multilayer Security Requirements Framework. Our three-layer requirements
framework is an initial effort to deal with complicated (security) requirements problems
via a multilayer manner, which can be further extended in the future. In particular, the
number and content of layers can be flexible, depending on the scope and the complexity
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of the system. For instance, if the target system is a technical-oriented system and does
not involve the design of the business process, then the framework can only focus on
the application layer and the physical layer. For another example, if the target system
not only deals with the software applications, but also intensively involves issues about
operating systems, then it is better to add an additional operating system layer between
the software layer and the infrastructure layer. Regardless of the structure of layers, we
argue that the analysis of the multilayer framework stays the same.
As such, we intend to propose a flexible multilayer framework based on our current
proposal in order to accommodate holistic security requirements analysis in different do-
mains. Specifically, we want to define a systematic process for adding or removing a
layer to the framework, by following which analysts are able to customize and obtain
their particular multilayer framework that help them to deal with security requirements
analysis in particular domains. Furthermore, although the current three-layer framework
analyzes the influences between layers via a top-down manner, we acknowledge that the
influences can also be propagated in bottom-up manner. For example, an infrastructure
task can create software or social requirements. As such, we also aim to define appropri-
ate mechanisms to allow analysts to perform influence analysis via a bottom-up manner.
Note that after enabling the bottom-up analysis, the overall analysis can be much more
complicated, as there can be an analysis loop among layers. Thus, a criterion for ending
the analysis is required.
Agent-Oriented Attack Simulation. The essence of our holistic attack analysis ap-
proach (Chapter 5) is to pragmatically take an attacker’s perspective and analyze poten-
tial attacks that can be performed by the attacker. In particular, the proposed approach
is intended to reflect how an attacker refines her malicious intentions and operationalizes
it into concrete attack actions. Currently, we manually follow the approach to analyze
one single attacker. As the next step of research, we intend to automate such analysis by
formalizing the proposed anti-goal refinement methods. Therefore, in line with the agent-
oriented paradigm that has been applied in Software Engineering (SE), we can also treat
each attacker as an intelligent agent and thus explore alternative attacks by simulating
different attackers’ behaviors. In particular, each attacker can automatically refine her
malicious goals by using our proposed anti-goal refinement methods and then operational-
ize her malicious intentions into attack actions based on attack patterns. In this way, we
can better explore the space of attack alternatives. Especially, we contend it is important
to take into account the interactions among attackers. This means one attacker can also
communicate/negotiate with other attackers and endeavor to deliver more complicated
and damaging attacks via appropriate collaborations.
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Appendix D
Context Inference Rules for Attack
Patterns
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Attack Pattern Context % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-20 Encryption Brute Forcing 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(20,AG) :- relevant_to(20,AG), has_target(AG,TA), protected_by(TA, 
encryption). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-97 Cryptanalysis 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(97,AG) :- relevant_to(97,AG), has_target(AG,TA), use_technique(TA, 
cryptographic_algorithm). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-49 Password Brute Forcing 
%%%%%%%%%%




% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_detailed_technique, TA, password_throttling_mechanism) :- relevant_to(49, 
AG), has_target(AG,TA), not use_detailed_technique(TA, password_throttling_mechanism), 
not no_use_detailed_technique(TA, password_throttling_mechanism). 
%%% new generated facts can be generated based on the answer to the question 
% use_detailed_technique(TA, password_throttling_mechanism) :- question(use_technique, 
TA, password_throttling_mechanism), yes 
% no_use_detailed_technique(TA, password_throttling_mechanism) :- 
question(use_technique, TA, password_throttling_mechanism), no 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-55 Rainbow Table Password Cracking 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(55,AG) :- relevant_to(55,AG), has_target(AG,TA), protected_by(TA, 
password_based_authentication), use_detailed_technique(TA, salt). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_detailed_technique, TA, salt) :- relevant_to(49, AG), has_target(AG,TA), 
not use_detailed_technique(TA, salt), not no_use_detailed_technique(TA, salt). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-16 Dictionary-based Password Attack 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(16,AG) :- relevant_to(16,AG), has_target(AG,TA), protected_by(TA, 
password_based_authentication), no_use_detailed_technique(TA, sound_password_policy), 
no_use_detailed_technique(TA, password_throttling_mechanism). 
%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%% 
question(use_detailed_technique, TA, password_throttling_mechanism) :- relevant_to(16, 
AG), has_target(AG,TA), not use_detailed_technique(TA, password_throttling_mechanism), 
not no_use_detailed_technique(TA, password_throttling_mechanism). 
question(use_detailed_technique, TA, sound_password_policy) :- relevant_to(16, AG), 
has_target(AG,TA), not use_detailed_technique(TA, sound_password_policy), not 
no_use_detailed_technique(TA, sound_password_policy). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-70 Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(70,AG) :- relevant_to(70,AG), has_target(AG,TA), protected_by(TA, 
password_based_authentication). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-56 Removing/short-circuiting 'guard logic' 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(56,AG) :- relevant_to(56,AG), has_target(AG,TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(56, AG), has_target(AG,TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-66 SQL Injection 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(66,AG) :- relevant_to(66,AG), has_target(AG,TA), use_technique(TA, 
sql_query). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-7 Blind SQL Injection 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(7,AG) :- relevant_to(7,AG), has_target(AG,TA), use_technique(TA, 
sql_query). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-110 SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(110,AG) :- relevant_to(110,AG), has_target(AG,TA), 
use_technique(TA,soap), use_paradigm(TA,soa). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm,TA,soa) :- relevant_to(110,AG), has_target(AG,TA), not 
use_paradigm(TA,soa), not no_use_paradigm(TA,soa). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-109 SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(109, AG) :- relevant_to(109, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_technique(TA, 
soap), accept_user_data(TA), use_paradigm(TA, client_server), 
use_detailed_technique(TA, data_access_layer_by_orm_tool). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(109, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
question(use_detailed_technique, TA, data_access_layer_by_orm_tool) :- relevant_to(109, 
AG), has_target(AG, TA), not use_detailed_technique(TA, data_access_layer_by_orm_tool), 
not no_use_detailed_technique(TA, data_access_layer_by_orm_tool). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-108 Command Line Execution through SQL Injection 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(108, AG) :- relevant_to(108, AG), has_target(AG, TA), trust(TA, 
data_in_the_database). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(trust, TA, data_in_the_database) :- relevant_to(108, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not trust(TA, data_in_the_database), not no_trust(TA, data_in_the_database). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-69 Target Programs with Elevated Privileges 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(69, AG) :- relevant_to(69, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_data_from(TA, _), 
technical_context(TA, run_with_elevated_OS_privileges), technical_context(TA, 
give_away_information_about_itself). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(technical_context, TA, run_with_elevated_OS_privileges) :- relevant_to(69, 
AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, run_with_elevated_OS_privileges), 
not no_technical_context(TA, run_with_elevated_OS_privileges). 
question(technical_context, TA, give_away_information_about_itself) :- relevant_to(69, 
AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, give_away_information_about_itself), 
not no_technical_context(TA, give_away_information_about_itself). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-14 Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(14, AG) :- relevant_to(14, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(14, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-42 MIME Conversion 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(42, AG) :- relevant_to(42, AG), has_target(AG, TA), technical_context(TA, 
use_a_mail_server). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(technical_context, TA, use_a_mail_server) :- relevant_to(42, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, use_a_mail_server), not 
no_technical_context(TA, use_a_mail_server). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-10 Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(10, AG) :- relevant_to(10, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
use_detailed_technique(TA, environment_variables). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_detailed_technique, TA, environment_variables) :- relevant_to(10, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not use_detailed_technique(TA, environment_variables), not 
no_use_detailed_technique(TA, environment_variables). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-24 Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(24, AG) :- relevant_to(24, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_language(TA, 
c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, c_or_c_plus_plus) :- relevant_to(24, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus), not no_use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-67 String Format Overflow in syslog() 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(67, AG) :- relevant_to(67, AG), has_target(AG, TA), accept_user_data(TA), 
use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, c_or_c_plus_plus) :- relevant_to(67, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus), not no_use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-9 String Format Overflow in syslog() 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(9, AG) :- relevant_to(9, AG), has_target(AG, TA), technical_context(TA, 
expose_a_command_line_utility_to_users). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(technical_context, TA, expose_a_command_line_utility_to_users) :- 
relevant_to(9, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
expose_a_command_line_utility_to_users), not no_technical_context(TA, 
expose_a_command_line_utility_to_users). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-8 Buffer Overflow in an API Call 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(8, AG) :- relevant_to(8, AG), has_target(AG, TA), technical_context(TA, 
expose_an_api_to_users). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(technical_context, TA, expose_an_api_to_users) :- relevant_to(8, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, expose_an_api_to_users), not 
no_technical_context(TA, expose_an_api_to_users). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-45 Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(45, AG) :- relevant_to(45, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_language(TA, 
c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, c_or_c_plus_plus) :- relevant_to(45, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus), not no_use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-44 Overflow Binary Resource File 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(44, AG) :- relevant_to(44, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_language(TA, 
c_or_c_plus_plus), technical_context(TA, processes_binary_resource_files). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, c_or_c_plus_plus) :- relevant_to(44, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus), not no_use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
question(technical_context, TA, processes_binary_resource_files) :- relevant_to(44, 
AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, processes_binary_resource_files), 
not no_technical_context(TA, processes_binary_resource_files). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-46 Overflow Variables and Tags 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(46, AG) :- relevant_to(46, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
accept_user_input(TA), use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, c_or_c_plus_plus) :- relevant_to(46, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus), not no_use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-47 Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(47, AG) :- relevant_to(47, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
accept_user_input(TA), use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, c_or_c_plus_plus) :- relevant_to(47, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus), not no_use_language(TA, c_or_c_plus_plus). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-100 Overflow Buffers 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(100, AG) :- relevant_to(100, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
technical_context(TA, perform_buffer_operation), use_language(TA, 
c_or_c_plus_plus_or_ajax_or_perl_or_php_or_vb_or_ruby). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, c_or_c_plus_plus_or_ajax_or_perl_or_php_or_vb_or_ruby) :- 
relevant_to(100, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not use_language(TA, 
c_or_c_plus_plus_or_ajax_or_perl_or_php_or_vb_or_ruby), not no_use_language(TA, 
c_or_c_plus_plus_or_ajax_or_perl_or_php_or_vb_or_ruby). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, perform_buffer_operation) :- relevant_to(100, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, perform_buffer_operation), not 
no_technical_context(TA, perform_buffer_operation). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-22 Exploiting Trust in Client (aka Make the Client Invisible) 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(22, AG) :- relevant_to(22, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
accept_user_input(TA), use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_ntier). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server_or_ntier) :- relevant_to(22, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_ntier), not 
no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_ntier). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(77, AG) :- relevant_to(77, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
accept_user_input(TA), technical_context(TA, a_variable_is_exposed_to_client). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(technical_context, TA, a_variable_is_exposed_to_client) :- relevant_to(77, 
AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, a_variable_is_exposed_to_client), 
not no_technical_context(TA, a_variable_is_exposed_to_client). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-39 Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data Tokens 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(39, AG) :- relevant_to(39, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
accept_user_input(TA). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-94 Man in the Middle Attack 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(94, AG) :- relevant_to(94, AG), has_target(AG, TA), communicate(TA, _), 
not protected_by(TA, encryption). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-13 Subverting Environment Variable Values 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(13, AG) :- relevant_to(13, AG), has_target(AG, TA), accept_user_data(TA), 
technical_context(TA, an_environment_variable_is_accessible_to_the_user). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(technical_context, TA, an_environment_variable_is_accessible_to_the_user) :- 
relevant_to(13, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
an_environment_variable_is_accessible_to_the_user), not no_technical_context(TA, 
an_environment_variable_is_accessible_to_the_user). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-31 Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(31, AG) :- relevant_to(31, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server_or_ntier), technical_context(TA, a_http_daemon_that_relies_on_cookies). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server_or_ntier) :- relevant_to(31, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_ntier), not 
no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_ntier). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, a_http_daemon_that_relies_on_cookies) :- 
relevant_to(31, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
a_http_daemon_that_relies_on_cookies), not no_technical_context(TA, 
a_http_daemon_that_relies_on_cookies). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-57 Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Register Man in the Middle 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(57, AG) :- relevant_to(57, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
soa).
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, soa) :- relevant_to(57, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not 
use_paradigm(TA, soa), not no_use_paradigm(TA, soa). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-219 XML Routing Detour Attacks 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(219, AG) :- relevant_to(219, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server), technical_context(TA, have_multiple_stages_processing_of_XML_content). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(219, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, have_multiple_stages_processing_of_XML_content) :- 
relevant_to(219, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
have_multiple_stages_processing_of_XML_content), not no_technical_context(TA, 
have_multiple_stages_processing_of_XML_content). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-76 Manipulating Input to File System Calls 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(76, AG) :- relevant_to(76, AG), has_target(AG, TA), accept_user_data(TA), 
technical_context(TA, user_controlled_variables_is_applied_directly_to_the_filesystem). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(technical_context, TA, 
user_controlled_variables_is_applied_directly_to_the_filesystem) :- relevant_to(76, 





% CAPEC-122 Privilege Abuse 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(122, AG) :- relevant_to(122, AG), has_target(AG, TA), protected_by(TA, 
access_control). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-180 Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(180, AG) :- relevant_to(180, AG), has_target(AG, TA), protected_by(TA, 
access_control). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-1 Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(1, AG) :- relevant_to(1, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_technique(TA, acl). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-58 Restful Privilege Elevation 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(58, AG) :- relevant_to(58, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
soa).
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, soa) :- relevant_to(58, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not 
use_paradigm(TA, soa), not no_use_paradigm(TA, soa). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-17 Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(17, AG) :- relevant_to(17, AG), has_target(AG, TA), technical_context(TA, 
user_can_directly_access_executable_files_or_upload_files_to_execute). 
%%%% 









% CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(115, AG) :- relevant_to(115, AG), has_target(AG, TA), protected_by(TA, 
authentication). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-237 Calling Signed Code From Another Language Within A Sandbox Allow This 
%%%%%%%%%%




% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_language, TA, java_or_asp_net_or_c_sharp_or_jsp) :- relevant_to(237, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not use_language(TA, java_or_asp_net_or_c_sharp_or_jsp), not 
no_use_language(TA, java_or_asp_net_or_c_sharp_or_jsp). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, deployed_code_signed_by_its_authoring_vendor) :- 
relevant_to(237, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
deployed_code_signed_by_its_authoring_vendor), not no_technical_context(TA, 
deployed_code_signed_by_its_authoring_vendor). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-114 Authentication Abuse 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(114, AG) :- relevant_to(114, AG), has_target(AG, TA), protected_by(TA, 
authentication). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-90 Reflection Attack in Authentication Protocol 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(90, AG) :- relevant_to(90, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server_or_soa). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server_or_soa) :- relevant_to(90, AG), has_target(AG, 




% CAPEC-21 Exploitation of Session Variables, Resource IDs and other Trusted 
Credentials 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(21, AG) :- relevant_to(21, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server_or_soa_or_ntier). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server_or_soa_or_ntier) :- relevant_to(21, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_soa_or_ntier), not 
no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_soa_or_ntier). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-62 Cross Site Request Forgery (aka Session Riding) 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(62, AG) :- relevant_to(62, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server), use_framework(TA, j2ee_or_dot_net). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(62, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
% 
question(use_framework, TA, j2ee_or_dot_net) :- relevant_to(62, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_framework(TA, j2ee_or_dot_net), not no_use_framework(TA, j2ee_or_dot_net). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-102 Session Sidejacking 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(102, AG) :- relevant_to(102, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not 
protected_by(TA, secure_communication_mechanism), use_paradigm(TA, client_server), 
use_language(TA, ajax), technical_context(TA, 
has_an_active_session_with_a_target_system). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(102, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, has_an_active_session_with_a_target_system) :- 
relevant_to(102, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 




% CAPEC-61 Session Fixation 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(61, AG) :- relevant_to(61, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 






% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(61, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
% 
question(use_framework, TA, j2ee_or_dot_net) :- relevant_to(61, AG), has_target(AG, 











identifiers) :- relevant_to(61, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
use_permissive_session_management_mechanism_that_accepts_random_user_generated_session_




% CAPEC-60 Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(60, AG) :- relevant_to(60, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 




% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(60, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
% 
question(use_framework, TA, j2ee_or_dot_net) :- relevant_to(60, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_framework(TA, j2ee_or_dot_net), not no_use_framework(TA, j2ee_or_dot_net). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, use_session_id_to_track_users) :- relevant_to(60, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, use_session_id_to_track_users), not 
no_technical_context(TA, use_session_id_to_track_users). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, use_session_id_to_control_access_to_resources) :- 
relevant_to(60, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
use_session_id_to_control_access_to_resources), not no_technical_context(TA, 
use_session_id_to_control_access_to_resources). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-196 Session Credential Falsification through Forging 
%%%%%%%%%%




% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server_or_soa) :- relevant_to(196, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not use_paradigm(TA, client_server_or_soa), not no_use_paradigm(TA, 
client_server_or_soa). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, use_session_credentials_to_identify_legitimate_users) 
:- relevant_to(196, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
use_session_credentials_to_identify_legitimate_users), not no_technical_context(TA, 
use_session_credentials_to_identify_legitimate_users). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-59 Session Credential Falsification through Prediction 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(59, AG) :- relevant_to(59, AG), has_target(AG, TA), use_paradigm(TA, 





% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(use_paradigm, TA, client_server) :- relevant_to(59, AG), has_target(AG, TA), 
not use_paradigm(TA, client_server), not no_use_paradigm(TA, client_server). 
% 
question(use_framework, TA, j2ee_or_dot_net) :- relevant_to(59, AG), has_target(AG, 
TA), not use_framework(TA, j2ee_or_dot_net), not no_use_framework(TA, j2ee_or_dot_net). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, use_session_id_to_track_users) :- relevant_to(59, AG), 
has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, use_session_id_to_track_users), not 
no_technical_context(TA, use_session_id_to_track_users). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, use_session_id_to_control_access_to_resources) :- 
relevant_to(59, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
use_session_id_to_control_access_to_resources), not no_technical_context(TA, 
use_session_id_to_control_access_to_resources). 
% 
question(technical_context, TA, use_session_ids_that_are_predictable) :- 
relevant_to(59, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not technical_context(TA, 
use_session_ids_that_are_predictable), not no_technical_context(TA, 
use_session_ids_that_are_predictable). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-522 Malicious Hardware Component Replacement 
%%%%%%%%%%








_at_the_victim_location) :- relevant_to(522, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not 
other_context(TA, 
can_be_physically_accessed_after_it_has_left_the_manufacturer_but_before_it_is_deployed




% CAPEC-524 Rogue Integration Procedures 
%%%%%%%%%%








_at_the_victim_location) :- relevant_to(524, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not 
other_context(TA, 
can_be_physically_accessed_after_it_has_left_the_manufacturer_but_before_it_is_deployed




% CAPEC-523 Malicious Software Implanted 
%%%%%%%%%%








_at_the_victim_location) :- relevant_to(523, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not 
other_context(TA, 
can_be_physically_accessed_after_it_has_left_the_manufacturer_but_before_it_is_deployed




% CAPEC-537 Infiltration of Hardware Development Environment 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(537, AG) :- relevant_to(537, AG), has_target(AG, TA), other_context(TA, 
use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(other_context, TA, use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide) 
:- relevant_to(537, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not other_context(TA, 
use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide), not no_other_context(TA, 
use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-511 Infiltration of Hardware Development Environment 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(511, AG) :- relevant_to(511, AG), has_target(AG, TA), other_context(TA, 
use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide). 
%%%% 
% question uncheckable context 
%%%% 
question(other_context, TA, use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide) 
:- relevant_to(511, AG), has_target(AG, TA), not other_context(TA, 
use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide), not no_other_context(TA, 
use_email_or_removable_media_from_systems_running_the_ide). 
%%%%%%%%%%
% CAPEC-520 Counterfeit Hardware Component Inserted During Product Assembly 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(520, AG) :- relevant_to(520, AG), has_target(AG, TA), other_context(TA, 
can_either_be_physically_accessed_or_supplied_by_malicious_hardware). 
%%%% 









% CAPEC-516 Hardware Component Substitution During Baselining 
%%%%%%%%%%
applicable_to(516, AG) :- relevant_to(516, AG), has_target(AG, TA), other_context(TA, 
can_either_be_physically_accessed_or_supplied_by_malicious_hardware). 
%%%% 









Attack Pattern Validation Results
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Energy consumption data, 
Target: Undetermined, 
Interval:  Realtime pricing is 
applied
Threat: Tampering, 




Asset: Energy consumption data, 
Target: Undetermined, 
Interval: Collect load info
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Energy consumption data, 





Asset: Energy management 
application, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Elevation of privilege  





Asset: Energy management application, 
Target: Energy management application, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Energy management application, 





Threat: Elevation of privilege (Reach), 
Asset: Energy supplier server,  
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Elevation of privilege (Access), 
Asset: Energy supplier server,  
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Reach, 
Asset: Energy supplier server, 
Target: Energy supplier server, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Elevation of privilege (Access), 
Asset: Energy supplier server, 
Target: Energy supplier server, 
Interval: Generate bill
Target-based refinement Target-based refinement
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 




Asset: Energy consumption data, 
Target: Undetermined, 




Asset: Energy consumption data, 
Target: Smart meter firmware, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Energy consumption data, 
Target: Energy management 
application, 




Asset: Energy management 
application, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat-based refinement
Threat: Elevation of privilege, 
Asset: Energy management application, 
Target: Energy management application, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Elevation of privilege, 
Asset: Energy management application, 








Asset: Energy management application, 
Target: Energy management application, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Elevation of privilege, 
Asset: Energy management application, 
Target: Energy management application, 
Interval: Generate bill
Target-based refinement







Asset: Energy management application, 
Target: Energy management application, 
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Target-based refinement
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Encryption, 
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Protection-based refinement
Target-based refinement
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Encryption, 
Target: Encryption, 
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Smart meter firmware, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat: Elevation of privilege  
Asset: Smart meter firmwire, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Smart meter firmware, 
Target: Smart meter firmware, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat-based refinement
Threat: Elevation of privilege, 
Asset: Smart meter firmware, 
Target: Smart meter firmware, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Smart meter firmware, 
Target: Smart meter device, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Target-based refinement
Threat: Elevation of privilege (Reach), 
Asset: Smart meter device,  
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Threat: Elevation of privilege (Access), 
Asset: Smart meter device,  
Interval: Calculating new price
Threat: Elevation of privilege, 
Asset: Smart meter firmware, 
Target: Smart meter device, 




Threat: Elevation of privilege (Reach), 
Asset: Smart meter device,
Target: Smart meter device,  
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Physical lock, 
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Protection-based refinement
Target-based refinement
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Physical lock,
 Target: Physical lock,
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Protection-based refinement
Threat: Elevation of privilege (Access), 
Asset: Energy supplier server, 
Target: Energy supplier server, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Authorization, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Physical access control, 
Target: Physical access control, 
Interval: Generate bill
Target-based refinement






Threat: Elevation of privilege (Access), 
Asset: Smart meter device,
Target: Smart meter device,  
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Threat-based refinement
Protection-based refinement
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Password-Based authorization, 
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Protection-based refinement
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Smart meter firmware, 
Target: Smart meter firmware, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat: Elevation of privilege, 
Asset: Smart meter firmware, 
Target: Smart meter firmware, 
Interval: Communicate with smart 
meter
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Password-Based authorization,
Target: Password-Based authorization 
Interval: Communicate with smart meter
Target-based refinement
Threat: Tampering, 
Asset: Energy consumption data, 
Target: Energy supplier database, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Elevation of privilege,  
Asset: Energy supplier database, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Elevation of privilege,  
Asset: Energy supplier database,





Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Firewall, 
Interval: Generate bill
Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Input Guard, 
Interval: Generate bill
Target-based refinement Target-based refinement




Threat: Defeated security mechanism, 
Asset: Input Guard,
Target: Input Guard, 
Interval: Generate bill
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